July 2019 Archives by thread

• Messages sorted by: [ subject ] [ author ] [ date ]
• More info on this list...

Starting: Mon Jul 1 02:59:33 UTC 2019
Ending: Wed Jul 31 22:16:17 UTC 2019
Messages: 615

• [PATCH 2/6] Adjust watch_queue documentation to mention mount and superblock watches. [ver #5]   Randy Dunlap
  • [PATCH 2/6] Adjust watch_queue documentation to mention mount and superblock watches. [ver #5]   David Howells
    • [PATCH 2/6] Adjust watch_queue documentation to mention mount and superblock watches. [ver #5]   Randy Dunlap
• [RFC PATCH v5 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Milan Broz
  • [RFC PATCH v5 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Singh Khurana
• [PATCH v4 2/3] initramfs: read metadata from special file METADATA!!!   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH] Revert "tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()"   Michal Suchanek
  • [PATCH] Revert "tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()"   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [PATCH] Revert "tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()"   Roberto Sassu
      • [PATCH] Revert "tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()"   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH] Revert "tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()"   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH] Revert "tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()"   Tyler Hicks
      • [PATCH] Revert "tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()"   Nayna
      • [PATCH] Revert "tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()"   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [PATCH] Revert "tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()"   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v4 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH v4 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk   Mimi Zohar
    • [PATCH v4 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk   Roberto Sassu
      • [PATCH v4 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk   Roberto Sassu
• [PATCH v12 00/11] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal   Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH v12 00/11] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions   Jessica Yu
  • [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions   Thiago Jung Bauermann
    • [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions   Philipp Rudo
      • [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions   Thiago Jung Bauermann
      • [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions   Philipp Rudo
      • [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
  • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Andy Lutomirski
    • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Xing, Cedric
  • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Andy Lutomirski
    • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Sean Christopherson
• [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
  • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Casey Schaufler
    • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Dr. Greg
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Dr. Greg
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Dr. Greg
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Andy Lutomirski
• [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Andy Lutomirski
  • [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH v6 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Khurana
• [RFC PATCH v6 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Khurana
• Fwd: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   James Morris
  • Fwd: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
• Reminder: 1 open syzbot bug in "security/smack" subsystem   Eric Biggers
• Reminder: 2 open syzbot bugs in "security/tomoyo" subsystem   Eric Biggers
• [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v5.3   Paul Moore
  • [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v5.3   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [PATCH] apparmor: Replace two seq_printf() calls by seq_puts() in aa_label_seq_xprint()   Markus Elfring
• [PATCH] ima: Replace two seq_printf() calls by seq_puts() in ima_show_template_data_ascii()   Markus Elfring
• [PATCH] ima: Replace two seq_printf() calls by seq_puts() in ima_show_template_data_ascii()   Markus Elfring
• [PATCH] ima: Replace two seq_printf() calls by seq_puts() in ima_show_template_data_ascii()   Markus Elfring
• [PATCH] ima: Replace two seq_printf() calls by seq_puts() in ima_show_template_data_ascii()   Markus Elfring
  • [PATCH] ima: Replace two seq_printf() calls by seq_puts() in ima_show_template_data_ascii()   David Laight
    • ima: Replace two seq_printf() calls by seq_puts() in ima_show_template_data_ascii()   Markus Elfring
    • [PATCH] ima: Replace two seq_printf() calls by seq_puts() in ima_show_template_data_ascii()   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH v10 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Andrew Morton
  • [PATCH v10 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH v10 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Andrew Morton
      • [PATCH v10 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
• [RFC PATCH 0/1] security: add SECURE_KEEP_FSUID to preserve fsuid/fsgid across execve   Lubashev, Igor
• [PATCH -next] integrity: Remove set but not used variable 'acl'   YueHaibing
  • [PATCH -next] integrity: Remove set but not used variable 'acl'   David Howells
    • [PATCH -next] integrity: Remove set but not used variable 'acl'   Yuehaibing
