[GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
oiaohm at gmail.com
Wed Apr 4 06:56:49 UTC 2018
On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 11:13 AM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59 at google.com> wrote:
> There are four cases:
> Verified Boot off, lockdown off: Status quo in distro and mainline kernels
> Verified Boot off, lockdown on: Perception of security improvement that's
> trivially circumvented (and so bad)
> Verified Boot on, lockdown off: Perception of security improvement that's
> trivially circumvented (and so bad), status quo in mainline kernels
> Verified Boot on, lockdown on: Security improvement, status quo in distro
> Of these four options, only two make sense. The most common implementation
> of Verified Boot on x86 platforms is UEFI Secure Boot,
Stop right there. Verified boot does not have to be UEFI secureboot.
You could be using a uboot verified boot or
https://www.coreboot.org/git-docs/Intel/vboot.html google vboot.
Neither of these provide flags to kernel to say they have been
So Verified boot looking off to kernel yet lockdown needing to be on
is one very valid combination and must be supported because the Linux
kernel does not always know when it verified boot environment. When
the Linux kernel thinks verified boot is off it may not be trivial to
Now Verified Boot on, lockdown off. Insanely this can be required in
diagnostic on some embedded platform because EFI secureboot does not
have a off switch. These are platforms where they don't boot if
they don't have a PK and KEK set installed. Yes some of these is jtag
the PK and KEK set in.
The fact that this Verified Boot on, lockdown off causes trouble
points to a clear problem. User owns the hardware they should have
the right to defeat secureboot if they wish to.
In fact the issue that you can not install a KEK per operating system
installed shows a problem as well.
So all OS use the same KEK for their installers and then you have all
non Microsoft in a lot of cases the same KEK for booting OS. Any of
these bootloaders/kernels with defect will end up with the security
being exactly like Verified Boot on, lockdown off. Remember attackers
will send around copies of what ever they need to so they can breach a
system so they find a defective solution some where they will ship it
everywhere. Attackers that secureboot is attempted to prevent are
criminal anyhow what is a little bit of copyright violation to them..
So when the current UEFI design is security theatre there should not
be any special effort to support it.
If UEFI was not security theatre there would be a clean way for people
install and setup up their systems to list what operating system KEK
should be accepted so allowing attack surface area to be minimised and
the damaged form any flawed implementation to also be limited. This
way end users could opt in or out of operating systems based on
security. If user has opted out of all operating systems doing
Verified Boot on, lockdown off: those are not a threat. Also any OS
with defective kernel or bootloader that the system has not allowed
the KEK of would also not be a threat.
Really I see no reason to be bending over in the Linux kernel for UEFI
secureboot. You list all 4 types need to exist for different usage
case of the Linux kernel. The fact UEFI secureboot currently is
implemented on x86 does not handle the fact all 4 use cases need to
exist is really a issue with UEFI Secureboot that needs to be fixed by
those designing UEFI for the future.
Allowing the kernel to be configured the 4 different ways does not
mean a party like Microsoft has to sign off on everything the Linux
kernel can do. Its not like android/IOT vendors have to bow to
The Linux kernel should not show favouritism. This does mean that
all 4 modes should be in the kernel configuration options.
Matthew Garrett your mistake is that only 2 are valid when all 4 are
valid in different usage cases. Circumventing security is sometimes
required accepting that case is hard for some people. Of course
when a party need perform circumventing security the fact that it
currently gives out the keys to world of UEFI systems is a very big
security design flaw in UEFI.
Why should the Linux kernel contain code to work around defective
design of UEFI and limit what users not using UEFI and using UEFI can
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