March 2019 Archives by subject

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Starting: Fri Mar 1 00:05:20 UTC 2019
Ending: Sat Mar 30 17:30:11 UTC 2019
Messages: 428

• [GIT PULL] apparmor updates for v5.1   John Johansen
• [GIT PULL] apparmor updates for v5.1   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [GIT PULL] security subsystem changes for v5.1   James Morris
• [GIT PULL] security subsystem changes for v5.1   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [GIT PULL] security: integrity subsystem updates for v5.1   James Morris
• [GIT PULL] security: tpm subsystem updates for v5.1   James Morris
• [GIT PULL] security: tpm subsystem updates for v5.1   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [GIT PULL] security: yama fix for v5.1   James Morris
• [GIT PULL] security: yama fix for v5.1   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.1 (#1)   Paul Moore
• [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.1 (#1)   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.1 (#2)   Paul Moore
• [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.1 (#2)   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v5.1   Paul Moore
• [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v5.1   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [GIT PULL] tpmdd fixes for Linux v5.1   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [GIT PULL] tpmdd fixes for Linux v5.1   James Morris
• [GIT PULL][UPDATED] security: yama and LSM config fixes   James Morris
• [GIT PULL][UPDATED] security: yama and LSM config fixes   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [PATCH 0/1] RFC: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH 0/1] RFC: security: add SECURE_KEEP_FSUID to preserve fsuid/fsgid across execve   Igor Lubashev
• [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 01/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock   Edwin Zimmerman
• [PATCH 01/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown   Randy Dunlap
• [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown   David Howells
• [PATCH 02/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   James Morris
• [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   James Morris
• [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 03/27] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 04/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 05/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 05/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 05/97] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH 05/97] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 06/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 08/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 08/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 09/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 09/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Alan Cox
• [PATCH 09/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 09/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Alan Cox
• [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 1/1] RFC: initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH 1/1] RFC: initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 1/1] RFC: initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Nick Desaulniers
• [PATCH 1/1] RFC: initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH 1/1] RFC: initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH 1/1] RFC: initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH 1/1] RFC: security: add SECURE_KEEP_FSUID to preserve fsuid/fsgid across execve   Igor Lubashev
• [PATCH 1/1] Smack :- In this patch, global rule list has been removed. Now all smack rules will be read using "smack_known_list". This list contains all the smack labels and internally each smack label structure maintains the list of smack rules corresponding to that smack label. So there is no need to maintain extra list.   Vishal Goel
• [PATCH 1/1] Smack: Create smack_rule cache to optimize memory usage   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 1/1] Smack: Create smack_rule cache to optimize memory usage   Vishal Goel
• [PATCH 1/1] smack: removal of global rule list   Vishal Goel
• [PATCH 1/1] smack: removal of global rule list   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 1/2] efi: add a function for transferring status to string   Lee, Chun-Yi
• [PATCH 1/2] efi: add a function for transferring status to string   Lee, Chun-Yi
• [PATCH 1/2] efi: add a function for transferring status to string   Lee, Chun-Yi
• [PATCH 1/2] efi: add a function for transferring status to string   Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 1/2] efi: add a function for transferring status to string   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 1/2] efi: add a function for transferring status to string   joeyli
• [PATCH 1/2] efi: add a function for transferring status to string   joeyli
• [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 10/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 11/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 11/43] convert do_remount_sb() to fs_context   Andreas Schwab
• [PATCH 11/43] convert do_remount_sb() to fs_context   David Howells
• [PATCH 11/43] convert do_remount_sb() to fs_context   Andreas Schwab
• [PATCH 11/43] convert do_remount_sb() to fs_context   Andreas Schwab
• [PATCH 11/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks   Edwin Zimmerman
• [PATCH 11/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down   Thomas Gleixner
• [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 12/27] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 13/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 13/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 14/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 15/43] vfs: Add configuration parser helpers   Al Viro
• [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 17/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 18/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 18/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 19/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 19/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 2/2 v2] efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 2/2 v2] efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates   jlee at suse.com
• [PATCH 2/2 v2] efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates   Lee, Chun-Yi
• [PATCH 2/2] efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates   Lee, Chun-Yi
• [PATCH 2/2] efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates   Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 2/2] efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates   jlee at suse.com
• [PATCH 2/3] scripts/ima: define a set of common functions   Dave Young
• [PATCH 2/3] scripts/ima: define a set of common functions   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 20/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 20/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 20/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Steven Rostedt
• [PATCH 21/27] Lock down /proc/kcore   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 21/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 22/27] Lock down /proc/kcore   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 22/27] Lock down kprobes   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 22/27] Lock down kprobes   Masami Hiramatsu
• [PATCH 22/27] Lock down kprobes   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 22/27] Lock down kprobes   Masami Hiramatsu
• [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   Stephen Hemminger
• [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   Stephen Hemminger
• [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   Daniel Borkmann
