[PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated
Roberto Sassu
roberto.sassu at huawei.com
Fri Jul 5 16:37:35 UTC 2019
Commit c78719203fc6 ("KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a
TPM") allows the trusted module to be loaded even a TPM is not found to
avoid module dependency problems.
Unfortunately, this does not completely solve the issue, as there could be
a case where a TPM is found but is not functional (the TPM commands return
an error). Specifically, after the tpm_chip structure is returned by
tpm_default_chip() in init_trusted(), the execution terminates after
init_digests() returns -EFAULT (due to the fact that tpm_get_random()
returns a positive value, but less than TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE).
This patch fixes the issue by ignoring the TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED and
TPM_ERR_DISABLED errors.
Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 2 --
include/linux/tpm.h | 3 +++
security/keys/trusted.c | 6 +++++-
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index e503ffc3aa39..a216ac396711 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ enum tpm_addr {
#define TPM_WARN_RETRY 0x800
#define TPM_WARN_DOING_SELFTEST 0x802
-#define TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED 0x6
-#define TPM_ERR_DISABLED 0x7
#define TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT 38
#define TPM_HEADER_SIZE 10
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 53c0ea9ec9df..efd3ccbb6aee 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */
#define TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED 0x6
+#define TPM_ERR_DISABLED 0x7
+
struct tpm_chip;
struct trusted_key_payload;
struct trusted_key_options;
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 9a94672e7adc..430d85090b3b 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -389,6 +389,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
+ /* This can happen if the TPM is inactive. */
+ if (!digests)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, digests) ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
@@ -1233,7 +1237,7 @@ static int __init init_digests(void)
int i;
ret = tpm_get_random(chip, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (ret < 0 || ret == TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED || ret == TPM_ERR_DISABLED)
return ret;
if (ret < TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE)
return -EFAULT;
--
2.17.1
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list