[PATCH v4 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks

Igor Stoppa igor.stoppa at huawei.com
Thu Apr 5 09:55:33 UTC 2018

On 01/04/18 08:41, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> The biggest security benefit of this patchset is the introduction of
> read-only hooks, even if some security modules have mutable hooks.
> Currently, if you have any LSMs with mutable hooks it will render all heads, and
> list nodes mutable. These are a prime place to attack, because being able to
> manipulate those hooks is a way to bypass all LSMs easily, and to create a
> persistent, covert channel to intercept nearly all calls.
> If LSMs have a model to be unloaded, or are compled as modules, they should mark
> themselves mutable at compile time, and use the LSM_HOOK_INIT_MUTABLE macro
> instead of the LSM_HOOK_INIT macro, so their hooks are on the mutable
> chain.

I'd rather consider these types of hooks:

A) hooks that are either const or marked as RO after init

B) hooks that are writable for a short time, long enough to load
additional, non built-in modules, but then get locked down
I provided an example some time ago [1]

C) hooks that are unloadable (and therefore always attackable?)

Maybe type-A could be dropped and used only as type-B, if it's
acceptable that type-A hooks are vulnerable before lock-down of type-B

I have some doubts about the usefulness of type-C, though.
The benefit I see htat it brings is that it avoids having to reboot when
a mutable LSM is changed, at the price of leaving it attackable.

Do you have any specific case in mind where this trade-off would be

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/7/10/403

To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

More information about the Linux-security-module-archive mailing list