• [PATCH 8/9] usb: Add USB subsystem notifications [ver #5]   Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 1/9] uapi: General notification ring definitions [ver #5]   Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4/9] General notification queue with user mmap()'able ring buffer [ver #5]   Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 6/9] Add a general, global device notification watch list [ver #5]   Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 6/9] Add a general, global device notification watch list [ver #5]   Greg Kroah-Hartman
  • [PATCH 6/9] Add a general, global device notification watch list [ver #5]   David Howells
    • [PATCH 6/9] Add a general, global device notification watch list [ver #5]   Greg Kroah-Hartman
      • [PATCH 6/9] Add a general, global device notification watch list [ver #5]   David Howells
      • [PATCH 6/9] Add a general, global device notification watch list [ver #5]   Greg Kroah-Hartman
      • [PATCH 6/9] Add a general, global device notification watch list [ver #5]   Alan Stern
• [PATCH v5 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 02/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v5 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH v5 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v5 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH v5 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v5 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH v5 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v5 16/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v5 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v5 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v5 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v5 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 21/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 22/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v5 23/23] SELinux: Verify LSM display sanity in binder   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH v5 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH v5 03/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH v5 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.   Casey Schaufler
• [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
    • [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v2] Revert "tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()"   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v2] tomoyo: Don't check open/getattr permission on sockets.   Tetsuo Handa
  • [PATCH v2] tomoyo: Don't check open/getattr permission on sockets.   James Morris
    • [PATCH v2] tomoyo: Don't check open/getattr permission on sockets.   James Morris
• [PATCH] smack: fix some kernel-doc notations   luanshi
• [RFC/RFT] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC/RFT] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [RFC/RFT] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework   Sumit Garg
• [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Xing, Cedric
    • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Xing, Cedric
    • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Dr. Greg
      • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Xing, Cedric
• [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated   Tyler Hicks
  • [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated   James Bottomley
    • [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated   Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated   Roberto Sassu
• [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 1 - Miscellany for 5.3   David Howells
  • [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 1 - Miscellany for 5.3   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 2 - request_key() improvements for 5.3   David Howells
  • [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 2 - request_key() improvements for 5.3   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 3 - Keyrings namespacing for 5.3   David Howells
  • [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 3 - Keyrings namespacing for 5.3   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 4 - Key ACLs for 5.3   David Howells
  • [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 4 - Key ACLs for 5.3   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
  • [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 4 - Key ACLs for 5.3   Linus Torvalds
    • [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 4 - Key ACLs for 5.3   Eric Biggers
      • [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 4 - Key ACLs for 5.3   Eric Biggers
      • [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 4 - Key ACLs for 5.3   Linus Torvalds
      • [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 4 - Key ACLs for 5.3   Mimi Zohar
• Quotes needed For July Shipments   Sales -Jpexcc.
• [PATCH v5 00/12] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM   Salvatore Mesoraca
  • [PATCH v5 01/12] S.A.R.A.: add documentation   Salvatore Mesoraca
    • [PATCH v5 01/12] S.A.R.A.: add documentation   Randy Dunlap
      • [PATCH v5 01/12] S.A.R.A.: add documentation   Salvatore Mesoraca
    • [PATCH v5 01/12] S.A.R.A.: add documentation   James Morris
  • [PATCH v5 02/12] S.A.R.A.: create framework   Salvatore Mesoraca
    • [PATCH v5 02/12] S.A.R.A.: create framework   Randy Dunlap
  • [PATCH v5 03/12] S.A.R.A.: cred blob management   Salvatore Mesoraca
    • [PATCH v5 03/12] S.A.R.A.: cred blob management   James Morris
  • [PATCH v5 04/12] S.A.R.A.: generic DFA for string matching   Salvatore Mesoraca
    • [PATCH v5 04/12] S.A.R.A.: generic DFA for string matching   Jann Horn
      • [PATCH v5 04/12] S.A.R.A.: generic DFA for string matching   Salvatore Mesoraca
      • [PATCH v5 04/12] S.A.R.A.: generic DFA for string matching   Jann Horn
  • [PATCH v5 05/12] LSM: creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook   Salvatore Mesoraca
  • [PATCH v5 06/12] S.A.R.A.: WX protection   Salvatore Mesoraca
    • [PATCH v5 06/12] S.A.R.A.: WX protection   Randy Dunlap
    • [PATCH v5 06/12] S.A.R.A.: WX protection   Al Viro
      • [PATCH v5 06/12] S.A.R.A.: WX protection   Salvatore Mesoraca
