[GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot

Linus Torvalds torvalds at linux-foundation.org
Wed Apr 4 00:15:09 UTC 2018

On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59 at google.com> wrote:
> So your argument is that we should make the user experience worse? Without
> some sort of verified boot mechanism, lockdown is just security theater.
> There's no good reason to enable it unless you have some mechanism for
> verifying that you booted something you trust.

Wow. Way to snip the rest of the email where I told you what the
solution was. Let me repeat it here, since you so conveniently missed
it and deleted it:

>> Or, like a lot of other kernel options, maybe have a way to just
>> disable it on the kernel command line, and let the user know about it.
>> That would still be better than disabling secure boot entirely in your
>> world view, so it's (a) more convenient and (b) better.

Matthew, it's simply not worth continuing talking with you.

I'll just not pull this crap, and vendors that you convince to do
stupid things have only themselves to blame.

You clearly have an agenda, and are not willing to look at arguments
against your idiotic choices.

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