[GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
mjg59 at google.com
Tue Apr 3 23:09:27 UTC 2018
On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 3:53 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto at kernel.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 3:51 PM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59 at google.com> wrote:
> > Lockdown is clearly useful without Secure Boot (and I intend to deploy
> > that way for various things), but I still don't understand why you feel
> > that the common case of booting a kernel from a boot chain that's widely
> > trusted derives no benefit from it being harder to subvert that kernel
> > subverting that boot chain. For cases where you're self-signing and feel
> > happy about that, you just set CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT to n
> > everyone's happy?
> I would like to see distros that want Secure Boot to annoy users by
> enabling Lockdown be honest about the fact that it's an annoyance and
> adds very little value by having to carry a patch that was rejected by
> the upstream kernel.
I disagree with the assertion that it adds very little value, but if you
want to reject a technically useful patch for political reasons then I'm
well beyond the point of caring.
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