April 2018 Archives by thread

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Starting: Sun Apr 1 05:15:39 UTC 2018
Ending: Mon Apr 30 21:35:38 UTC 2018
Messages: 459

• [PATCH] security: Split out hook definitions into lsm_hook_types.h   Sargun Dhillon
• [PATCH v4 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH v4 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH v4 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Igor Stoppa
    • [PATCH v4 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Peter Dolding
      • [PATCH v4 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Igor Stoppa
      • [PATCH v4 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Peter Dolding
      • [PATCH v4 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v4 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Sargun Dhillon
• [PATCH] security: remove security_settime   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH] security: remove security_settime   Sargun Dhillon
    • [PATCH] security: remove security_settime   James Morris
  • [PATCH] security: remove security_settime   James Morris
• [PATCH 0/4] security: Split out hook definitions into lsm_hook_types.h   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH 2/4] security: Refactor security hooks into structured hooks   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH 3/4] security: Make security_hook_heads use definitions in lsm_hook_types.h   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH 4/4] security: generated security hook initialization based on lsm_hook_types.h   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH 0/4] security: Split out hook definitions into lsm_hook_types.h   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH 0/4] security: Split out hook definitions into lsm_hook_types.h   Sargun Dhillon
• [PATCH v3 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time   Tetsuo Handa
• [RFC v3 0/2] WhiteEgret LSM module   Serge E. Hallyn
  • [RFC v3 0/2] WhiteEgret LSM module   shinya1.takumi at toshiba.co.jp
    • [RFC v3 0/2] WhiteEgret LSM module   Serge E. Hallyn
      • [RFC v3 0/2] WhiteEgret LSM module   shinya1.takumi at toshiba.co.jp
• [PATCH bpf-next v8 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing   Tycho Andersen
• [REVIEW][PATCH 11/11] ipc/sem: Fix semctl(..., GETPID, ...) between pid namespaces   Manfred Spraul
• [GIT PULL][SECURITY] general changes for v4.17   James Morris
• [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support   Stefan Berger
  • [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support   Dr. Greg Wettstein
• [PATCH] tpm: moves the delay_msec increment after sleep in tpm_transmit()   Nayna Jain
  • [PATCH] tpm: moves the delay_msec increment after sleep in tpm_transmit()   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [PATCH] tpm: moves the delay_msec increment after sleep in tpm_transmit()   Nayna Jain
      • [PATCH] tpm: moves the delay_msec increment after sleep in tpm_transmit()   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [PATCH] tpm: moves the delay_msec increment after sleep in tpm_transmit()   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH] tpm: moves the delay_msec increment after sleep in tpm_transmit()   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [PATCH] tpm: moves the delay_msec increment after sleep in tpm_transmit()   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
  • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Kees Cook
    • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
  • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   David Howells
    • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Alexei Starovoitov
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   David Howells
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   David Howells
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   David Howells
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Alan Cox
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   David Howells
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Alan Cox
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Greg Kroah-Hartman
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Theodore Y. Ts'o
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Greg Kroah-Hartman
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Theodore Y. Ts'o
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Greg Kroah-Hartman
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Mike Galbraith
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   David Howells
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Theodore Y. Ts'o
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   David Howells
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Justin Forbes
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Peter Dolding
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Peter Dolding
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Peter Dolding
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Justin Forbes
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Jann Horn
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   David Howells
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   David Howells
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Eric W. Biederman
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   David Howells
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   David Howells
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   David Howells
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Kees Cook
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Kees Cook
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Peter Jones
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Thomas Gleixner
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Andy Lutomirski
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Peter Dolding
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Al Viro
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
• [RFC PATCH v1] fw_lockdown: new micro LSM module to prevent loading unsigned firmware   Andy Lutomirski
  • [RFC PATCH v1] fw_lockdown: new micro LSM module to prevent loading unsigned firmware   Luis R. Rodriguez
