[PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image

Linus Torvalds torvalds at linux-foundation.org
Wed Apr 11 22:38:27 UTC 2018

On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 2:05 PM, Jordan Glover
<Golden_Miller83 at protonmail.ch> wrote:
>> If that /dev/mem access prevention was just instead done as an even
>> stricter mode of the existing CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, it could just be
>> enabled unconditionally.

just not obvious from the patch.

But the important part is this part:

>> So I would seriously ask that the distros that have been using these
>> patches look at which parts of lockdown they could make unconditional
>> (because it doesn't break machines), and which ones need that escape
>> clause.

.. because I get the feeling that not a lot of people have actually
been testing this, because "turn off secure boot" is such a universal
thing when people boot Linux.

So it's really the whole claim that distributions have been running
for this for the last five years that I wonder about, and how often
people end up being told: "just disable secure boot":.

But if people really don't need DEVMEM/DEVKMEM/DEVPORT, maybe we
should just disable them in the default configs, and consider them

I'm just surprised. I suspect a lot of people end up actually using
devmem as a fallback for dmidecode etc. Maybe those people don't boot
with EFI secure mode, but if so that just shows that this whole
"hardening" is just security theater.

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