[RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable
jmorris at namei.org
Sat Jul 13 04:29:59 UTC 2019
On Fri, 12 Jul 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> I'm not disagreeing with that. What I'm saying is that the capability
> check interface is not the right place to pass that information. The
> capability check has no use for the object information. I would much
> rather see a security_pass_object_data() hook that gets called after
> (or before) the security_capable() hook in the places where you want
> the extra information.
Extending existing security models is a core feature of the LSM framework.
The Linux capability code has no use for object metadata by design, but
extending that model to MAC (and other models) via LSM hooks is well
within scope and of course already happening e.g. mediating Linux
capabilities wrt SELinux subject types. Adding object metadata extends the
function of the capability hook along these lines, so that more effective
MAC policies may be implemented by LSMs.
<jmorris at namei.org>
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