Linux 5.1-rc2

Randy Dunlap rdunlap at
Wed Mar 27 22:55:21 UTC 2019

On 3/27/19 3:23 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 3/27/2019 3:05 PM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>> On 2019/03/28 6:43, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>>> I don't see problems for an exclusive LSM user (AA, SELinux, Smack)
>>>>> also initializing TOMOYO, though. It should be a no-op. Is there some
>>>>> situation where this is not true?
>>>> There should be no problem except some TOMOYO messages are printed.
>>> Okay, so I should send my latest version of the patch to James? Or do
>>> you explicitly want TOMOYO removed from all the CONFIG_LSM default
>>> lines except when selected by CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO? (I worry
>>> the latter will lead to less testing of the stacking.)
>> My approach is "opt-in" while your approach is "opt-out". And the problem
>> here is that people might fail to change CONFIG_LSM from the default value
>> to what they need. (And Jakub did not change CONFIG_LSM to reflect
>> CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR from the old config.) Thus, I suggest
>> "opt-in" approach; which includes up to only one legacy major LSM and allows
>> people to change the default value to include multiple legacy major LSMs.
>> You can propose your latest version. If SELinux/Smack/AppArmor people
>> prefer "opt-out" approach, I'm fine with "opt-out" approach.
> In the long haul we want people to use CONFIG_LSM to set their
> list of modules. Providing a backward compatible CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_BLAH
> makes some sense, but it's important that we encourage a mindset change.
> Maybe with CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_LIST with a a full list, which uses the
> value from CONFIG_LSM, and make it the default?


I'm still confused.  Does this mindset change include removing support of
SECURITY_DAC?  If so, where was this discussed and decided?
And if so (again), that feels like enforcing some kind of policy in the kernel.


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