[PATCH bpf-next v10 09/10] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock
Mickaël Salaün
mic at digikod.net
Sun Jul 21 21:31:15 UTC 2019
Test basic context access, ptrace protection and filesystem hooks.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast at kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital.net>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel at iogearbox.net>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris at namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah at kernel.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad at chromium.org>
---
Changes since v9:
* replace subtype with expected_attach_type and expected_attach_triggers
* rename inode_map_lookup() into inode_map_lookup_elem()
* check for inode map entry without value (which is now possible thanks
to the pointer null check)
* use read-only inode map for Landlock programs
Changes since v8:
* update eBPF include path for macros
* use TEST_GEN_PROGS and use the generic "clean" target
* add more verbose errors
* update the bpf/verifier files
* remove chain tests (from landlock and bpf/verifier)
* replace the whitelist tests with blacklist tests (because of stateless
Landlock programs): remove "dotdot" tests and other depth tests
* sync the landlock Makefile with its bpf sibling directory and use
bpf_load_program_xattr()
Changes since v7:
* update tests and add new ones for filesystem hierarchy and Landlock
chains.
Changes since v6:
* use the new kselftest_harness.h
* use const variables
* replace ASSERT_STEP with ASSERT_*
* rename BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK to BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULE
* force sample library rebuild
* fix install target
Changes since v5:
* add subtype test
* add ptrace tests
* split and rename files
* cleanup and rebase
---
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 1 +
.../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/landlock.c | 24 ++
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore | 4 +
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile | 39 +++
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test.h | 50 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c | 24 ++
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c | 256 ++++++++++++++++++
.../testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c | 148 ++++++++++
9 files changed, 547 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/landlock.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
index 25b43a8c2b15..1949fbb3098e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ TARGETS += ir
TARGETS += kcmp
TARGETS += kexec
TARGETS += kvm
+TARGETS += landlock
TARGETS += lib
TARGETS += livepatch
TARGETS += membarrier
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
index b0773291012a..b8542431c78b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/if_ether.h>
#include <linux/btf.h>
+#include <linux/landlock.h>
#include <bpf/bpf.h>
#include <bpf/libbpf.h>
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/landlock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/landlock.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..eaf6dddbf208
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/landlock.c
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+{
+ "landlock/fs_walk: always accept",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK,
+ .expected_attach_type = BPF_LANDLOCK_FS_WALK,
+},
+{
+ "landlock/fs_pick: read context",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_6,
+ offsetof(struct landlock_ctx_fs_pick, inode)),
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK,
+ .expected_attach_type = BPF_LANDLOCK_FS_PICK,
+ .expected_attach_triggers = LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READ,
+},
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..25b9cd834c3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+/test_base
+/test_fs
+/test_ptrace
+/tmp_*
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7a253bf6d580
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+LIBDIR := ../../../lib
+BPFDIR := $(LIBDIR)/bpf
+APIDIR := ../../../include/uapi
+GENDIR := ../../../../include/generated
+GENHDR := $(GENDIR)/autoconf.h
+
+ifneq ($(wildcard $(GENHDR)),)
+ GENFLAGS := -DHAVE_GENHDR
+endif
+
+BPFOBJS := $(BPFDIR)/bpf.o $(BPFDIR)/nlattr.o
+LOADOBJ := ../../../../samples/bpf/bpf_load.o
+
+CFLAGS += -Wl,-no-as-needed -Wall -O2 -I$(APIDIR) -I$(LIBDIR) -I$(BPFDIR) -I$(GENDIR) $(GENFLAGS) -I../../../include
+LDFLAGS += -lelf
+
+test_src = $(wildcard test_*.c)
+
+test_objs := $(test_src:.c=)
+
+TEST_GEN_PROGS := $(test_objs)
