April 2019 Archives by thread

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Starting: Mon Apr 1 10:02:03 UTC 2019
Ending: Tue Apr 30 22:39:20 UTC 2019
Messages: 821

• [GIT PULL] tpmdd fixes for Linux v5.1   Jarkko Sakkinen
• Add support for TCG2 log format on UEFI systems   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Add support for TCG2 log format on UEFI systems   Matthew Garrett
    • Add support for TCG2 log format on UEFI systems   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Add support for TCG2 log format on UEFI systems   Matthew Garrett
      • Add support for TCG2 log format on UEFI systems   Jarkko Sakkinen
• Urgent!   Dr. Abidi Bello
• [PATCH] TCG2 log support build fixes for non-x86_64   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH 1/2] efi: Fix cast to pointer from integer of different size in TPM log code   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH 1/2] efi: Fix cast to pointer from integer of different size in TPM log code   David Laight
      • [PATCH 1/2] efi: Fix cast to pointer from integer of different size in TPM log code   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH 1/2] efi: Fix cast to pointer from integer of different size in TPM log code   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [PATCH 1/2] efi: Fix cast to pointer from integer of different size in TPM log code   Ard Biesheuvel
      • [PATCH 1/2] efi: Fix cast to pointer from integer of different size in TPM log code   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH 2/2] tpm: Fix builds on platforms that lack early_memremap()   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH 2/2] tpm: Fix builds on platforms that lack early_memremap()   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH] TCG2 log support build fixes for non-x86_64   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [PATCH] TCG2 log support build fixes for non-x86_64   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH] TCG2 log support build fixes for non-x86_64   Jarkko Sakkinen
• Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Matthew Garrett
  • Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Igor Zhbanov
    • Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Matthew Garrett
      • Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Igor Zhbanov
      • Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Matthew Garrett
      • Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Igor Zhbanov
      • Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Matthew Garrett
      • Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Igor Zhbanov
  • Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Mimi Zohar
    • Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Perez Yves-Alexis
• Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Mimi Zohar
  • Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Stephen Smalley
    • Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Mimi Zohar
      • Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Stephen Smalley
      • Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH] Smack: Fix IPv6 handling of 0 secmark   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH V32 0/27] Lockdown patches for 5.2   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V32 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Andrew Donnellan
      • [PATCH V32 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Daniel Axtens
      • [PATCH V32 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Matthew Garrett
      • [PATCH V32 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Daniel Axtens
      • [PATCH V32 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Daniel Axtens
      • [PATCH V32 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Andrew Donnellan
    • [PATCH V32 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 02/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 03/27] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 04/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 05/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 06/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 07/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V32 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   Thomas Gleixner
  • [PATCH V32 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 13/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 14/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 15/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 16/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 17/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 18/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 19/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V32 19/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Steven Rostedt
    • [PATCH V32 19/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Thomas Gleixner
  • [PATCH V32 20/27] Lock down /proc/kcore   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 21/27] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 22/27] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V32 22/27] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Jann Horn
  • [PATCH V32 23/27] Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 24/27] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 25/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 26/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V32 27/27] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V32 27/27] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down   Steven Rostedt
      • [PATCH V32 27/27] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• [RFC PATCH v9 00/13] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership   Nadav Amit
  • [RFC PATCH v9 00/13] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership   Khalid Aziz
• [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Andy Lutomirski
    • [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Greg KH
      • [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Greg KH
• [PATCH v2 1/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Masahiro Yamada
  • [PATCH v2 1/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH v2 2/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Masahiro Yamada
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH 1/2] apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches   Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
  • [PATCH 1/2] apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches   Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
  • [PATCH 1/2] apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches   John Johansen
    • [PATCH 1/2] apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches   Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
• [PATCH 2/2] apparmor: Switch to GFP_KERNEL where possible   Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
• Vidat Advocaten   Vidat Advocaten
• [PATCH v3 bpf-next 00/21] bpf: Sysctl hook   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v3 bpf-next 00/21] bpf: Sysctl hook   Alexei Starovoitov
    • [PATCH v3 bpf-next 00/21] bpf: Sysctl hook   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v3 bpf-next 00/21] bpf: Sysctl hook   Andrey Ignatov
• [REGRESSION] AppArmor module parameter layout changed with c5459b829b716   David Rheinsberg
  • [REGRESSION] AppArmor module parameter layout changed with c5459b829b716   Kees Cook
• [PATCH] apparmor: Restore Y/N in /sys for apparmor's "enabled"   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH] apparmor: Restore Y/N in /sys for apparmor's "enabled"   John Johansen
    • [PATCH] apparmor: Restore Y/N in /sys for apparmor's "enabled"   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH] apparmor: Restore Y/N in /sys for apparmor's "enabled"   John Johansen
  • [PATCH] apparmor: Restore Y/N in /sys for apparmor's "enabled"   David Rheinsberg
    • [PATCH] apparmor: Restore Y/N in /sys for apparmor's "enabled"   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH] apparmor: Restore Y/N in /sys for apparmor's "enabled"   James Morris
