[RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
jarkko.sakkinen at linux.intel.com
Tue Jul 9 16:22:03 UTC 2019
On Mon, Jul 08, 2019 at 10:29:30AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 05, 2019 at 07:05:49PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 19, 2019 at 03:23:49PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > I still don't get why we need this whole mess and do not simply admit
> > that there are two distinct roles:
> > 1. Creator
> > 2. User
> Because SELinux has existing concepts of EXECMEM and EXECMOD.
What is the official documentation for those? I've only found some
explanations from discussions and some RHEL sysadmin guides.
> That being said, we can do so without functional changes to the SGX uapi,
> e.g. add reserved fields so that the initial uapi can be extended *if* we
> decide to go with the "userspace provides maximal protections" path, and
> use the EPCM permissions as the maximal protections for the initial
> That'd give us a minimal implemenation for initial upstreaming and would
> eliminate Cedric's blocking complaint. The "whole mess" of whitelisting,
> blacklisting and SGX2 support would be deferred until post-upstreaming.
I'd like that approach more too.
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