[PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation

[Tetsuo Handa]

Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 12:58 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com> wrote:
> > Quoting Tycho Andersen (tycho at tycho.ws):
> >> On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 11:46:38PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> >> > Tycho Andersen wrote:
> >> > > > > +     if (unlikely(crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != GCM_AES_IV_SIZE)) {
> >> > > > > +             WARN(1, "big key algorithm changed?");
> >> >
> >> > Please avoid using WARN() WARN_ON() etc.
> >> > syzbot would catch it and panic() due to panic_on_warn == 1.
> >>
> >> But it is really a programming bug in this case (and it seems better
> >> than BUG()...). Isn't this exactly the sort of case we want to catch?
> >>
> >> Tycho
> >
> > Right - is there a url to some discussion about this?  Because not
> > using WARN when WARN should be used, because it troubles a bot, seems
> > the wrong solution.  If this *is* what's been agreed upon, then
> > what is the new recommended thing to do here?
> 
> BUG() is basically supposed to never be used, as decreed by Linus.
> WARN() here is entirely correct: if we encounter a case where
> crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != GCM_AES_IV_SIZE is not true, we
> run the risk of stack memory corruption. If this is an EXPECTED
> failure case, then okay, drop the WARN() but we have to keep the
> -EINVAL.

big_key_init() is __init function of built-in module which will be called
only once upon boot, isn't it? Then, there is no point to continue after
WARN(); BUG() is better here.



Moreover, if this is meant for sanity check in case something went wrong
(e.g. memory corruption), it is better to check at run time like

diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 9336237..bca04f2 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
 #include <keys/big_key-type.h>
 #include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/gcm.h>
 
 struct big_key_buf {
 	unsigned int		nr_pages;
@@ -109,7 +110,12 @@ static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, struct big_key_buf *buf, size_t dat
 	 * an .update function, so there's no chance we'll wind up reusing the
 	 * key to encrypt updated data. Simply put: one key, one encryption.
 	 */
-	u8 zero_nonce[crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead)];
+	u8 zero_nonce[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE];
+
+	if (crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != sizeof(zero_nonce)) {
+		pr_err("big key algorithm changed?");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	aead_req = aead_request_alloc(big_key_aead, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!aead_req)

because crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) == GCM_AES_IV_SIZE is true
unless something goes wrong at run time, isn't it?



Moreover, zero_nonce[] can be "static" if all actions after memory allocation
are guarded by global big_key_aead_lock mutex?

diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 9336237..1e7d2d1 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
 #include <keys/big_key-type.h>
 #include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/gcm.h>
 
 struct big_key_buf {
 	unsigned int		nr_pages;
@@ -109,27 +110,28 @@ static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, struct big_key_buf *buf, size_t dat
 	 * an .update function, so there's no chance we'll wind up reusing the
 	 * key to encrypt updated data. Simply put: one key, one encryption.
 	 */
-	u8 zero_nonce[crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead)];
+	static u8 zero_nonce[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE];
+
+	if (crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != sizeof(zero_nonce)) {
+		pr_err("big key algorithm changed?");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	aead_req = aead_request_alloc(big_key_aead, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!aead_req)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	mutex_lock(&big_key_aead_lock);
 	memset(zero_nonce, 0, sizeof(zero_nonce));
 	aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, buf->sg, buf->sg, datalen, zero_nonce);
 	aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
 	aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0);
-
-	mutex_lock(&big_key_aead_lock);
-	if (crypto_aead_setkey(big_key_aead, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) {
+	if (crypto_aead_setkey(big_key_aead, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE))
 		ret = -EAGAIN;
-		goto error;
-	}
-	if (op == BIG_KEY_ENC)
+	else if (op == BIG_KEY_ENC)
 		ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
 	else
 		ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
-error:
 	mutex_unlock(&big_key_aead_lock);
 	aead_request_free(aead_req);
 	return ret;
--
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