      • [PATCH] apparmor: Restore Y/N in /sys for apparmor's "enabled"   James Morris
      • [PATCH] apparmor: Restore Y/N in /sys for apparmor's "enabled"   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH] apparmor: Restore Y/N in /sys for apparmor's "enabled"   John Johansen
      • [PATCH] apparmor: Restore Y/N in /sys for apparmor's "enabled"   John Johansen
• [GIT PULL] tpmdd fixes for Linux v5.1   Dan Williams
  • [GIT PULL] tpmdd fixes for Linux v5.1   James Morris
• [PATCH v2 2/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Laura Abbott
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v2 2/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH v2 2/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH v3 0/2] RFC: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH v3 1/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH v3 1/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Randy Dunlap
      • [PATCH v3 1/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH v3 1/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Masahiro Yamada
      • [PATCH v3 1/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH v3 1/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH v3 1/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v3 2/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH v3 2/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Jann Horn
    • [PATCH v3 2/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Mark Rutland
      • [PATCH v3 2/2] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Alexander Potapenko
• [GIT PULL] TPM fixes for v5.1   James Morris
  • [GIT PULL] TPM fixes for v5.1   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [PATCH 00/59] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 01/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 02/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 03/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 04/59] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 05/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 06/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 07/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 08/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 09/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 10/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 11/59] LSM: Fix logical operation in lsm_export checks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 12/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 13/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 14/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 15/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 16/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 17/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 18/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 19/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 20/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 21/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 22/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 23/59] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 24/59] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 25/59] Audit: Convert osid to an lsm_export structure   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 26/59] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 27/59] NET: Store LSM access information in the socket blob for UDS   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 28/59] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 29/59] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 30/59] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 31/59] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 32/59] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 33/59] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 34/59] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 35/59] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 36/59] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 37/59] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 38/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 39/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 40/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 41/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 42/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 43/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 44/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 45/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 46/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 47/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 00/59] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 01/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 02/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 03/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 04/59] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 05/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 06/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 07/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 08/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 09/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 10/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 11/59] LSM: Fix logical operation in lsm_export checks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 12/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 13/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 14/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 15/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 16/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 17/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 18/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 19/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 20/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 21/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 22/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 23/59] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 24/59] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 25/59] Audit: Convert osid to an lsm_export structure   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 26/59] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 27/59] NET: Store LSM access information in the socket blob for UDS   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 28/59] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 29/59] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 30/59] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 31/59] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 32/59] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 33/59] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 34/59] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 35/59] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 36/59] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 37/59] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 38/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 39/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 40/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH v3 bpf-next 00/21] bpf: Sysctl hook   Jann Horn
  • [PATCH v3 bpf-next 00/21] bpf: Sysctl hook   Andrey Ignatov
    • [PATCH v3 bpf-next 00/21] bpf: Sysctl hook   Jann Horn
      • [PATCH v3 bpf-next 00/21] bpf: Sysctl hook   Alexei Starovoitov
