[GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot

Andy Lutomirski luto at kernel.org
Wed Apr 4 00:18:09 UTC 2018

On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 5:16 PM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59 at google.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 5:15 PM Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
> wrote:
>> On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59 at google.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > So your argument is that we should make the user experience worse?
> Without
>> > some sort of verified boot mechanism, lockdown is just security theater.
>> > There's no good reason to enable it unless you have some mechanism for
>> > verifying that you booted something you trust.
>> Wow. Way to snip the rest of the email where I told you what the
>> solution was. Let me repeat it here, since you so conveniently missed
>> it and deleted it:
> I ignored it because it's not a viable option. Part of the patchset
> disables various kernel command line options. If there's a kernel command
> line option that disables the patchset then it's pointless.

if your secure boot-enabled bootloader can't prevent a bad guy from
using malicious kernel command line parameters, then fix it.
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