[RFC PATCH v1 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on sys_open()
mickael.salaun at ssi.gouv.fr
Wed Apr 17 15:04:41 UTC 2019
On 17/04/2019 12:01, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Steve Grubb:
>> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 7:49:39 AM EDT Florian Weimer wrote:
>>> * Steve Grubb:
>>>> This flag that is being proposed means that you would have to patch all
>>>> interpreters to use it. If you are sure that upstreams will accept that,
>>>> why not just change the policy to interpreters shouldn't execute
>>>> anything unless the execute bit is set? That is simpler and doesn't need
>>>> a kernel change. And setting the execute bit is an auditable event.
>>> I think we need something like O_MAYEXEC so that security policies can
>>> be enforced and noexec mounts can be detected.
>> Application whitelisting can already today stop unknown software without
>> needing O_MAYEXEC.
Whitelisting may be a lot of thing (path/TPE, signed binaries…), but
being able to handle this with a global system configuration (instead of
app-specific hardcoded configuration) is a good idea. ;)
> I'm somewhat interested in using this to add a proper check for
> executability to explicit dynamic loader invocations. In other words,
> /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 /path/to/noexec/fs/program
> should refuse to run the program if the program is located on a file
> system mounted with the noexec attribute.
What if a sysadmin need to do this on an executable mount point? Being
able to enforce a security policy according to a configuration may fit
to much more use cases.
>> The problem is that passing O_MAYEXEC is opt-in. You can use ptrace/seccomp/
>> bpf/LD_PRELOAD/LD_AUDIT to remove that bit from an otherwise normal program.
>> This does not require privs to do so.
> That doesn't really help with the above.
Right, ptrace/LD_PRELOAD and so on must be addressed by something else
than only O_MAYEXEC.
>> But let's consider that this comes to pass and every interpreter is
>> updated and IMA can see the O_MAYEXEC flag. Attackers now simply pivot
>> to running programs via stdin. It never touches disk and therefore
>> nothing enforces security policy. This already is among the most
>> common ways that malware runs today to evade detection.
As my previous reply, use cases like stdin may be restricted as well.
> Are you referring to Windows malware using Powershell?
> I'm not sure this is applicable to Linux. We do not have much
> behavioral monitoring anyway.
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