• [PATCH 00/59] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 01/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 02/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 04/59] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 06/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 07/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 09/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 10/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 11/59] LSM: Fix logical operation in lsm_export checks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 12/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 13/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 14/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 15/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 16/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 17/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 18/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 19/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 20/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 21/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 22/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 23/59] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 24/59] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 25/59] Audit: Convert osid to an lsm_export structure   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 26/59] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 27/59] NET: Store LSM access information in the socket blob for UDS   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH 27/59] NET: Store LSM access information in the socket blob for UDS   Stephen Smalley
  • [PATCH 28/59] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 29/59] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 30/59] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 31/59] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 32/59] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 33/59] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 34/59] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 35/59] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 36/59] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 37/59] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 38/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 39/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 40/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 41/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 42/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 43/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 44/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 45/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 46/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 47/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 48/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 49/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 50/59] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 51/59] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 52/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_setsecctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 53/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_setsecctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 54/59] kernfs: remove lsm_context scaffolding   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 55/59] LSM: Remove unused macro   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 56/59] LSM: Special handling for secctx lsm hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 57/59] SELinux: Use blob offset in current_sid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 58/59] LSM: Specify which LSM to display with /proc/self/attr/display   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH 58/59] LSM: Specify which LSM to display with /proc/self/attr/display   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH 58/59] LSM: Specify which LSM to display with /proc/self/attr/display   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH 58/59] LSM: Specify which LSM to display with /proc/self/attr/display   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 59/59] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 00/59] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Stephen Smalley
    • [PATCH 00/59] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 03/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 05/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 08/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks   Casey Schaufler
• Sorry about duplicates on the stacking patches   Casey Schaufler
• [ANNOUNCE][CFP] Linux Security Summit North America 2019   James Morris
• [PATCH 1/1] Smack :- In this patch, global rule list has been removed. Now all smack rules will be read using "smack_known_list". This list contains all the smack labels and internally each smack label structure maintains the list of smack rules corresponding to that smack label. So there is no need to maintain extra list.   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 1/1] Smack: Create smack_rule cache to optimize memory usage   Casey Schaufler
• crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Eric Biggers
  • crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Kees Cook
    • crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Eric Biggers
      • crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Kees Cook
      • crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Eric Biggers
      • crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Kees Cook
      • crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Eric Biggers
      • crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Kees Cook
      • crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Eric Biggers
      • [PATCH] crypto: testmgr - allocate buffers with __GFP_COMP   Eric Biggers
      • [PATCH] crypto: testmgr - allocate buffers with __GFP_COMP   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH] crypto: testmgr - allocate buffers with __GFP_COMP   Dmitry Vyukov
      • [PATCH] crypto: testmgr - allocate buffers with __GFP_COMP   Matthew Wilcox
      • [PATCH] crypto: testmgr - allocate buffers with __GFP_COMP   Herbert Xu
      • [PATCH] crypto: testmgr - allocate buffers with __GFP_COMP   Matthew Wilcox
      • [PATCH] crypto: testmgr - allocate buffers with __GFP_COMP   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH] crypto: testmgr - allocate buffers with __GFP_COMP   Matthew Wilcox
      • [PATCH] crypto: testmgr - allocate buffers with __GFP_COMP   Russell King - ARM Linux admin
      • [PATCH] crypto: testmgr - allocate buffers with __GFP_COMP   Robin Murphy
      • crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Kees Cook
      • crypto: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages   Eric Biggers
• [GIT PULL] apparmor regression fix for v5.1-rc5   John Johansen
  • [GIT PULL] apparmor regression fix for v5.1-rc5   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [PATCH v4 0/3] RFC: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH v4 1/3] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_MEMORY and CONFIG_INIT_ALL_STACK   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH v4 2/3] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH v4 2/3] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v4 2/3] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH v4 2/3] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v4 2/3] initmem: introduce CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH 3/3] net: make sk_prot_alloc() work with CONFIG_INIT_ALL_HEAP   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH v5 1/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions   Micah Morton
  • [PATCH v5 1/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions   James Morris
• [PATCH 0/3] Kconfig: Refactor memory initialization hardening   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 0/3] Kconfig: Refactor memory initialization hardening   Masahiro Yamada
• [PATCH 1/3] Kconfig: Create "kernel hardening" config area   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 1/3] Kconfig: Create "kernel hardening" config area   Masahiro Yamada
    • [PATCH 1/3] Kconfig: Create "kernel hardening" config area   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 2/3] kbuild: Move stackleak config to Kconfig.hardening   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 3/3] kbuild: Implement Clang's stack initialization   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 3/3] kbuild: Implement Clang's stack initialization   Masahiro Yamada