      • [PATCH v5 06/12] S.A.R.A.: WX protection   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v5 06/12] S.A.R.A.: WX protection   David Laight
  • [PATCH v5 07/12] LSM: creation of "pagefault_handler" LSM hook   Salvatore Mesoraca
  • [PATCH v5 08/12] S.A.R.A.: trampoline emulation   Salvatore Mesoraca
    • [PATCH v5 08/12] S.A.R.A.: trampoline emulation   Randy Dunlap
  • [PATCH v5 09/12] S.A.R.A.: WX protection procattr interface   Salvatore Mesoraca
  • [PATCH v5 10/12] S.A.R.A.: XATTRs support   Salvatore Mesoraca
  • [PATCH v5 11/12] S.A.R.A.: /proc/*/mem write limitation   Salvatore Mesoraca
    • [PATCH v5 11/12] S.A.R.A.: /proc/*/mem write limitation   Jann Horn
      • [PATCH v5 11/12] S.A.R.A.: /proc/*/mem write limitation   Salvatore Mesoraca
  • [PATCH v5 12/12] MAINTAINERS: take maintainership for S.A.R.A.   Salvatore Mesoraca
  • [PATCH v5 00/12] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM   Jordan Glover
    • [PATCH v5 00/12] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM   Salvatore Mesoraca
  • [PATCH v5 00/12] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM   James Morris
    • [PATCH v5 00/12] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM   Salvatore Mesoraca
• [PATCH] security/commoncap: Use xattr security prefix len   Carmeli Tamir
  • [PATCH] security/commoncap: Use xattr security prefix len   James Morris
• [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX   Sean Christopherson
• [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Sean Christopherson
• [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks   Cedric Xing
  • [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH v3 1/4] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Cedric Xing
• [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] x86/64: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module   Cedric Xing
  • [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] x86/64: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module   Sean Christopherson
• [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module   Cedric Xing
  • [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module   Casey Schaufler
    • [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Cedric Xing
  • [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Xing, Cedric
  • [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Xing, Cedric
• [PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around   Tetsuo Handa
  • [PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around   Al Viro
    • [PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around   Al Viro
      • [PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around   Al Viro
      • [PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around   Al Viro
      • [PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around   John Johansen
      • [PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around   James Morris
      • [PATCH 02/10] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around   Al Viro
• [RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Jens Wiklander
    • [RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Sumit Garg
• [GIT PULL] integrity subsystem updates for v5.3   Mimi Zohar
  • [GIT PULL] integrity subsystem updates for v5.3   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG   Sean Christopherson
• [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting   Sean Christopherson
  • [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [RFC 3/7] tee: add private login method for kernel clients   Jens Wiklander
  • [RFC 3/7] tee: add private login method for kernel clients   Sumit Garg
    • [RFC 3/7] tee: add private login method for kernel clients   Jens Wiklander
      • [RFC 3/7] tee: add private login method for kernel clients   Sumit Garg
      • [RFC 3/7] tee: add private login method for kernel clients   Jens Wiklander
      • [RFC 3/7] tee: add private login method for kernel clients   Sumit Garg
• [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Sean Christopherson
  • [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Xing, Cedric
• [PATCH 2/9] security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch [ver #5]   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH 3/9] security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion [ver #5]   Stephen Smalley
• [GIT PULL] tpmdd updates for Linux v5.3   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• keyrings pull requests for the next merge window   Linus Torvalds
• [GIT PULL] LSM: capabilities updates for v5.3   James Morris
  • [GIT PULL] LSM: capabilities updates for v5.3   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• RFC: BUG: overlayfs getxattr recursion leaves a poison sid.   Casey Schaufler
  • RFC: BUG: overlayfs getxattr recursion leaves a poison sid.   Mark Salyzyn
• [PATCH v1 01/22] docs: Documentation/*.txt: rename all ReST files to *.rst   Rob Herring
• Reminder: 2 open syzbot bugs in "security/integrity" subsystem   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH 2/2] KEYS: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL   Eric Biggers
  • [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL   Eric Biggers
  • [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL   Eric Biggers
    • [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL   Eric Biggers
• Greetings!   fuqingzheng at asia.com
• [RFC PATCH] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Aaron Goidel
  • [RFC PATCH] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Amir Goldstein
    • [Non-DoD Source] Re: [RFC PATCH] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Aaron Goidel
  • [RFC PATCH] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Casey Schaufler
    • [RFC PATCH] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Randy Dunlap
      • [RFC PATCH] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Joe Perches
      • [RFC PATCH] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Joe Perches
