[PATCH ghak47 V1] audit: normalize MAC_POLICY_LOAD record

Paul Moore paul at paul-moore.com
Tue Apr 17 21:55:40 UTC 2018


On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 5:11 PM, Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 7:36 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb at redhat.com> wrote:
>> The audit MAC_POLICY_LOAD record had redundant dangling keywords and was
>> missing information about which LSM was responsible and its completion
>> status.  While this record is only issued on success, the parser expects
>> the res= field to be present.
>>
>> Old record:
>> type=MAC_POLICY_LOAD msg=audit(1479299795.404:43): policy loaded auid=0 ses=1
>>
>> Delete the redundant dangling keywords, add the lsm= field and the res=
>> field.
>>
>> New record:
>> type=MAC_POLICY_LOAD msg=audit(1523293846.204:894): auid=0 ses=1 lsm=selinux res=1
>>
>> See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/47
>> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb at redhat.com>
>> ---
>>  security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 2 +-
>>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
>> index 00b21b2..496915a 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
>> @@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>>
>>  out1:
>>         audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
>> -               "policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u",
>> +               "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1",
>
> This is another case of NACK on principle, but I think we can make an
> exception in this particular case.
>
> Also like the other patch, this will need to wait for the merge window
> to close before I can merge it.

Merged into selinux/next.

>>                 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
>>                 audit_get_sessionid(current));
>>  out:
>> --
>> 1.8.3.1

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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