[GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot

Matthew Garrett mjg59 at google.com
Tue Apr 3 23:59:40 UTC 2018


On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 4:55 PM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
wrote:

> On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 4:45 PM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59 at google.com> wrote:
> >> Be honest now. It wasn't generally users who clamored for it.
> >
> > If you ask a user whether they want a system that lets an attacker
replace
> > their kernel or one that doesn't, what do you think their answer is
likely
> > to be?

> Goddamnit.

> We both know what the answer will be.

> And it will have *nothing* to do with secure boot.

Right, because they care about outcome rather than mechanism. Secure Boot
is the mechanism we have to make that outcome possible.

> > Again, what is your proposed mechanism for ensuring that off the shelf
> > systems can be configured in a way that makes this possible?

> If you think lockdown is a good idea, and you enabled it, then IT IS
ENABLED.

Ok. So we can build distribution kernels that *always* have this on, and to
turn it off you have to disable Secure Boot and install a different kernel.
Or we can build distribution kernels that only have this on when you're
booting in a context that makes sense, and you can disable it by just
disabling Secure Boot (by running mokutil --disable-validation) and not
have to install a new kernel. Which outcome do you prefer?
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html



More information about the Linux-security-module-archive mailing list