[GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot

Eric W. Biederman ebiederm at xmission.com
Wed Apr 4 15:43:57 UTC 2018

David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com> writes:

> Andy Lutomirski <luto at kernel.org> wrote:
>> As far as I can tell, what's really going on here is that there's a
>> significant contingent here that wants to prevent Linux from
>> chainloading something that isn't Linux.
> You have completely the wrong end of the stick.  No one has said that or even
> implied that.  You are alleging dishonesty on our part.
> What we *have* said is that *if* we want to pass the secure boot state across
> kexec, then we have to make sure that:
>  (1) no one tampers with the intermediate kernel between boot and kexec
>      otherwise the secure boot state is effectively invalidated, and
>  (2) the image that gets kexec'ed is trusted.
> Remember: you cannot know (2) if you don't have (1).
> And if someone tampers with the aim of breaking, say, Windows, then someone,
> e.g.  Microsoft, might blacklist the shim.

*Wow*   You just denied this isn't about not booting Windows and a few
lines later said that is your concern.

I was thinking I would have to dig up old archives where I had been told
this before, but you just nicely repeated all of the old arguments so I
don't see the point.

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