[GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot

Andy Lutomirski luto at kernel.org
Wed Apr 4 16:39:08 UTC 2018

On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59 at google.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 6:52 AM Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso at mit.edu> wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 02:33:37PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
>> > Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso at mit.edu> wrote:
>> >
>> > > Whoa.  Why doesn't lockdown prevent kexec?  Put another away, why
>> > > isn't this a problem for people who are fearful that Linux could be
>> > > used as part of a Windows boot virus in a Secure UEFI context?
>> >
>> > Lockdown mode restricts kexec to booting an authorised image (where the
>> > authorisation may be by signature or by IMA).
>> If that's true, then Matthew's assertion that lockdown w/o secure boot
>> is insecure goes away, no?
> If you don't have secure boot then an attacker with root can modify your
> bootloader or kernel, and on next boot lockdown can be silently disabled.

This has been rebutted over and over and over.  Secure boot is not the
only verified boot mechanism in the world.  Other, better, much more
auditable, and much simpler mechanisms have been around for a long,
long time.

>> The fact that this Verified Boot on, lockdown off causes trouble
>> points to a clear problem.   User owns the hardware they should have
>> the right to defeat secureboot if they wish to.
> Which is why Shim allows you to disable validation if you prove physical
> user presence.

And that's a giant hack.  The actual feature should be that a user
proves physical presence and thus disables lockdown *without*
disabling verification.

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