kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!
paul at paul-moore.com
Wed Apr 17 23:39:19 UTC 2019
On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 12:27 PM Oleg Nesterov <oleg at redhat.com> wrote:
> On 04/17, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 10:57 AM Oleg Nesterov <oleg at redhat.com> wrote:
> > > On 04/17, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > >
> > > > I'm tempted to simply return an error in selinux_setprocattr() if
> > > > the task's credentials are not the same as its real_cred;
> > >
> > > What about other modules? I have no idea what smack_setprocattr() is,
> > > but it too does prepare_creds/commit creds.
> > >
> > > it seems that the simplest workaround should simply add the additional
> > > cred == real_cred into proc_pid_attr_write().
> > Yes, that is simple, but I worry about what other LSMs might want to
> > do. While I believe failing if the effective creds are not the same
> > as the real_creds is okay for SELinux (possibly Smack too), I worry
> > about what other LSMs may want to do. After all,
> > proc_pid_attr_write() doesn't change the the creds itself, that is
> > something the specific LSMs do.
> Yes, but if proc_pid_attr_write() is called with cred != real_cred then
> something is already wrong?
True, or at least I would think so.
Looking at the current tree there are three LSMs which implement
setprocattr hooks: SELinux, Smack, and AppArmor. I know Casey has
already mentioned that he wasn't able to trigger the problem in Smack,
but looking at smack_setprocattr() I see the similar commit_creds()
usage so I would expect the same problem in Smack; what say you Casey?
Looking at apparmor_setprocattr(), it appears that it too could end
up calling commit_creds() via aa_set_current_hat().
Since it looks like all three LSMs which implement the setprocattr
hook are vulnerable I'm open to the idea that proc_pid_attr_write() is
a better choice for the cred != read_cred check, but I would want to
make sure John and Casey are okay with that.
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