[PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
jmorris at namei.org
Sat Mar 9 04:45:36 UTC 2019
On Fri, 8 Mar 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 3:00 PM James Morris <jmorris at namei.org> wrote:
> > On Wed, 6 Mar 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
> > >
> > > If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
> > > signatures that we can verify.
> > Perhaps note that this won't cover the case where folk are using DM-Verity
> > with a signed root hash for verifying kernel modules.
> Mm. I can't see a terribly good way of doing this generically -
> loadpin gives no indication to the module loading code that it comes
> from a trusted source. Would making the lockdown/module signature
> enforcement a separate config option be reasonable?
I was just suggest documenting this.
<jmorris at namei.org>
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