+
+.PHONY: all clean force
+
+all: $(test_objs)
+
+# force a rebuild of BPFOBJS when its dependencies are updated
+force:
+
+# rebuild bpf.o as a workaround for the samples/bpf bug
+$(BPFOBJS): $(LOADOBJ) force
+ $(MAKE) -C $(BPFDIR)
+
+$(LOADOBJ): force
+ $(MAKE) -C $(dir $(LOADOBJ))
+
+$(test_objs): $(BPFOBJS) $(LOADOBJ) ../kselftest_harness.h
+
+include ../lib.mk
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test.h b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e1e86a804180
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Landlock helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2019 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#include <bpf/bpf.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/landlock.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+
+#include "../kselftest_harness.h"
+#include "../../../../samples/bpf/bpf_load.h"
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG
+#define SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG 4
+#endif
+
+#ifndef seccomp
+static int __attribute__((unused)) seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
+ void *args)
+{
+ errno = 0;
+ return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* bpf_load_program() with subtype */
+static int __attribute__((unused)) ll_bpf_load_program(
+ const struct bpf_insn *insns, size_t insns_cnt, char *log_buf,
+ size_t log_buf_sz, const enum bpf_attach_type attach_type,
+ __u64 attach_triggers)
+{
+ struct bpf_load_program_attr load_attr;
+
+ memset(&load_attr, 0, sizeof(struct bpf_load_program_attr));
+ load_attr.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK;
+ load_attr.expected_attach_type = attach_type;
+ load_attr.expected_attach_triggers = attach_triggers;
+ load_attr.insns = insns;
+ load_attr.insns_cnt = insns_cnt;
+ load_attr.license = "GPL";
+
+ return bpf_load_program_xattr(&load_attr, log_buf, log_buf_sz);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..db46f39048cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Landlock tests - base
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net>
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "test.h"
+
+TEST(seccomp_landlock)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG, 0, NULL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK");
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f35b99fcb70f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Landlock tests - file system
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2018-2019 Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net>
+ */
+
+#include <bpf/bpf.h> /* bpf_create_map() */
+#include <fcntl.h> /* O_DIRECTORY */
+#include <sys/stat.h> /* statbuf */
+#include <unistd.h> /* faccessat() */
+
+#include "test.h"
+
+#define TEST_PATH_TRIGGERS ( \
+ LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_OPEN | \
+ LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READDIR | \
+ LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_EXECUTE | \
+ LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_GETATTR)
+
+static void test_path_rel(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int dirfd,
+ const char *path, int ret)
+{
+ int fd;
+ struct stat statbuf;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, faccessat(dirfd, path, R_OK | X_OK, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, fstatat(dirfd, path, &statbuf, 0));
+ fd = openat(dirfd, path, O_DIRECTORY);
+ if (ret) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, fd);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_NE(-1, fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+ }
+}
+
+static void test_path(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, const char *path,
+ int ret)
+{
+ return test_path_rel(_metadata, AT_FDCWD, path, ret);
+}
+
+static const char d1[] = "/usr";
+static const char d2[] = "/usr/share";
+static const char d3[] = "/usr/share/doc";
+
+TEST(fs_base)
+{
+ test_path(_metadata, d1, 0);
+ test_path(_metadata, d2, 0);
+ test_path(_metadata, d3, 0);
+}
+
+#define MAP_VALUE_DENY 1
+
+static int create_denied_inode_map(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ const char *const dirs[])
+{
+ int map, key, dirs_len, i;
+ __u64 value = MAP_VALUE_DENY;
+
+ ASSERT_NE(NULL, dirs) {
+ TH_LOG("No directory list\n");
+ }
+ ASSERT_NE(NULL, dirs[0]) {
+ TH_LOG("Empty directory list\n");
+ }
+
+ /* get the number of dir entries */
+ for (dirs_len = 0; dirs[dirs_len]; dirs_len++);
+ map = bpf_create_map(BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE, sizeof(key), sizeof(value),
+ dirs_len, BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG);