• [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   Jordan Glover
• [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   James Morris
• [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   James Morris
• [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   James Morris
• [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 23/27] Lock down kprobes   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 24/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 24/27] Lock down perf   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 25/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 25/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 25/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 25/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 25/27] Lock down perf   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 26/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 26/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 27/27] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 27/27] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 27/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 3/3] x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 3/3] x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 3/3] x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 3/3] x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 3/3] x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 3/3] x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 3/3] x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 3/3] x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 3/3] x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 3/3] x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 34/38] vfs: Convert apparmorfs to fs_context   David Howells
• [PATCH 35/38] vfs: Convert securityfs to fs_context   David Howells
• [PATCH 36/38] vfs: Convert selinuxfs to fs_context   David Howells
• [PATCH 37/38] vfs: Convert smackfs to fs_context   David Howells
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 07/33] keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key   Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 11/48] keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key   Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.20 13/60] keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key   Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.0 010/262] apparmor: fix double free when unpack of secmark rules fails   Pavel Machek
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.0 010/262] apparmor: fix double free when unpack of secmark rules fails   Sasha Levin
• [PATCH ghak109 V1] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH ghak109 V1] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH ghak109 V1] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Paul Moore
• [PATCH ghak109 V1] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Richard Guy Briggs
• [PATCH ghak109 V1] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Paul Moore
• [PATCH ghak109 V1] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Steve Grubb
• [PATCH ghak109 V1] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Richard Guy Briggs
• [PATCH ghak109 V1] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Richard Guy Briggs
• [PATCH ghak109 V1] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH ghak109 V1] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Richard Guy Briggs
• [PATCH ghak109 V2] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH ghak109 V2] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH ghak109 V2] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Paul Moore
• [PATCH ghak109 V2] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Paul Moore
• [PATCH ghak109 V2] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event   Richard Guy Briggs
• [PATCH RESEND] KEYS: remove CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH v10, RESEND 5/6] KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()   Dan Williams
• [PATCH v10, RESEND 5/6] KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v10, RESEND 5/6] KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()   Roberto Sassu
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Sean Christopherson
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Huang, Kai
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Nathaniel McCallum
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Huang, Kai
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Sean Christopherson
• [PATCH v19,RESEND 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v2 0/2] RFC: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH v2 00/11] LSM documentation update   Denis Efremov
• [PATCH v2 00/11] LSM documentation update   Jonathan Corbet
• [PATCH v2 00/11] LSM documentation update   James Morris
• [PATCH v2 00/11] LSM documentation update   James Morris
• [PATCH v2 1/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH v2 1/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH v2 1/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Kees Cook
• [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading   Borislav Petkov
• [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading   hpa at zytor.com
• [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading   Borislav Petkov
• [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading   Borislav Petkov
• [PATCH v2 2/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v2] x86/ima: require signed kernel modules   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH v2] x86/ima: require signed kernel modules   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH v2] x86/ima: require signed kernel modules   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH v2] x86/ima: require signed kernel modules   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH v2] x86/ima: require signed kernel modules   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 00/25] Add support for kernel lockdown   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 01/25] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 02/25] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 03/25] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 04/25] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 05/25] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 06/25] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 08/25] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 09/25] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 10/25] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH V31 10/25] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   Alex Williamson
• [PATCH V31 10/25] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 11/25] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH V31 11/25] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 12/25] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 13/25] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 14/25] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 15/25] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 16/25] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 17/25] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 18/25] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 19/25] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Steven Rostedt
• [PATCH V31 19/25] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 19/25] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 20/25] Lock down /proc/kcore   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 21/25] Lock down kprobes when in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 22/25] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 22/25] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH V31 23/25] Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 24/25] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Greg KH
