[RFC PATCH v1 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on sys_open()
sgrubb at redhat.com
Tue Apr 16 15:34:07 UTC 2019
On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 7:49:39 AM EDT Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Steve Grubb:
> > This flag that is being proposed means that you would have to patch all
> > interpreters to use it. If you are sure that upstreams will accept that,
> > why not just change the policy to interpreters shouldn't execute
> > anything unless the execute bit is set? That is simpler and doesn't need
> > a kernel change. And setting the execute bit is an auditable event.
> I think we need something like O_MAYEXEC so that security policies can
> be enforced and noexec mounts can be detected.
Application whitelisting can already today stop unknown software without
> I don't think it's a good idea to do this in userspace, especially the
The problem is that passing O_MAYEXEC is opt-in. You can use ptrace/seccomp/
bpf/LD_PRELOAD/LD_AUDIT to remove that bit from an otherwise normal program.
This does not require privs to do so.
But let's consider that this comes to pass and every interpreter is updated
and IMA can see the O_MAYEXEC flag. Attackers now simply pivot to running
programs via stdin. It never touches disk and therefore nothing enforces
security policy. This already is among the most common ways that malware runs
today to evade detection.
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