[GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
torvalds at linux-foundation.org
Tue Apr 3 22:46:11 UTC 2018
On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 3:39 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto at kernel.org> wrote:
> Sure. I have no problem with having an upstream kernel have a
> lockdown feature, although I think that feature should distinguish
> between reads and writes. But I don't think the upstream kernel
> should apply a patch that ties any of this to Secure Boot without a
> genuine technical reason why it makes sense.
So this is where I violently agree with Andy.
For example, I love signed kernel modules. The fact that I love them
has absolutely zero to do with secure boot, though. There is
absolutely no linkage between the two issues: I use (self-)signed
kernel modules simply because I think it's a good thing in general.
The same thing is true of some lockdown patch. Maybe it's a good thing
in general. But whether it's a good thing is _entirely_ independent of
any secure boot issue. I can see using secure boot without it, but I
can very much also see using lockdown without secure boot.
The two things are simply entirely orthogonal. They have _zero_
overlap. I'm not seeing why they'd be linked at all in any way.
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