+ ASSERT_NE(-1, map) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to create a map of %d elements: %s\n", dirs_len,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; dirs[i]; i++) {
+ key = open(dirs[i], O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY);
+ ASSERT_NE(-1, key) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to open directory \"%s\": %s\n", dirs[i],
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bpf_map_update_elem(map, &key, &value, BPF_ANY)) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to update the map with \"%s\": %s\n",
+ dirs[i], strerror(errno));
+ }
+ close(key);
+ }
+ return map;
+}
+
+static void enforce_map(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int map,
+ bool subpath)
+{
+ const struct bpf_insn prog_deny[] = {
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1),
+ /* look for the requested inode in the map */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_6,
+ offsetof(struct landlock_ctx_fs_walk, inode)),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map), /* 2 instructions */
+ BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
+ BPF_FUNC_inode_map_lookup_elem),
+ /* if there is no mark, then allow access to this inode */
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ /* otherwise, deny access to this inode */
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, MAP_VALUE_DENY, 2),
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, LANDLOCK_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, LANDLOCK_RET_DENY),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ };
+ int fd_walk = -1, fd_pick;
+ char log[1024] = "";
+
+ if (subpath) {
+ fd_walk = ll_bpf_load_program((const struct bpf_insn *)&prog_deny,
+ sizeof(prog_deny) / sizeof(struct bpf_insn),
+ log, sizeof(log), BPF_LANDLOCK_FS_WALK, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(-1, fd_walk) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to load fs_walk program: %s\n%s",
+ strerror(errno), log);
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG, 0, &fd_walk)) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to apply Landlock program: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd_walk));
+ }
+
+ fd_pick = ll_bpf_load_program((const struct bpf_insn *)&prog_deny,
+ sizeof(prog_deny) / sizeof(struct bpf_insn), log,
+ sizeof(log), BPF_LANDLOCK_FS_PICK, TEST_PATH_TRIGGERS);
+ ASSERT_NE(-1, fd_pick) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to load fs_pick program: %s\n%s",
+ strerror(errno), log);
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG, 0, &fd_pick)) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to apply Landlock program: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd_pick));
+}
+
+static void check_map_blacklist(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ bool subpath)
+{
+ int map = create_denied_inode_map(_metadata, (const char *const [])
+ { d2, NULL });
+ ASSERT_NE(-1, map);
+ enforce_map(_metadata, map, subpath);
+ test_path(_metadata, d1, 0);
+ test_path(_metadata, d2, -1);
+ test_path(_metadata, d3, subpath ? -1 : 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(map));
+}
+
+TEST(fs_map_blacklist_literal)
+{
+ check_map_blacklist(_metadata, false);
+}
+
+TEST(fs_map_blacklist_subpath)
+{
+ check_map_blacklist(_metadata, true);
+}
+
+static const char r2[] = ".";
+static const char r3[] = "./doc";
+
+enum relative_access {
+ REL_OPEN,
+ REL_CHDIR,
+ REL_CHROOT,
+};
+
+static void check_access(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ bool enforce, enum relative_access rel)
+{
+ int dirfd;
+ int map = -1;
+
+ if (rel == REL_CHROOT)
+ ASSERT_NE(-1, chdir(d2));
+ if (enforce) {
+ map = create_denied_inode_map(_metadata, (const char *const [])
+ { d3, NULL });
+ ASSERT_NE(-1, map);
+ enforce_map(_metadata, map, true);
+ }
+ switch (rel) {
+ case REL_OPEN:
+ dirfd = open(d2, O_DIRECTORY);
+ ASSERT_NE(-1, dirfd);
+ break;
+ case REL_CHDIR:
+ ASSERT_NE(-1, chdir(d2));
+ dirfd = AT_FDCWD;
+ break;
+ case REL_CHROOT:
+ ASSERT_NE(-1, chroot(d2)) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to chroot: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ dirfd = AT_FDCWD;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ASSERT_TRUE(false);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ test_path_rel(_metadata, dirfd, r2, 0);
+ test_path_rel(_metadata, dirfd, r3, enforce ? -1 : 0);
+
+ if (rel == REL_OPEN)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(dirfd));
+ if (enforce)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(map));
+}
+
+TEST(fs_allow_open)
+{
+ /* no enforcement, via open */