    • [PATCH 3/3] kbuild: Implement Clang's stack initialization   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 01/10] LSM: SafeSetID: fix pr_warn() to include newline   Micah Morton
  • [PATCH 01/10] LSM: SafeSetID: fix pr_warn() to include newline   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 02/10] LSM: SafeSetID: fix check for setresuid(new1, new2, new3)   Micah Morton
  • [PATCH 02/10] LSM: SafeSetID: fix check for setresuid(new1, new2, new3)   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 03/10] LSM: SafeSetID: refactor policy hash table   Micah Morton
  • [PATCH 03/10] LSM: SafeSetID: refactor policy hash table   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 04/10] LSM: SafeSetID: refactor safesetid_security_capable()   Micah Morton
  • [PATCH 04/10] LSM: SafeSetID: refactor safesetid_security_capable()   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 05/10] LSM: SafeSetID: refactor policy parsing   Micah Morton
  • [PATCH 05/10] LSM: SafeSetID: refactor policy parsing   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 06/10] LSM: SafeSetID: fix userns handling in securityfs   Micah Morton
  • [PATCH 06/10] LSM: SafeSetID: fix userns handling in securityfs   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 07/10] LSM: SafeSetID: rewrite userspace API to atomic updates   Micah Morton
  • [PATCH 07/10] LSM: SafeSetID: rewrite userspace API to atomic updates   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH 07/10] LSM: SafeSetID: rewrite userspace API to atomic updates   Jann Horn
      • [PATCH 07/10] LSM: SafeSetID: rewrite userspace API to atomic updates   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 08/10] LSM: SafeSetID: add read handler   Micah Morton
  • [PATCH 08/10] LSM: SafeSetID: add read handler   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH 08/10] LSM: SafeSetID: add read handler   Jann Horn
• [PATCH 09/10] LSM: SafeSetID: verify transitive constrainedness   Micah Morton
  • [PATCH 09/10] LSM: SafeSetID: verify transitive constrainedness   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH 09/10] LSM: SafeSetID: verify transitive constrainedness   Jann Horn
      • [PATCH 09/10] LSM: SafeSetID: verify transitive constrainedness   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 10/10] LSM: SafeSetID: fix use of literal -1 in capable hook   Micah Morton
  • [PATCH 10/10] LSM: SafeSetID: fix use of literal -1 in capable hook   Kees Cook
• [PATCH] Yama: mark local symbols as static   James Morris
• [PATCH] security: don't use RCU accessors for cred->session_keyring   James Morris
• [PATCH] keys: safe concurrent user->{session,uid}_keyring access   James Morris
• [PATCH] security: inode: fix a missing check for securityfs_create_file   James Morris
  • [PATCH] security: inode: fix a missing check for securityfs_create_file   Al Viro
    • [PATCH] security: inode: fix a missing check for securityfs_create_file   James Morris
• [PATCH] Yama: mark function as static   James Morris
• KASAN: use-after-free Read in path_lookupat   Al Viro
  • KASAN: use-after-free Read in path_lookupat   Linus Torvalds
• Hi dear,   Katie Huggins
• [PATCH] net: socket: Always initialize family field at move_addr_to_kernel().   Tetsuo Handa
  • [PATCH] net: socket: Always initialize family field at move_addr_to_kernel().   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH] net: socket: Always initialize family field at move_addr_to_kernel().   Paul Moore
    • [PATCH] net: socket: Always initialize family field at move_addr_to_kernel().   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH v2 0/3] Refactor memory initialization hardening   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area   Masahiro Yamada
      • [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area   Masahiro Yamada
    • [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area   Alexander Popov
      • [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area   Alexander Popov
      • [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area   Alexander Popov
  • [PATCH v2 2/3] security: Move stackleak config to Kconfig.hardening   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v2 3/3] security: Implement Clang's stack initialization   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v2 3/3] security: Implement Clang's stack initialization   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH v2 08/10] LSM: SafeSetID: add read handler   Micah Morton
  • [PATCH v2 08/10] LSM: SafeSetID: add read handler   Kees Cook
• [PATCH v2 09/10] LSM: SafeSetID: verify transitive constrainedness   Micah Morton
  • [PATCH v2 09/10] LSM: SafeSetID: verify transitive constrainedness   Kees Cook
• [GIT PULL] linux-integrity patches for Linux 5.2   Mimi Zohar
  • [GIT PULL] linux-integrity patches for Linux 5.2   James Morris
• ATTENTION:BENEFICIARY   MRS.ZARA KUMAR
• [PATCH 1/3] selinux: Check address length before reading address family   Tetsuo Handa
  • [PATCH 2/3] smack: Check address length before reading address family   Tetsuo Handa
    • [PATCH 2/3] smack: Check address length before reading address family   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH 2/3] smack: Check address length before reading address family   James Morris
      • [PATCH 2/3] smack: Check address length before reading address family   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 3/3] tomoyo: Check address length before reading address family   Tetsuo Handa
    • [PATCH 3/3] tomoyo: Check address length before reading address family   James Morris
  • [PATCH 1/3] selinux: Check address length before reading address family   Paul Moore
• [PATCH (resend)] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   Tetsuo Handa
  • [PATCH (resend)] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   Tetsuo Handa
    • [PATCH (resend)] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   James Morris
      • [PATCH (resend)] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   Tetsuo Handa
  • [PATCH (resend)] tomoyo: Add a kernel config option for fuzzing testing.   James Morris
• [PATCH] tomoyo: Change pathname calculation for read-only filesystems.   Tetsuo Handa
  • [PATCH] tomoyo: Change pathname calculation for read-only filesystems.   James Morris
• [PATCH] mm: security: introduce CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH] mm: security: introduce CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL   Qian Cai
    • [PATCH] mm: security: introduce CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH] mm: security: introduce CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL   Andrew Morton
    • [PATCH] mm: security: introduce CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL   Vlastimil Babka
    • [PATCH] mm: security: introduce CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH] mm: security: introduce CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL   Vlastimil Babka
    • [PATCH] mm: security: introduce CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH] mm: security: introduce CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL   Christopher Lameter
    • [PATCH] mm: security: introduce CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH] mm: security: introduce CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL   Christopher Lameter
      • [PATCH] mm: security: introduce CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH] mm: security: introduce CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL   Alexander Potapenko
• kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Casey Schaufler
  • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Oleg Nesterov
    • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Paul Moore
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Oleg Nesterov
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Paul Moore
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Kees Cook
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   chengjian (D)
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Paul Moore
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Oleg Nesterov