    • [RFC PATCH v1] fw_lockdown: new micro LSM module to prevent loading unsigned firmware   Luis R. Rodriguez
• [PATCH v2 1/5] selinux:Remove direct references to policydb.   peter enderborg
  • [PATCH v2 1/5] selinux:Remove direct references to policydb.   Paul Moore
• [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Ard Biesheuvel
  • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   James Morris
  • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Alan Cox
• [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v4.17   Paul Moore
  • [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v4.17   Linus Torvalds
    • [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v4.17   Richard Haines
      • [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v4.17   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v4.17   Paul Moore
      • [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v4.17   Richard Haines
      • [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v4.17   Xin Long
      • [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v4.17   Richard Haines
      • [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v4.17   Richard Haines
      • [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v4.17   Xin Long
    • [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v4.17   Xin Long
      • [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v4.17   Paul Moore
• [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Linus Torvalds
• [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Alexei Starovoitov
  • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Matthew Garrett
    • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   joeyli
  • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   joeyli
    • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Alexei Starovoitov
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   Daniel Borkmann
      • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot   joeyli
• An actual suggestion (Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot)   Andy Lutomirski
  • An actual suggestion (Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot)   David Howells
    • An actual suggestion (Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot)   Jann Horn
      • An actual suggestion (Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot)   David Howells
      • An actual suggestion (Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot)   joeyli
    • An actual suggestion (Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot)   Andy Lutomirski
    • An actual suggestion (Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot)   James Morris
      • An actual suggestion (Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot)   Matthew Garrett
    • An actual suggestion (Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot)   joeyli
      • An actual suggestion (Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot)   Mimi Zohar
      • An actual suggestion (Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot)   jlee at suse.com
  • An actual suggestion (Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot)   joeyli
• Updates on ima digest list feature   Roberto Sassu
• [PATCH v4 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Peter Dolding
  • [PATCH v4 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Peter Dolding
• [PATCH v4 0/4] Migrate all TPM 2.0 commands to use struct tpm_buf   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name   Randy Dunlap
  • [PATCH] uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name   David Howells
    • [PATCH] uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name   Mat Martineau
  • [PATCH] uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name   Sasha Levin
• [PATCH] tpm: tpm_crb: relinquish locality on error path.   Tomas Winkler
  • [PATCH] tpm: tpm_crb: relinquish locality on error path.   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [PATCH] tpm: tpm_crb: relinquish locality on error path.   Winkler, Tomas
      • [PATCH] tpm: tpm_crb: relinquish locality on error path.   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [PATCH] tpm: tpm_crb: relinquish locality on error path.   Winkler, Tomas
      • [PATCH] tpm: tpm_crb: relinquish locality on error path.   Winkler, Tomas
      • [PATCH] tpm: tpm_crb: relinquish locality on error path.   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [PATCH] tpm: tpm_crb: relinquish locality on error path.   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [PATCH] tpm: tpm_crb: relinquish locality on error path.   Winkler, Tomas
      • [PATCH] tpm: tpm_crb: relinquish locality on error path.   Winkler, Tomas
• [GIT PULL][SECURITY] Smack updates for v4.17   James Morris
• [GIT PULL][SECURITY] TPM updates for v4.17   James Morris
• [GIT PULL][SECURITY] Integrity updates for v4.17   James Morris
• [PATCH v5 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Sargun Dhillon
• [PATCH v5 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH v5 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time   Tetsuo Handa
    • [PATCH v5 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time   Sargun Dhillon
      • [PATCH v5 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH v5 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time   Sargun Dhillon
      • [PATCH v5 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH v5 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time   Paul Moore
• [PATCH 0/5 V2] tpm: timeouts revamp   Ken Goldman
• [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock programs per process hierarchy   Andy Lutomirski
• [ANNOUNCE] Linux Security Summit North America 2018 - CFP   James Morris
• [PATCH ghak46 V1] audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record   Richard Guy Briggs
  • [PATCH ghak46 V1] audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record   Paul Moore
    • [PATCH ghak46 V1] audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record   Paul Moore
      • [PATCH ghak46 V1] audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record   Richard Guy Briggs
      • [PATCH ghak46 V1] audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record   Paul Moore