      • [RFC PATCH] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Randy Dunlap
    • [RFC PATCH] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Casey Schaufler
    • [RFC PATCH] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   James Morris
• [PATCH V34 10/29] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Joey Lee
• [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Xing, Cedric
• [PATCH V34 10/29] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   joeyli
• possible deadlock in process_measurement   Mimi Zohar
  • possible deadlock in process_measurement   Eric Biggers
    • possible deadlock in process_measurement   Eric Biggers
• possible deadlock in process_measurement   Mimi Zohar
  • possible deadlock in process_measurement   Mimi Zohar
• Some LSM and SGX remarks before parting of for two weeks   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Some LSM and SGX remarks before parting of for two weeks   James Morris
    • Some LSM and SGX remarks before parting of for two weeks   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH 11/12] Documentation/x86: repointer docs to Documentation/arch/   Alex Shi
• [PATCH] LSM: Update MAINTAINERS file for SafeSetID LSM.   Micah Morton
  • [PATCH] LSM: Update MAINTAINERS file for SafeSetID LSM.   James Morris
    • [PATCH] LSM: Update MAINTAINERS file for SafeSetID LSM.   Micah Morton
• Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
  • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Steve Grubb
    • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Richard Guy Briggs
• [RFC PATCH v6 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Singh Khurana
  • [RFC PATCH v6 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Milan Broz
    • [RFC PATCH v6 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Singh Khurana
      • [RFC PATCH v6 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Milan Broz
• [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   Nicholas Franck
  • [RFC PATCH] security,capability: pass object information to security_capable   James Morris
    • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   Richard Guy Briggs
  • [RFC PATCH] security,capability: pass object information to security_capable   Casey Schaufler
    • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   James Morris
      • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   James Morris
      • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   Serge E. Hallyn
      • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable   Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH] security,capability: pass object information to security_capable   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH 1/6] security: Add hooks to rule on setting a superblock or mount watch [ver #5]   James Morris
• [PATCH v21 17/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
• Loan offer !!   Smith Jerry
• Kindly Respond   Donald Douglas
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.2 116/249] integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch   Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.1 102/219] integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch   Sasha Levin
• [GIT PULL] SafeSetID LSM changes for 5.3   Micah Morton
  • [GIT PULL] SafeSetID LSM changes for 5.3   Linus Torvalds
    • [GIT PULL] SafeSetID LSM changes for 5.3   Linus Torvalds
    • [GIT PULL] SafeSetID LSM changes for 5.3   Micah Morton
  • [GIT PULL] SafeSetID LSM changes for 5.3   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [PATCH V35 00/29] Kernel lockdown functionality   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 01/29] security: Support early LSMs   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 10/29] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V35 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Dave Young
      • [PATCH V35 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V35 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   James Morris
  • [PATCH V35 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V35 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Daniel Borkmann
      • [PATCH V35 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 24/29] Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V35 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   James Morris
  • [PATCH V35 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V35 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down   Steven Rostedt
      • [PATCH V35 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V35 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages   Matthew Garrett
• [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Andy Lutomirski
• Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
• Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
  • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Paul Moore
    • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
    • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Steve Grubb
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Paul Moore
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Steve Grubb
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Paul Moore
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Paul Moore
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Paul Moore
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Simon McVittie
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Simon McVittie
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Simon McVittie
      • Dbus and multiple LSMs (was Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs)   Casey Schaufler
      • Dbus and multiple LSMs (was Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs)   Simon McVittie
      • Dbus and multiple LSMs (was Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs)   Casey Schaufler
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Paul Moore
