[PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches
mjg59 at google.com
Fri Mar 1 03:33:16 UTC 2019
On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 5:45 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 2019-02-28 at 17:01 -0800, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > That's not a valid reason for preventing systems that do use IMA for
> > > verifying the kexec kernel image signature or kernel module signatures
> > > from enabling "lock down". This just means that there needs to be
> > > some coordination between the different signature verification
> > > methods. 
> > I agree, but the current form of the integration makes it impossible
> > for anyone using an IMA-enabled kernel (but not using IMA) to do
> > anything unless they have IMA signatures. It's a problem we need to
> > solve, I just don't think it's a problem we need to solve before
> > merging the patchset.
> That's simply not true. Have you even looked at the IMA architecture
Sorry, I think we're talking at cross purposes - I was referring to
your patch "ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode"
If the goal is just to use the architecture rules then I don't see any
conflict, and as far as I can tell things would just work as is if I
drop the ima portion from "kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the
kernel is locked down"? Apologies, I'd thought that the secure_boot
ruleset was still intended to be used in a lockdown environment.
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