[GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot

Linus Torvalds torvalds at linux-foundation.org
Tue Apr 3 21:26:48 UTC 2018

On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 2:08 PM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59 at google.com> wrote:
> Secure Boot ensures that the firmware will only load signed bootloaders. If
> a signed bootloader loads a kernel that's effectively an unsigned
> bootloader, there's no point in using Secure Boot


I may want to know that I'm running *my* kernel, but once that is the
case, I trust it.

In fact, I tend to trust it more than some random vendor key. You should too.

Your whole argument is FUNDAMENTALLY garbage. It's the Disney kind of
garbage. It was garbage back then, and it's garbage now.

It is also garbage for a simple technical reason: secure boot can be
hard to turn off. Sometimes "turn off" means "you just have to add
your own keys".

Yes, on x86 hardware at least at some point MS actually had the rule
that it has to be something you can turn off. That rule is apparently
not true on ARM, though.

Seriously. You sound like you're parroting some party line, not like
you are answering the actual question.

So again: why do you conflate the two issues?

If you want lockdown, fine, enable it. But what the F*CK does that
have to do with whether you had secure boot or not?

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