  • [PATCH ghak46 V1] audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record   Ondrej Mosnacek
    • [PATCH ghak46 V1] audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record   Richard Guy Briggs
      • [PATCH ghak46 V1] audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record   Ondrej Mosnacek
      • [PATCH ghak46 V1] audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record   Steve Grubb
• [PATCH ghak47 V1] audit: normalize MAC_POLICY_LOAD record   Richard Guy Briggs
  • [PATCH ghak47 V1] audit: normalize MAC_POLICY_LOAD record   Paul Moore
    • [PATCH ghak47 V1] audit: normalize MAC_POLICY_LOAD record   Paul Moore
• [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock programs per process hierarchy   Alexei Starovoitov
• KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in xattr_getsecurity   Eric W. Biederman
  • KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in xattr_getsecurity   Serge E. Hallyn
  • KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in xattr_getsecurity   Tetsuo Handa
    • KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in xattr_getsecurity   Tetsuo Handa
  • KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in xattr_getsecurity   James Morris
• [PATCH 00/24] security: Add kernel lockdown   David Howells
• [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   David Howells
  • [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Jann Horn
  • [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Randy Dunlap
    • [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   David Howells
    • [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Miguel Ojeda
  • [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Linus Torvalds
    • [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Justin Forbes
    • [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Jordan Glover
      • [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Linus Torvalds
      • [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Justin Forbes
      • [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Linus Torvalds
  • [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH 02/24] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown   David Howells
  • [PATCH 02/24] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown   Jann Horn
• [PATCH 03/24] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode   David Howells
• [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 06/24] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
  • [PATCH 06/24] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH 06/24] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
    • [PATCH 06/24] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH 06/24] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 07/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 08/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 09/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 10/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 11/24] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 12/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 13/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 14/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 15/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 16/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 17/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL   David Howells
• [PATCH 18/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   David Howells
  • [PATCH 18/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   Randy Dunlap
• [PATCH 19/24] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   David Howells
• [PATCH 20/24] Lock down /proc/kcore   David Howells
• [PATCH 21/24] Lock down kprobes   David Howells
• [PATCH 22/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 23/24] Lock down perf   David Howells
• [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
  • [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Randy Dunlap
  • [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Eric W. Biederman
  • [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Greg KH
    • [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
      • [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Greg KH
      • [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Andy Lutomirski
      • [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Greg KH
      • [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Greg KH
• [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH] security: Remove unused field from security_hook_list   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH] security: Remove unused field from security_hook_list   Tetsuo Handa
    • [PATCH] security: Remove unused field from security_hook_list   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH v6 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH v6 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time   Sargun Dhillon
    • [PATCH v6 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH v6 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time   Sargun Dhillon
      • [PATCH v6 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH 0/3] kexec: limit kexec_load syscall   Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH 1/3] ima: based on the "secure_boot" policy limit syscalls   Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH 2/3] kexec: call LSM hook for kexec_load syscall   Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH 3/3] ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images   Mimi Zohar
• [RFC PATCH v22 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data   Igor Stoppa
  • [PATCH 1/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct   Igor Stoppa
  • [PATCH 2/6] vmalloc: rename llist field in vmap_area   Igor Stoppa
  • [PATCH 3/6] Protectable Memory   Igor Stoppa
  • [PATCH 4/6] Documentation for Pmalloc   Igor Stoppa
  • [PATCH 5/6] Pmalloc selftest   Igor Stoppa
  • [PATCH 6/6] lkdtm: crash on overwriting protected pmalloc var   Igor Stoppa
• [PATCH] lockdown: fix coordination of kernel module signature verification   Mimi Zohar