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Casey Schaufler
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Paul Moore
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Oleg Nesterov
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Casey Schaufler
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Stephen Smalley
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Paul Moore
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   John Johansen
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Casey Schaufler
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Yang Yingliang
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Paul Moore
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Yang Yingliang
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Paul Moore
• fanotify and LSM path hooks   Amir Goldstein
  • fanotify and LSM path hooks   Al Viro
    • fanotify and LSM path hooks   Amir Goldstein
      • fanotify and LSM path hooks   Al Viro
      • fanotify and LSM path hooks   Amir Goldstein
  • fanotify and LSM path hooks   Jan Kara
    • fanotify and LSM path hooks   Amir Goldstein
      • fanotify and LSM path hooks   Jan Kara
      • fanotify and LSM path hooks   Miklos Szeredi
      • fanotify and LSM path hooks   Jan Kara
      • fanotify and LSM path hooks   Miklos Szeredi
      • fanotify and LSM path hooks   Jan Kara
• [PULL] Smack: Changes for 5.2   Casey Schaufler
  • [PULL] Smack: Changes for 5.2   James Morris
• [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on sys_open()   Steve Grubb
  • [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on sys_open()   Florian Weimer
    • [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on sys_open()   Steve Grubb
      • [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on sys_open()   Florian Weimer
      • [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on sys_open()   Mickaël Salaün
  • [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on sys_open()   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH 00/57] Convert files to ReST   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
  • Avoiding merge conflicts while adding new docs - Was: Re: [PATCH 00/57] Convert files to ReST   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
    • Avoiding merge conflicts while adding new docs - Was: Re: [PATCH 00/57] Convert files to ReST   Jonathan Corbet
• [PATCH 23/57] docs: netlabel: convert it to ReST   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
  • [PATCH 23/57] docs: netlabel: convert it to ReST   Paul Moore
• [PATCH] apparmor: fix spelling mistake "immutible" -> "immutable"   Colin King
  • [PATCH] apparmor: fix spelling mistake "immutible" -> "immutable"   John Johansen
• [PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Huang, Kai
    • [PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Ingo Molnar
  • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Khalid Aziz
    • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Ingo Molnar
      • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Nadav Amit
      • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Ingo Molnar
      • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Nadav Amit
      • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Thomas Gleixner
      • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Khalid Aziz
      • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Tycho Andersen
      • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Khalid Aziz
• [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Thomas Gleixner
  • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Linus Torvalds
    • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Kees Cook
      • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Khalid Aziz
      • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Khalid Aziz
      • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Kees Cook
    • [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)   Thomas Gleixner
• [PATCH v10 00/12] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v10 01/12] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v10 02/12] PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v10 03/12] PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v10 04/12] integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v10 05/12] integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v10 06/12] ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v10 07/12] ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v10 08/12] ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v10 09/12] ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v10 10/12] ima: Collect modsig   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v10 11/12] ima: Define ima-modsig template   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v10 12/12] ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH 0/3] RFC: add init_allocations=1 boot option   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the init_allocations=1 boot option   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the init_allocations=1 boot option   Dave Hansen
      • [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the init_allocations=1 boot option   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the init_allocations=1 boot option   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the init_allocations=1 boot option   Michal Hocko
    • [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the init_allocations=1 boot option   Randy Dunlap
    • [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the init_allocations=1 boot option   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the init_allocations=1 boot option   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the init_allocations=1 boot option   Dave Hansen
    • [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the init_allocations=1 boot option   Christopher Lameter
  • [PATCH 2/3] gfp: mm: introduce __GFP_NOINIT   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH 2/3] gfp: mm: introduce __GFP_NOINIT   Dave Hansen
      • [PATCH 2/3] gfp: mm: introduce __GFP_NOINIT   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 2/3] gfp: mm: introduce __GFP_NOINIT   Dave Hansen
    • [PATCH 2/3] gfp: mm: introduce __GFP_NOINIT   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 3/3] RFC: net: apply __GFP_NOINIT to AF_UNIX sk_buff allocations   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH 3/3] RFC: net: apply __GFP_NOINIT to AF_UNIX sk_buff allocations   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 0/3] RFC: add init_allocations=1 boot option   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH 0/3] RFC: add init_allocations=1 boot option   Randy Dunlap
  • [PATCH 0/3] RFC: add init_allocations=1 boot option   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH 0/3] RFC: add init_allocations=1 boot option   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH 00/90] LSM: Module stacking for all   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 02/90] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 05/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 06/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 07/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 08/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 09/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 10/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 11/90] LSM: Fix logical operation in lsm_export checks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 12/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 13/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 14/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 15/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 16/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 17/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 18/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 19/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 20/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 