[GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
mjg59 at google.com
Wed Apr 4 16:17:55 UTC 2018
On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 9:09 AM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
> On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 9:30 PM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59 at google.com> wrote:
> > Bear in mind that I'm talking about defaults here
> Mattyhew, I really want you to look yourself in the mirror.
> Those defaults are really horrible defautls for real technical reasons.
> You asked me why when I questioned this, but then when I replied, you
> entirely ignored it.
> So let me repeat: the defaults are *horrible*. They are horrible for a
> very simple reason: kernel behavior changes that depend on some subtle
> boot difference are truly nasty to debug, and nasty to get coverage
They're the defaults that the mainline distros have been shipping for
years. So what are you actually asking for here? If you're saying that it
should be possible to enable the lockdown functionality even in the absence
of any kind of verified boot, then yes, I agree - I just think it makes a
poor distro default to have that be the case out of the box. If you're
saying that it should be possible to disable the lockdown functionality
even in the presence of any kind of verified boot, then yes, I agree - I
just think it makes a poor distro default to have that be the case out of
the box. You're arguing against a patch that provides the default policy
that distros want to ship.
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