• [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support   Mimi Zohar
  • [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support   John Johansen
    • [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support   Mimi Zohar
      • [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support   Eric W. Biederman
      • [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support   Mimi Zohar
      • [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support   John Johansen
      • [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support   Stefan Berger
      • [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support   John Johansen
      • [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support   Stefan Berger
      • [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support   Eric W. Biederman
• [manpages PATCH] capabilities.7: describe namespaced file capabilities   Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
  • [manpages PATCH] capabilities.7: describe namespaced file capabilities   Jann Horn
    • [manpages PATCH] capabilities.7: describe namespaced file capabilities   Serge E. Hallyn
  • [manpages PATCH] capabilities.7: describe namespaced file capabilities   Serge E. Hallyn
• [manpages PATCH] capabilities.7: describe namespaced file capabilities   Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
  • [manpages PATCH] capabilities.7: describe namespaced file capabilities   Serge E. Hallyn
    • [manpages PATCH] capabilities.7: describe namespaced file capabilities   Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
      • [manpages PATCH] capabilities.7: describe namespaced file capabilities   Serge E. Hallyn
      • [manpages PATCH] capabilities.7: describe namespaced file capabilities   Eric W. Biederman
• [RFC PATCH] rootfs: force mounting rootfs as tmpfs   Mimi Zohar
• Proposal   MS Zeliha Omer Faruk
• [PATCH v2 0/2] tpm: improving granularity in poll sleep times   Nayna Jain
• [PATCH v2 1/2] tpm: reduce poll sleep time in tpm_transmit()   Nayna Jain
  • [PATCH v2 1/2] tpm: reduce poll sleep time in tpm_transmit()   Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH v2 1/2] tpm: reduce poll sleep time in tpm_transmit()   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v2 2/2] tpm: reduce polling time to usecs for even finer granularity   Nayna Jain
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] tpm: reduce polling time to usecs for even finer granularity   Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] tpm: reduce polling time to usecs for even finer granularity   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v2] X.509: unpack RSA signatureValue field from BIT STRING   Maciej S. Szmigiero
  • [PATCH v2] X.509: unpack RSA signatureValue field from BIT STRING   Kamil Konieczny
    • [PATCH v2] X.509: unpack RSA signatureValue field from BIT STRING   Maciej S. Szmigiero
• [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support   John Johansen
• [PATCH 00/24] VFS: Introduce filesystem context [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 01/24] vfs: Undo an overly zealous MS_RDONLY -> SB_RDONLY conversion [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 02/24] VFS: Suppress MS_* flag defs within the kernel unless explicitly enabled [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 03/24] VFS: Introduce the structs and doc for a filesystem context [ver #7]   David Howells
    • [PATCH 03/24] VFS: Introduce the structs and doc for a filesystem context [ver #7]   Randy Dunlap
  • [PATCH 04/24] VFS: Add LSM hooks for filesystem context [ver #7]   David Howells
    • [PATCH 04/24] VFS: Add LSM hooks for filesystem context [ver #7]   Paul Moore
      • [PATCH 04/24] VFS: Add LSM hooks for filesystem context [ver #7]   David Howells
      • [PATCH 04/24] VFS: Add LSM hooks for filesystem context [ver #7]   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH 04/24] VFS: Add LSM hooks for filesystem context [ver #7]   David Howells
      • [PATCH 04/24] VFS: Add LSM hooks for filesystem context [ver #7]   Stephen Smalley
  • [PATCH 05/24] apparmor: Implement security hooks for the new mount API [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 06/24] tomoyo: Implement security hooks for the new mount API [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 07/24] smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 09/24] VFS: Implement a filesystem superblock creation/configuration context [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 10/24] VFS: Remove unused code after filesystem context changes [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 11/24] procfs: Move proc_fill_super() to fs/proc/root.c [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 12/24] proc: Add fs_context support to procfs [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 13/24] ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 14/24] cpuset: Use fs_context [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 15/24] kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 16/24] hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 17/24] VFS: Remove kern_mount_data() [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 18/24] VFS: Implement fsopen() to prepare for a mount [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 19/24] VFS: Implement fsmount() to effect a pre-configured mount [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 20/24] afs: Fix server record deletion [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 21/24] net: Export get_proc_net() [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 22/24] afs: Add fs_context support [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 23/24] afs: Implement namespacing [ver #7]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 24/24] afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount [ver #7]   David Howells
• [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 07/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
  • [PATCH 07/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Andy Lutomirski
• Representative Needed.   PPMC OFFSHORE
• [PATCH 0/3] Introduce LSM-hook for socketpair(2)   David Herrmann