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Greg KH
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Greg KH
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Greg KH
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Greg KH
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   James Morris
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Greg KH
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Greg KH
• [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH v3] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v3] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM   Dan Williams
• [PATCH v3] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v4 1/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions   Micah Morton
• [PATCH v4 1/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions   James Morris
• [PATCH v4 1/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions   Micah Morton
• [PATCH v4 2/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions   mortonm at chromium.org
• [PATCH v4 2/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions   Micah Morton
• [PATCH v4 2/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions   James Morris
• [PATCH v5 1/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions   mortonm at chromium.org
• [PATCH v5 1/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions   mortonm at chromium.org
• [PATCH v5 1/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions   James Morris
• [PATCH v5 1/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent   Ondrej Mosnacek
• [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent   Paul Moore
• [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent   Ondrej Mosnacek
• [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent   Ondrej Mosnacek
• [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent   Paul Moore
• [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent   Ondrej Mosnacek
• [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent   Paul Moore
• [PATCH] device_cgroup: fix RCU imbalance in error case   Jann Horn
• [PATCH] device_cgroup: fix RCU imbalance in error case   Michal Hocko
• [PATCH] device_cgroup: fix RCU imbalance in error case   Tejun Heo
• [PATCH] keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY   Ben Dooks
• [PATCH] keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH] keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY   James Morris
• [PATCH] keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY   David Howells
• [PATCH] keys: safe concurrent user->{session,uid}_keyring access   Jann Horn
• [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM   Dan Williams
• [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: defer execution of TPM-specific code until key instantiate   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: defer execution of TPM-specific code until key instantiate   Dan Williams
• [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: defer execution of TPM-specific code until key instantiate   Roberto Sassu
• [PATCH] LSM: lsm_hooks.h - fix missing colon in docstring   Ondrej Mosnacek
• [PATCH] LSM: lsm_hooks.h - fix missing colon in docstring   Paul Moore
• [PATCH] LSM: Revive CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* for "make oldconfig"   Kees Cook
• [PATCH] LSM: Revive CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* for "make oldconfig"   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH] LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig   James Morris
• [PATCH] secuirty: integrity: ima: pedantic formatting   Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult
• [PATCH] security: don't use RCU accessors for cred->session_keyring   Jann Horn
• [PATCH] security: inode: fix a missing check for securityfs_create_file   Kangjie Lu
• [PATCH] security: inode: fix a missing check for securityfs_create_file   James Morris
• [PATCH] security: inode: fix a missing check for securityfs_create_file   Kangjie Lu
• [PATCH] security: inode: fix a missing check for securityfs_create_file   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH] security: keys: Kconfig: pedantic cleanup   Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   James Morris
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   James Morris
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   James Morris
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   James Morris
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   James Morris
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   Edwin Zimmerman
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   Paul Moore
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   James Morris
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH] tpm: turn on TPM on suspend for TPM 1.x   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] tpm: turn on TPM on suspend for TPM 1.x   Domenico Andreoli
• [PATCH] tpm: turn on TPM on suspend for TPM 1.x   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] vfs: Move kernel_read_file() to fs/read_write.c   David Howells
• [PATCH] vfs: Move kernel_read_file() to fs/read_write.c   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH] vfs: Move kernel_read_file() to fs/read_write.c   David Howells
• [PATCH] vfs: Move kernel_read_file() to fs/read_write.c   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH] vfs: Move kernel_read_file() to fs/read_write.c   David Howells
• [PATCH] x86/cpufeature: Remove __pure attribute to _static_cpu_has()   hpa at zytor.com
• [PATCH] x86/cpufeature: Remove __pure attribute to _static_cpu_has()   Borislav Petkov
• [PATCH] x86/cpufeature: Remove __pure attribute to _static_cpu_has()   Borislav Petkov
• [PATCH] Yama: mark function as static   Mukesh Ojha
• [PATCH] Yama: mark local symbols as static   Jann Horn
• [PATCH] Yama: mark local symbols as static   Mukesh Ojha
• [PULL REQUEST] Kernel lockdown patches for 5.2   Matthew Garrett
• [PULL REQUEST] Kernel lockdown patches for 5.2   Mimi Zohar
• [PULL REQUEST] Kernel lockdown patches for 5.2   Matthew Garrett
• [PULL REQUEST] Kernel lockdown patches for 5.2   Matthew Garrett
• [PULL REQUEST] Kernel lockdown patches for 5.2   Mimi Zohar
• [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches   Mimi Zohar
• [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches   Matthew Garrett
• [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches   Mimi Zohar
• [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches   Matthew Garrett
• [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches   Mimi Zohar
• [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches   Matthew Garrett
• [PULL REQUEST] Lockdown patches for 5.2   Matthew Garrett
• [RFC PATCH 0/2] Create CAAM HW key in linux keyring and use in dmcrypt   Jan Lübbe
• [RFC PATCH 0/2] Create CAAM HW key in linux keyring and use in dmcrypt   David Howells
• [RFC PATCH 0/2] Create CAAM HW key in linux keyring and use in dmcrypt   Franck Lenormand
• [RFC PATCH 0/2] Create CAAM HW key in linux keyring and use in dmcrypt   Franck Lenormand
• [RFC PATCH 0/2] Create CAAM HW key in linux keyring and use in dmcrypt   Franck LENORMAND
• [RFC PATCH 1/2] drivers: crypto: caam: key: Add caam_tk key type   Franck LENORMAND
• [RFC PATCH 2/2] dm-crypt: Use any key type which is registered   Franck LENORMAND
• [RFC PATCH 37/68] vfs: Convert apparmorfs to use the new mount API   David Howells
• [RFC PATCH 38/68] vfs: Convert securityfs to use the new mount API   David Howells
• [RFC PATCH 39/68] vfs: Convert selinuxfs to use the new mount API   David Howells
• [RFC PATCH 40/68] vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API   David Howells
• Add support for TCG2 log format on UEFI systems   Jarkko Sakkinen
• Add support for TCG2 log format on UEFI systems   Matthew Garrett
• Add support for TCG2 log format on UEFI systems   Jarkko Sakkinen
• Attention Dear,   Barr.Augusto Daniel.
• crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Eric Biggers
• crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Eric Biggers
• crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Kees Cook
• crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Eric Biggers
• crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Geert Uytterhoeven
• From Mrs. Elia Rodrigues,   Mrs. Elia Rodrigues
• Hello   Mr Wong
• Hello   Mr Wong
• Hi   Sgt Clara B Herbert
• INFO: task hung in process_measurement   syzbot
• INFO: task hung in process_measurement   Tomi Valkeinen
• Inquiry March-2019   Daniel Murray
• kernel panic: MAC Initialization failed. (3)   syzbot
• kernel panic: MAC Initialization failed. (3)   Tetsuo Handa
• Linux 5.1-rc2   Randy Dunlap
• Linux 5.1-rc2   James Morris
• Linux 5.1-rc2   Tetsuo Handa
• Linux 5.1-rc2   Kees Cook
• Linux 5.1-rc2   Tetsuo Handa
• Linux 5.1-rc2   Kees Cook
• Linux 5.1-rc2   Tetsuo Handa
• Linux 5.1-rc2   Kees Cook
• Linux 5.1-rc2   Tetsuo Handa
• Linux 5.1-rc2   Casey Schaufler
• Linux 5.1-rc2   Randy Dunlap
• Linux 5.1-rc2   Casey Schaufler
• Linux 5.1-rc2   James Morris
• Linux security subsystem tree sync to v5.1-rc2   James Morris
• Linux security subsystem tree sync to v5.1-rc2   Casey Schaufler
• LoadPin old-api-denied   Martin Townsend
• LoadPin old-api-denied   Martin Townsend
• LoadPin old-api-denied   Kees Cook
• mount.nfs: Protocol error after upgrade to linux/master   Kees Cook
• mount.nfs: Protocol error after upgrade to linux/master   Kees Cook
• mount.nfs: Protocol error after upgrade to linux/master   Tetsuo Handa
• mount.nfs: Protocol error after upgrade to linux/master   Casey Schaufler
• mount.nfs: Protocol error after upgrade to linux/master   Tetsuo Handa
• mount.nfs: Protocol error after upgrade to linux/master   Casey Schaufler
• mount.nfs: Protocol error after upgrade to linux/master   Kees Cook
• mount.nfs: Protocol error after upgrade to linux/master   Tetsuo Handa
• mount.nfs: Protocol error after upgrade to linux/master   Kees Cook
• mount.nfs: Protocol error after upgrade to linux/master   Tetsuo Handa
• overlayfs access checks on underlying layers   Casey Schaufler
• overlayfs access checks on underlying layers   Stephen Smalley
• overlayfs access checks on underlying layers   Amir Goldstein
• PRIVATE...   daniele at mybusinessdriver.com
• Replacing IPv6 port labeling with CALIPSO in Smack   Casey Schaufler
• Repost: Missing security_mmap_file() in remap_file_pages syscall   Kirill A. Shutemov
• Repost: Missing security_mmap_file() in remap_file_pages syscall   Stephen Smalley
• Repost: Missing security_mmap_file() in remap_file_pages syscall   TongZhang
• Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Mimi Zohar
• Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Jordan Glover
• Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Stephen Smalley
• Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Igor Zhbanov
• what happened to SECURITY_DAC?   Kees Cook

Last message date: Sat Mar 30 17:30:11 UTC 2019
Archived on: Sat Mar 30 21:45:01 UTC 2019

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