21/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 22/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 23/90] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 24/90] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 25/90] Audit: Convert osid to an lsm_export structure   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 26/90] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 27/90] NET: Change the UNIXCB from a secid to an lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 28/90] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 29/90] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 30/90] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 31/90] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 32/90] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 33/90] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 34/90] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 35/90] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 36/90] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 37/90] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 38/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 39/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 40/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 41/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 42/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 43/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 44/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 45/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 46/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 47/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 48/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 49/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 50/90] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 51/90] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 52/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_setsecctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 53/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_setsecctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 54/90] kernfs: remove lsm_context scaffolding   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 55/90] LSM: Remove unused macro   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 56/90] LSM: Special handling for secctx lsm hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 57/90] SELinux: Use blob offset in current_sid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 58/90] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 59/90] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 60/90] LSM: Add secmark_relabel_packet to the set of one call hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 61/90] LSM: Make getting the secmark right cleaner   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 62/90] netfilter: Fix memory leak introduced with lsm_context   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 63/90] Smack: Consolidate secmark conversions   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 64/90] netfilter: Remove unnecessary NULL check in lsm_context   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 65/90] LSM: Add secmark refcounting to call_one list   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 66/90] LSM: refactor security_setprocattr   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 67/90] Smack: Detect if secmarks can be safely used   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 68/90] LSM: Support multiple LSMs using inode_init_security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 69/90] LSM: Use full security context in security_inode_setsecctx   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH 69/90] LSM: Use full security context in security_inode_setsecctx   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH 69/90] LSM: Use full security context in security_inode_setsecctx   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH 69/90] LSM: Use full security context in security_inode_setsecctx   Tetsuo Handa
  • [PATCH 70/90] LSM: Correct handling of ENOSYS in inode_setxattr   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 71/90] LSM: Infrastructure security blobs for mount options   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 72/90] LSM: Fix for security_init_inode_security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 73/90] Smack: Advertise the secid to netlabel   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 74/90] LSM: Change error detection for UDP peer security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 75/90] Smack: Fix setting of the CIPSO MLS_CAT flags   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 76/90] Smack: Set netlabel flags properly on new label import   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 77/90] Netlabel: Add a secattr comparison API function   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 78/90] Smack: Let netlabel do the work on the ambient domain   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 79/90] Smack: Don't set the socket label on each send   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 80/90] Smack: Let netlabel do the work on connections   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 81/90] Netlabel: Return the labeling type on socket   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 00/90] LSM: Module stacking for all   Stephen Smalley
    • [PATCH 00/90] LSM: Module stacking for all   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH 00/90] LSM: Module stacking for all   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH 00/90] LSM: Module stacking for all   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 01/90] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 03/90] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 04/90] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.   Casey Schaufler
• kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Yang Yingliang
  • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Paul Moore
    • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Yang Yingliang
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Paul Moore
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Yang Yingliang
      • kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!   Paul Moore
• Dear   Mark Casady
• [PATCH] proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials   Paul Moore
  • [PATCH] proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials   Paul Moore
    • [PATCH] proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials   James Morris
      • [PATCH] proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials   Paul Moore
  • [PATCH] proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials   John Johansen
  • [PATCH] proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCHv2] added ima hook for buffer, being enabled as a policy   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCHv2] use event name instead of enum to make the call generic   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCHv2] since cmdline args can be same for multiple kexec, log entry hash will collide. Prepend the kernel file name to the cmdline args to distinguish between cmdline args passed to subsequent kexec calls   Prakhar Srivastava
• [PATCH v2 23/79] docs: netlabel: convert docs to ReST and rename to *.rst   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
  • [PATCH v2 23/79] docs: netlabel: convert docs to ReST and rename to *.rst   Paul Moore
• [PATCH v4 00/23] Merge text_poke fixes and executable lockdowns   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 01/23] Fix "x86/alternatives: Lockdep-enforce text_mutex in text_poke*()"   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 02/23] x86/jump_label: Use text_poke_early() during early init   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 03/23] x86/mm: Introduce temporary mm structs   Rick Edgecombe
    • [PATCH v4 03/23] x86/mm: Introduce temporary mm structs   Borislav Petkov