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   James Morris
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Paul Moore
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Simon McVittie
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   James Morris
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Paul Moore
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   James Morris
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Paul Moore
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   William Roberts
      • Preferred subj= with multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
• [RFC] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Matthew Garrett
• KASAN: use-after-free Write in check_noncircular   syzbot
  • KASAN: use-after-free Write in check_noncircular   Tetsuo Handa
• [RFC PATCH v7 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Khurana
  • [RFC PATCH v7 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Khurana
    • [RFC PATCH v7 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Randy Dunlap
• [RFC/RFT v2 0/2] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC/RFT v2 1/2] KEYS: trusted: create trusted keys subsystem   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC/RFT v2 2/2] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework   Sumit Garg
• [RFC PATCH v2] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Aaron Goidel
  • [RFC PATCH v2] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Amir Goldstein
    • [Non-DoD Source] Re: [RFC PATCH v2] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Aaron Goidel
      • [Non-DoD Source] Re: [RFC PATCH v2] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Amir Goldstein
  • [RFC PATCH v2] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH V36 00/29] security: Add kernel lockdown functionality   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 01/29] security: Support early LSMs   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V36 01/29] security: Support early LSMs   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH V36 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V36 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH V36 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 10/29] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V36 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V36 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V36 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V36 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH V36 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 24/29] Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V36 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down   Steven Rostedt
      • [PATCH] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
      • [PATCH] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down   Steven Rostedt
  • [PATCH V36 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V36 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH bpf-next v10 00/10] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH bpf-next v10 02/10] bpf: Add expected_attach_triggers and a is_valid_triggers() verifier   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH bpf-next v10 03/10] bpf, landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock hooks   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH bpf-next v10 04/10] seccomp, landlock: Enforce Landlock programs per process hierarchy   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH bpf-next v10 05/10] landlock: Handle filesystem access control   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH bpf-next v10 06/10] bpf,landlock: Add a new map type: inode   Mickaël Salaün
    • [PATCH bpf-next v10 06/10] bpf,landlock: Add a new map type: inode   Alexei Starovoitov
      • [PATCH bpf-next v10 06/10] bpf,landlock: Add a new map type: inode   Mickaël Salaün
      • [PATCH bpf-next v10 06/10] bpf, landlock: Add a new map type: inode   Alexei Starovoitov
      • [PATCH bpf-next v10 06/10] bpf,landlock: Add a new map type: inode   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH bpf-next v10 09/10] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH bpf-next v10 01/10] fs, security: Add a new file access type: MAY_CHROOT   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH bpf-next v10 07/10] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH bpf-next v10 08/10] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH bpf-next v10 10/10] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation for Landlock   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH bpf-next v10 10/10] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation for Landlock   Randy Dunlap
• [PATCH] [RESEND v2] structleak: disable STRUCTLEAK_BYREF in combination with KASAN_STACK   Arnd Bergmann
  • [PATCH] [RESEND v2] structleak: disable STRUCTLEAK_BYREF in combination with KASAN_STACK   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH] [RESEND v2] structleak: disable STRUCTLEAK_BYREF in combination with KASAN_STACK   Arnd Bergmann
      • [PATCH] [RESEND v2] structleak: disable STRUCTLEAK_BYREF in combination with KASAN_STACK   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH] [RESEND v2] structleak: disable STRUCTLEAK_BYREF in combination with KASAN_STACK   Arnd Bergmann
  • [PATCH] [RESEND v2] structleak: disable STRUCTLEAK_BYREF in combination with KASAN_STACK   Kees Cook
• [PATCH] selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH] selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry   Paul Moore
  • [PATCH] selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry   Ondrej Mosnacek
• [PATCH] security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb()   Jia-Ju Bai
• [RFC PATCH v3] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Aaron Goidel
• Reminder: 2 open syzbot bugs in "security/tomoyo" subsystem   Eric Biggers
  • Reminder: 2 open syzbot bugs in "security/tomoyo" subsystem   Tetsuo Handa
