[PATCH v7 0/6] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks
sargun at sargun.me
Fri Apr 27 20:32:18 UTC 2018
On Wed, Apr 25, 2018 at 1:58 AM, Sargun Dhillon <sargun at sargun.me> wrote:
> The primary security benefit of this patchset is the introduction of
> read-only hooks, even if some security modules have mutable hooks.
> Currently, if you have any LSMs with mutable hooks it will render all
> heads, and list nodes mutable. These are a prime place to attack because
> being able to manipulate those hooks is a way to bypass all LSMs easily
> and to create a persistent, covert channel to intercept nearly all
> There is a shares SRCU between all security hooks to facilitate safe
> LSM- unloading. This SRCU is very cheap for runtime overhead on reads,
> but there is synchronization around it for unloads. There is only a cost
> to pay at unload time, which is based on the execution time of longest
> chain of callbacks after synchronization begins.
> If CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS is enabled, then hooks can be loaded
> at runtime. The module can check the return code of security_add_hooks
> to determine whether or not they can install their hooks, independently
> of checking for the Kconfig value. In the future, we may make it so that
> runtime hook loading is also disabled, after boot. We can do that in a
> follow-up patch.
> If CONFIG_SECURITY_UNREGISTRABLE_HOOKS is enabled, then hooks can be
> unloaded at runtime. This behaviour can be disabled by setting
> security.allow_unregister_hooks to 0. Once set, it requires a reboot
> to be reset.
> SELinux is exempt from the CONFIG_SECURITY_UNREGISTRABLE_HOOKS
> rule, and can unregister at any time. SELinux exposes a mechanism
> to disable itself, prior to policy loading. This can be disabled
> at compilation time, and it depends on CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS.
> Changing this behaviour would require breaking the uapi.
> This patch can allow for a new style of LSMs. There are many cases
> where LSM "policies" would be better defined in some formal
> programming language, like C. This is either due to flexibility,
> or performance, for functions in the hot path.
> It also unlocks development usecases, but those come as a secondary
> benefit to the earlier feature. There has been an appetite for
> out-of-tree LSMs:
> Casey's work has been great enabling minor LSM stacking, and a variety
> of LSMs have been proposed on list that haven't made it into the kernel
> but fit into the minor LSM stacking model.
> One of the other big changes is the introduction of the lsm_info
> structure. This encapsulates various information about the LSM
> itself, and can be used at a later time.
> This patch was tested with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING to prove the correctness
> of the locking in lock_existing_hooks. It grabs the module lock
> to prevent new hooks from being loaded, or current hooks from being
> unloaded. It then grabs the lsm_info_lock, which is only grabbed
> on hook modification, or inspection of the loaded LSMs.
> The other thing that this introduces is monitoring of LKM
> unloading. If an LSM's LKM is unloaded when it is not
> supposed to be, it will crash the system.
> Thanks to Tetsuo for their review, and feedback.
> Changes since:
> * introduce LSM info
> * Crash by default instead of leaving it up to module authors
> to deal with things going wrong
> * Monitor module unloading, to ensure that attempts to
> unload the LKM for an LSM crashes the system.
> * Rename "CONFIG_SECURITY_UNLOADABLE_MODULES" to
> "CONFIG_SECURITY_UNREGISTRABLE_HOOKS" which enables arbitrary hook
> deregistration. If disabled, hooks are not allowed to deregister.
> SELinux is exempt.
> * Rename security.allow_unload_hooks to
> * Make it so that both security_add_hooks, and security_delete_hooks
> return errors upon being unsuccessful, allowing module authors to
> make the best decision for their use case.
> * Get rid of LSM_HOOK_INIT_MUTABLE
> * Introduce the configuration flag "CONFIG_SECURITY_UNLOADABLE_MODULES"
> to disable module unloading
> * Introduce the kernel parameter security.allow_unload_hooks
> * Instead of taking the approach of a "null hook", using the approach of
> a second set of hooks -- this was mostly done through the
> FOR_EACH_SECURITY_HOOK_MUTABLE macro, which gets compiled out if
> CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS is disabled.
> * Split out hlist_head patch
> * Apply Tetsuo's changes to clean up functions which are not
> covered by call_int_hook / call_void_hook
> * Disable NULL hook checking when uneeded
> * Add SRCU to allow for code-unloading
> * Add concurrency control around hook mutation
> Sargun Dhillon (6):
> security: Move LSM registration arguments to struct lsm_info
> security: Make security_hook_heads private
> security: Introduce mutable (RW) hooks
> security: Expose security_add_hooks externally and add error handling
> security: Panic on forced unloading of security module
> security: Add SECURITY_UNREGISTRABLE_HOOKS to allow for hook removal
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 67 ++--
> scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c | 2 -
> security/Kconfig | 12 +
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 +-
> security/commoncap.c | 8 +-
> security/inode.c | 56 +++-
> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 6 +-
> security/security.c | 421 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
> security/security.h | 11 +
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 +-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +-
> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 6 +-
> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 6 +-
> 13 files changed, 491 insertions(+), 133 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 security/security.h
Should I respin patches 1-5 with the fixes that Tetsuo suggested, and
do you want to pick those up? It seems like other than the few errors,
those look good. And then we can figure out to deal with patch 6
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