      • [PATCH v4 03/23] x86/mm: Introduce temporary mm structs   Nadav Amit
      • [PATCH v4 03/23] x86/mm: Introduce temporary mm structs   Andy Lutomirski
  • [PATCH v4 04/23] x86/mm: Save DRs when loading a temporary mm   Rick Edgecombe
    • [PATCH v4 04/23] x86/mm: Save DRs when loading a temporary mm   Borislav Petkov
    • [PATCH v4 04/23] x86/mm: Save DRs when loading a temporary mm   Peter Zijlstra
  • [PATCH v4 05/23] fork: Provide a function for copying init_mm   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 06/23] x86/alternative: Initialize temporary mm for patching   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 07/23] x86/alternative: Use temporary mm for text poking   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 08/23] x86/kgdb: Avoid redundant comparison of patched code   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 09/23] x86/ftrace: Set trampoline pages as executable   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 10/23] x86/kprobes: Set instruction page as executable   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 11/23] x86/module: Avoid breaking W^X while loading modules   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 12/23] x86/jump-label: Remove support for custom poker   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 13/23] x86/alternative: Remove the return value of text_poke_*()   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 14/23] x86/mm/cpa: Add set_direct_map_ functions   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 15/23] mm: Make hibernate handle unmapped pages   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 16/23] vmalloc: Add flag for free of special permsissions   Rick Edgecombe
    • [PATCH v4 16/23] vmalloc: Add flag for free of special permsissions   Peter Zijlstra
      • [PATCH v4 16/23] vmalloc: Add flag for free of special permsissions   Edgecombe, Rick P
  • [PATCH v4 17/23] modules: Use vmalloc special flag   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 18/23] bpf: Use vmalloc special flag   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 19/23] x86/ftrace: Use vmalloc special flag   Rick Edgecombe
    • [PATCH v4 19/23] x86/ftrace: Use vmalloc special flag   Steven Rostedt
      • [PATCH v4 19/23] x86/ftrace: Use vmalloc special flag   Edgecombe, Rick P
  • [PATCH v4 20/23] x86/kprobes: Use vmalloc special flag   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 21/23] x86/alternative: Comment about module removal races   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 22/23] tlb: provide default nmi_uaccess_okay()   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 23/23] bpf: Fail bpf_probe_write_user() while mm is switched   Rick Edgecombe
  • [PATCH v4 00/23] Merge text_poke fixes and executable lockdowns   Peter Zijlstra
    • [PATCH v4 00/23] Merge text_poke fixes and executable lockdowns   Peter Zijlstra
• [PATCH] kexec_buffer measure   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH] apparmor: Force type-casting of current->real_cred   Bharath Vedartham
• [PATCH v3 0/3] Refactor memory initialization hardening   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v3 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v3 2/3] security: Move stackleak config to Kconfig.hardening   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 2/3] security: Move stackleak config to Kconfig.hardening   Alexander Popov
      • [PATCH v3 2/3] security: Move stackleak config to Kconfig.hardening   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v3 3/3] security: Implement Clang's stack initialization   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v3 0/3] Refactor memory initialization hardening   Masahiro Yamada
    • [PATCH v3 0/3] Refactor memory initialization hardening   Kees Cook
• Lieber Freund   J Glanzmann
• [PATCH 00/11] keys: Namespacing   David Howells
  • [PATCH 01/11] keys: Invalidate used request_key authentication keys   David Howells
  • [PATCH 02/11] keys: Kill off request_key_async{,_with_auxdata}   David Howells
  • [PATCH 03/11] keys: Simplify key description management   David Howells
  • [PATCH 04/11] keys: Cache the hash value to avoid lots of recalculation   David Howells
  • [PATCH 05/11] keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches   David Howells
    • [PATCH 05/11] keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches   Andrew Zaborowski
      • [PATCH 05/11] keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches   David Howells
  • [PATCH 06/11] keys: Namespace keyring names   David Howells
  • [PATCH 07/11] keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace   David Howells
    • [PATCH 07/11] keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace   Jann Horn
      • [PATCH 07/11] keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace   David Howells
      • [PATCH 07/11] keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace   David Howells
  • [PATCH 08/11] keys: Include target namespace in match criteria   David Howells
  • [PATCH 09/11] keys: Garbage collect keys for which the domain has been removed   David Howells
  • [PATCH 10/11] keys: Network namespace domain tag   David Howells
    • [PATCH 10/11] keys: Network namespace domain tag   David Howells
  • [PATCH 11/11] keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism   David Howells
• [PATCH 26/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Vasily Gorbik
  • [PATCH 26/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
• smack ( on host ) + apparmor ( on docker ) - possible ?   Casey Schaufler
  • smack ( on host ) + apparmor ( on docker ) - possible ?   John Johansen
• [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation   Mike Rapoport
  • [RFC PATCH 1/7] x86/cpufeatures: add X86_FEATURE_SCI   Mike Rapoport
  • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Mike Rapoport
    • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Peter Zijlstra
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Mike Rapoport
    • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Ingo Molnar
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Ingo Molnar
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Ingo Molnar
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Ingo Molnar
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   James Morris
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Ingo Molnar
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Peter Zijlstra
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Ingo Molnar
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   James Bottomley
    • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Dave Hansen
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   James Bottomley
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   James Bottomley
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   James Bottomley
      • [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation   Andy Lutomirski
  • [RFC PATCH 3/7] x86/entry/64: add infrastructure for switching to isolated syscall context   Mike Rapoport
  • [RFC PATCH 4/7] x86/sci: hook up isolated system call entry and exit   Mike Rapoport
  • [RFC PATCH 5/7] x86/mm/fault: hook up SCI verification   Mike Rapoport
    • [RFC PATCH 5/7] x86/mm/fault: hook up SCI verification   Peter Zijlstra
      • [RFC PATCH 5/7] x86/mm/fault: hook up SCI verification   Mike Rapoport
      • [RFC PATCH 5/7] x86/mm/fault: hook up SCI verification   Andy Lutomirski
  • [RFC PATCH 6/7] security: enable system call isolation in kernel config   Mike Rapoport
  • [RFC PATCH 7/7] sci: add example system calls to exercse SCI   Mike Rapoport
  • [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation   Andy Lutomirski
    • [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation   Jiri Kosina
    • [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation   Mike Rapoport
  • [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation   Dave Hansen
    • [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation   Mike Rapoport
• [PATCH v5 00/23] x86: text_poke() fixes and executable lockdowns   Nadav Amit