  • [PATCH 0/3] Introduce LSM-hook for socketpair(2)   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 0/3] Introduce LSM-hook for socketpair(2)   Serge E. Hallyn
  • [PATCH 0/3] Introduce LSM-hook for socketpair(2)   James Morris
    • [PATCH 0/3] Introduce LSM-hook for socketpair(2)   David Miller
    • [PATCH 0/3] Introduce LSM-hook for socketpair(2)   Paul Moore
      • [PATCH 0/3] Introduce LSM-hook for socketpair(2)   James Morris
• [PATCH 1/3] security: add hook for socketpair(AF_UNIX, ...)   David Herrmann
• [PATCH 2/3] net/unix: hook unix_socketpair() into LSM   David Herrmann
  • [PATCH 2/3] net/unix: hook unix_socketpair() into LSM   Paul Moore
    • [PATCH 2/3] net/unix: hook unix_socketpair() into LSM   David Miller
      • [PATCH 2/3] net/unix: hook unix_socketpair() into LSM   Paul Moore
• [PATCH 3/3] selinux: provide unix_stream_socketpair callback   David Herrmann
  • [PATCH 3/3] selinux: provide unix_stream_socketpair callback   Stephen Smalley
• Security tree merge to v4.17-rc2   James Morris
  • Security tree merge to v4.17-rc2   Casey Schaufler
    • Security tree merge to v4.17-rc2   Tetsuo Handa
      • Security tree merge to v4.17-rc2   Casey Schaufler
      • Security tree merge to v4.17-rc2   James Morris
      • Security tree merge to v4.17-rc2   Casey Schaufler
      • Security tree merge to v4.17-rc2   James Morris
• [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation   Tycho Andersen
  • [PATCH 2/3] dh key: get rid of stack allocated array   Tycho Andersen
  • [PATCH 3/3] dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroes   Tycho Andersen
    • [PATCH 3/3] dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroes   Tycho Andersen
  • [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation   Eric Biggers
    • [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation   Tycho Andersen
      • [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation   Tycho Andersen
      • [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation   Serge E. Hallyn
      • [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation   Tycho Andersen
      • [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH 7/9] Pmalloc Rare Write: modify selected pools   Igor Stoppa
  • [PATCH 7/9] Pmalloc Rare Write: modify selected pools   Igor Stoppa
• [PATCH 7/9] Pmalloc Rare Write: modify selected pools   Igor Stoppa
• [PATCH 9/9] Protect SELinux initialized state with pmalloc   Stephen Smalley
  • [PATCH 9/9] Protect SELinux initialized state with pmalloc   Igor Stoppa
• [PATCH v3 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation   Tycho Andersen
  • [PATCH v3 2/3] dh key: get rid of stack allocated array   Tycho Andersen
  • [PATCH v3 3/3] dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroes   Tycho Andersen
• [PATCH v3 2/5] efi: Add embedded peripheral firmware support   Luis R. Rodriguez
  • [PATCH v3 2/5] efi: Add embedded peripheral firmware support   Mimi Zohar
    • [PATCH v3 2/5] efi: Add embedded peripheral firmware support   Luis R. Rodriguez
• [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH v7 1/6] security: Move LSM registration arguments to struct lsm_info   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH v7 2/6] security: Make security_hook_heads private   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH v7 3/6] security: Introduce mutable (RW) hooks   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH v7 4/6] security: Expose security_add_hooks externally and add error handling   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH v7 5/6] security: Panic on forced unloading of security module   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH v7 6/6] security: Add SECURITY_UNREGISTRABLE_HOOKS to allow for hook removal   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Tetsuo Handa
    • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Sargun Dhillon
      • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Sargun Dhillon
      • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Sargun Dhillon
      • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Sargun Dhillon
      • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Sargun Dhillon
      • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Sargun Dhillon
      • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   James Morris
      • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Sargun Dhillon
  • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Sargun Dhillon
    • [PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 7/9] Pmalloc Rare Write: modify selected pools   Igor Stoppa
• [PATCH 07/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Rafael J. Wysocki
• [PATCH 07/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Jiri Kosina
• Extracting written string from the write syscall   Casey Schaufler
  • Extracting written string from the write syscall   Sargun Dhillon
    • Extracting written string from the write syscall   Casey Schaufler
• Extracting written string from the write syscall   Richard Guy Briggs
• [PATCH 0/3] Better integrate seccomp logging and auditing   Tyler Hicks
• [PATCH 1/3] seccomp: Separate read and write code for actions_logged sysctl   Tyler Hicks
• [PATCH 2/3] seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctl   Tyler Hicks
• [PATCH 3/3] seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when logging   Tyler Hicks
• [PATCH 0/3] linux-next: mm: hardening: Track genalloc allocations   Igor Stoppa
  • [PATCH 1/3] genalloc: track beginning of allocations   Igor Stoppa
  • [PATCH 2/3] Add label and license to genalloc.rst   Igor Stoppa
  • [PATCH 3/3] genalloc: selftest   Igor Stoppa
    • [PATCH 3/3] genalloc: selftest   Randy Dunlap
      • [PATCH 3/3] genalloc: selftest   Igor Stoppa
    • [PATCH 3/3] genalloc: selftest   kbuild test robot
    • [PATCH 3/3] genalloc: selftest   kbuild test robot
  • [PATCH 0/3] linux-next: mm: hardening: Track genalloc allocations   Matthew Wilcox
    • [PATCH 0/3] linux-next: mm: hardening: Track genalloc allocations   Igor Stoppa
      • [PATCH 0/3] linux-next: mm: hardening: Track genalloc allocations   Igor Stoppa

Last message date: Mon Apr 30 21:35:38 UTC 2018
Archived on: Mon Apr 30 21:35:48 UTC 2018

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