[PATCH v3 bpf-next 00/21] bpf: Sysctl hook
keescook at chromium.org
Tue Apr 9 16:50:50 UTC 2019
On Sat, Apr 6, 2019 at 10:03 AM Alexei Starovoitov
<alexei.starovoitov at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 06, 2019 at 09:43:50AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Fri, Apr 5, 2019 at 12:36 PM Andrey Ignatov <rdna at fb.com> wrote:
> > > BPF_CGROUP_SYSCTL hook is placed before calling to sysctl's proc_handler so
> > > that accesses (read/write) to sysctl can be controlled for specific cgroup
> > > and either allowed or denied, or traced.
> > This sounds more like an LSM than BPF.
> not at all. the key difference is being cgroup scoped.
> essentially for different containers.
Okay, works for me. I was looking at it from the perspective of
something providing resource access control policy, which usually
falls into the LSM world.
> bpf prog is attached to this hook in a particular cgroup
> and executed for sysctls for tasks that belong to that cgroup.
So it's root limiting root-in-a-container? Nice to have some
boundaries there, for sure.
> > Can the BPF be removed (or rather,
> > what's the lifetime of such BPF?)
> same as all other cgroup-bpf hooks.
> Do you have a specific concern or just asking how life time of programs
> is managed?
> High level description of lifetime is here:
I'm mostly curious about the access control stacking. i.e. can
in-container root add new eBPF to its own cgroup, and if so, can it
undo the restrictions already present? (I assume it can't, but figured
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