+ check_access(_metadata, false, REL_OPEN);
+}
+
+TEST(fs_allow_chdir)
+{
+ /* no enforcement, via chdir */
+ check_access(_metadata, false, REL_CHDIR);
+}
+
+TEST(fs_allow_chroot)
+{
+ /* no enforcement, via chroot */
+ check_access(_metadata, false, REL_CHROOT);
+}
+
+TEST(fs_deny_open)
+{
+ /* enforcement without tag, via open */
+ check_access(_metadata, true, REL_OPEN);
+}
+
+TEST(fs_deny_chdir)
+{
+ /* enforcement without tag, via chdir */
+ check_access(_metadata, true, REL_CHDIR);
+}
+
+TEST(fs_deny_chroot)
+{
+ /* enforcement without tag, via chroot */
+ check_access(_metadata, true, REL_CHROOT);
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b190a809ceec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Landlock tests - ptrace
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net>
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <signal.h> /* raise */
+#include <sys/ptrace.h>
+#include <sys/types.h> /* waitpid */
+#include <sys/wait.h> /* waitpid */
+#include <unistd.h> /* fork, pipe */
+
+#include "test.h"
+
+static void apply_null_sandbox(struct __test_metadata *_metadata)
+{
+ const struct bpf_insn prog_accept[] = {
+ BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ };
+ int prog;
+ char log[256] = "";
+
+ prog = ll_bpf_load_program((const struct bpf_insn *)&prog_accept,
+ sizeof(prog_accept) / sizeof(struct bpf_insn), log,
+ sizeof(log), BPF_LANDLOCK_FS_PICK, LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_OPEN);
+ ASSERT_NE(-1, prog) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to load minimal rule: %s\n%s",
+ strerror(errno), log);
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG, 0, &prog)) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to apply minimal rule: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(prog));
+}
+
+/* PTRACE_TRACEME and PTRACE_ATTACH without Landlock rules effect */
+static void check_ptrace(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ int sandbox_both, int sandbox_parent, int sandbox_child,
+ int expect_ptrace)
+{
+ pid_t child;
+ int status;
+ int pipefd[2];
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(pipefd));
+ if (sandbox_both)
+ apply_null_sandbox(_metadata);
+
+ child = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+ if (child == 0) {
+ char buf;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[1]));
+ if (sandbox_child)
+ apply_null_sandbox(_metadata);
+
+ /* test traceme */
+ ASSERT_EQ(expect_ptrace, ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME));
+ if (expect_ptrace) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, raise(SIGSTOP));
+ }
+
+ /* sync */
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipefd[0], &buf, 1)) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to read() sync from parent");
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ('.', buf);
+ _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[0]));
+ if (sandbox_parent)
+ apply_null_sandbox(_metadata);
+
+ /* test traceme */
+ if (!expect_ptrace) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFSTOPPED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, child, NULL, 0));
+ }
+ /* test attach */
+ ASSERT_EQ(expect_ptrace, ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, child, NULL, 0));
+ if (expect_ptrace) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFSTOPPED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child, NULL, 0));
+ }
+
+ /* sync */
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipefd[1], ".", 1)) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to write() sync to child");
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status))
+ _metadata->passed = 0;
+}
+
+TEST(ptrace_allow_without_sandbox)
+{
+ /* no sandbox */
+ check_ptrace(_metadata, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+TEST(ptrace_allow_with_one_sandbox)
+{
+ /* child sandbox */
+ check_ptrace(_metadata, 0, 0, 1, 0);
+}
+
+TEST(ptrace_allow_with_nested_sandbox)
+{
+ /* inherited and child sandbox */
+ check_ptrace(_metadata, 1, 0, 1, 0);
+}
+
+TEST(ptrace_deny_with_parent_sandbox)
+{
+ /* parent sandbox */
+ check_ptrace(_metadata, 0, 1, 0, -1);
+}
+
+TEST(ptrace_deny_with_nested_and_parent_sandbox)
+{
+ /* inherited and parent sandbox */
+ check_ptrace(_metadata, 1, 1, 0, -1);
+}
+
+TEST(ptrace_deny_with_forked_sandbox)
+{
+ /* inherited, parent and child sandbox */
+ check_ptrace(_metadata, 1, 1, 1, -1);
+}
+
+TEST(ptrace_deny_with_sibling_sandbox)
+{
+ /* parent and child sandbox */
+ check_ptrace(_metadata, 0, 1, 1, -1);
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
2.22.0
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