Linux 5.1-rc2

Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel at
Wed Mar 27 21:05:42 UTC 2019

On 2019/03/28 5:45, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 1:30 PM Tetsuo Handa
> <penguin-kernel at> wrote:
>> On 2019/03/28 4:16, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> The part I don't understand is what you've said about TOMOYO being
>>> primary and not wanting the others stackable? That kind of goes
>>> against the point, but I'm happy to do that if you want it that way.
>> Automatically enabling multiple legacy major LSMs might result in a confusion like
>> Jakub encountered.
> The confusion wasn't multiple enabled: it was a change of what was
> enabled (due to ignoring the old config). (My very first suggested
> patch fixed this...)

Someone else might get confused when TOMOYO is automatically enabled
despite they did not specify TOMOYO in lsm= or security= or CONFIG_LSM.

>> For a few releases from 5.1 (about one year or so?), since
>> CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* will be ignored after CONFIG_LSM is once defined in
>> their kernel configs, I guess that it is better not to enable TOMOYO automatically
>> until most people complete migrating from CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* to CONFIG_LSM
>> and get used to use lsm= kernel command line option rather than security= kernel
>> command line option.
> It sounds like you want TOMOYO to stay an exclusive LSM? Should we
> revert a5e2fe7ede12 ("TOMOYO: Update LSM flags to no longer be
> exclusive") instead? (I'm against this idea, but defer to you. I think
> it should stay stackable since the goal is to entirely remove the
> concept of exclusive LSMs.)

I never want to revert a5e2fe7ede12. For transition period, I just don't
want to automatically enable TOMOYO when people did not specify TOMOYO.

> I don't see problems for an exclusive LSM user (AA, SELinux, Smack)
> also initializing TOMOYO, though. It should be a no-op. Is there some
> situation where this is not true?

There should be no problem except some TOMOYO messages are printed.

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