  • [PATCH v5 02/23] x86/jump_label: Use text_poke_early() during early init   Nadav Amit
  • [PATCH v5 00/23] x86: text_poke() fixes and executable lockdowns   Peter Zijlstra
• [PATCH v5 01/23] Fix "x86/alternatives: Lockdep-enforce text_mutex in text_poke*()"   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 03/23] x86/mm: Introduce temporary mm structs   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 04/23] x86/mm: Save debug registers when loading a temporary mm   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 05/23] fork: Provide a function for copying init_mm   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 06/23] x86/alternative: Initialize temporary mm for patching   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 07/23] x86/alternative: Use temporary mm for text poking   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 08/23] x86/kgdb: Avoid redundant comparison of patched code   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 09/23] x86/ftrace: Set trampoline pages as executable   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 10/23] x86/kprobes: Set instruction page as executable   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 11/23] x86/module: Avoid breaking W^X while loading modules   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 12/23] x86/jump-label: Remove support for custom poker   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 13/23] x86/alternative: Remove the return value of text_poke_*()   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 14/23] x86/mm/cpa: Add set_direct_map_ functions   Nadav Amit
  • [PATCH v5 14/23] x86/mm/cpa: Add set_direct_map_ functions   Linus Torvalds
    • [PATCH v5 14/23] x86/mm/cpa: Add set_direct_map_ functions   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 15/23] mm: Make hibernate handle unmapped pages   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 16/23] vmalloc: Add flag for free of special permsissions   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 17/23] modules: Use vmalloc special flag   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 18/23] bpf: Use vmalloc special flag   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 19/23] x86/ftrace: Use vmalloc special flag   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 20/23] x86/kprobes: Use vmalloc special flag   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 21/23] x86/alternative: Comment about module removal races   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 22/23] mm/tlb: Provide default nmi_uaccess_okay()   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH v5 23/23] bpf: Fail bpf_probe_write_user() while mm is switched   Nadav Amit
• [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the init_allocations=1 boot option   Christopher Lameter
  • [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the init_allocations=1 boot option   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH v6 00/24] x86: text_poke() fixes and executable lockdowns   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 01/24] Fix "x86/alternatives: Lockdep-enforce text_mutex in text_poke*()"   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 02/24] x86/jump_label: Use text_poke_early() during early init   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 03/24] x86/mm: Introduce temporary mm structs   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 04/24] x86/mm: Save debug registers when loading a temporary mm   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 05/24] uprobes: Initialize uprobes earlier   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 06/24] fork: Provide a function for copying init_mm   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 07/24] x86/alternative: Initialize temporary mm for patching   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 08/24] x86/alternative: Use temporary mm for text poking   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 09/24] x86/kgdb: Avoid redundant comparison of patched code   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 10/24] x86/ftrace: Set trampoline pages as executable   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 11/24] x86/kprobes: Set instruction page as executable   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 12/24] x86/module: Avoid breaking W^X while loading modules   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 13/24] x86/jump-label: Remove support for custom poker   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 14/24] x86/alternative: Remove the return value of text_poke_*()   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 15/24] x86/mm/cpa: Add set_direct_map_ functions   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 16/24] mm: Make hibernate handle unmapped pages   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 17/24] vmalloc: Add flag for free of special permsissions   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 18/24] modules: Use vmalloc special flag   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 19/24] bpf: Use vmalloc special flag   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 20/24] x86/ftrace: Use vmalloc special flag   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 21/24] x86/kprobes: Use vmalloc special flag   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 22/24] x86/alternative: Comment about module removal races   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 23/24] mm/tlb: Provide default nmi_uaccess_okay()   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 24/24] bpf: Fail bpf_probe_write_user() while mm is switched   nadav.amit at gmail.com
  • [PATCH v6 00/24] x86: text_poke() fixes and executable lockdowns   Ingo Molnar
  • [PATCH v6 00/24] x86: text_poke() fixes and executable lockdowns   Peter Zijlstra
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.0 52/79] KEYS: trusted: fix -Wvarags warning   Sasha Levin
• Zdravstvuyte! Vas interesuyut kliyentskiye bazy dannykh?   linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org
• [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.1 (#3)   Paul Moore
  • [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.1 (#3)   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [PULL] Smack: one more change for 5.2   Casey Schaufler
  • [PULL] Smack: one more change for 5.2   James Morris
    • [PULL] Smack: one more change for 5.2   James Morris
• [PATCH V5 2/4] tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table   Bartosz Szczepanek
  • [PATCH V5 2/4] tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V5 2/4] tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH 00/11] keys: Namespacing [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 02/11] keys: Kill off request_key_async{, _with_auxdata} [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 03/11] keys: Simplify key description management [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 04/11] keys: Cache the hash value to avoid lots of recalculation [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 05/11] keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 06/11] keys: Namespace keyring names [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 07/11] keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 08/11] keys: Include target namespace in match criteria [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 09/11] keys: Garbage collect keys for which the domain has been removed [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 10/11] keys: Network namespace domain tag [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 11/11] keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism [ver #2]   David Howells
• [PATCH 01/11] keys: Invalidate used request_key authentication keys [ver #2]   David Howells
• [PULL] Smack: Repair for 5.2 build issue.   Casey Schaufler
• [GIT PULL] keys: Namespacing   David Howells

Last message date: Tue Apr 30 22:39:20 UTC 2019
Archived on: Tue Apr 30 22:39:37 UTC 2019

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