    • Reminder: 2 open syzbot bugs in "security/tomoyo" subsystem   Eric Biggers
      • Reminder: 2 open syzbot bugs in "security/tomoyo" subsystem   Tetsuo Handa
      • Reminder: 2 open syzbot bugs in "security/tomoyo" subsystem   Eric Biggers
• Reminder: 1 open syzbot bug in "security/smack" subsystem   Eric Biggers
• Reminder: 1 open syzbot bug in "security/integrity" subsystem   Eric Biggers
• KASAN: use-after-free Read in keyring_compare_object   syzbot
• [PATCH] test_meminit: use GFP_ATOMIC in RCU critical section   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH 0/5] security: integrity: Makefile cleanups   Masahiro Yamada
  • [PATCH 3/5] integrity: use obj-y for non-modular objects   Masahiro Yamada
• [PATCH 1/5] integrity: remove unneeded, broken attempt to add -fshort-wchar   Masahiro Yamada
• [PATCH 2/5] integrity: remove pointless subdir-$(CONFIG_...)   Masahiro Yamada
• [PATCH 4/5] IMA: use obj-y for non-modular objects   Masahiro Yamada
  • [PATCH 4/5] IMA: use obj-y for non-modular objects   Eric Biggers
    • [PATCH 4/5] IMA: use obj-y for non-modular objects   Masahiro Yamada
• [PATCH 5/5] EVM: use obj-y for non-modular objects   Masahiro Yamada
• [PATCH] AppArmor: Remove semicolon   Vasyl Gomonovych
• [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.3 (#1)   Paul Moore
  • [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.3 (#1)   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [PATCH v5 00/27] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 01/27] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 02/27] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 03/27] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 04/27] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 05/27] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 06/27] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 07/27] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 08/27] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 09/27] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 10/27] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 11/27] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 12/27] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 13/27] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 14/27] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH 14/27] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 15/27] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 16/27] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 17/27] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 18/27] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 19/27] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 20/27] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 21/27] SELinux: Verify LSM display sanity in binder   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 22/27] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 23/27] Audit: Include object data for all security modules   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 24/27] LSM: Provide an user space interface for the default display   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH 24/27] LSM: Provide an user space interface for the default display   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 25/27] NET: Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH 25/27] NET: Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for multiple LSMs   Simon McVittie
      • [PATCH 25/27] NET: Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for multiple LSMs   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 26/27] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH 26/27] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 26/27] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH 26/27] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 27/27] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   Casey Schaufler
• [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC v2 1/6] tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC v2 2/6] tee: enable support to register kernel memory   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC v2 3/6] tee: add private login method for kernel clients   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC v2 4/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC v2 5/6] doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC v2 6/6] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Janne Karhunen
    • [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Janne Karhunen
      • [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Sumit Garg
    • [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Sumit Garg
      • [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Janne Karhunen
      • [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Sumit Garg
• [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf   Andy Lutomirski
  • [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf   Song Liu
    • [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH v12 0/5] overlayfs override_creds=off   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Aaron Goidel
  • [PATCH] fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH] tomoyo: common: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability   Gustavo A. R. Silva
• [GIT PULL] SafeSetID MAINTAINERS file update for v5.3   Micah Morton
• [PATCH V37 00/29] security: Add support for locking down the kernel   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 01/29] security: Support early LSMs   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 10/29] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 24/29] Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V37 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages   Matthew Garrett

Last message date: Wed Jul 31 22:16:17 UTC 2019
Archived on: Wed Jul 31 22:19:45 UTC 2019

• Messages sorted by: [ subject ] [ author ] [ date ]
• More info on this list...