April 2017 Archives by author

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Starting: Sat Apr 1 03:32:05 UTC 2017
Ending: Sun Apr 30 23:28:52 UTC 2017
Messages: 621

• [PATCH 0/6] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH 1/6] integrity: Small code improvements   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH 2/6] ima: Tidy up constant strings   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH 3/6] ima: Simplify policy_func_show.   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH 4/6] ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH 5/6] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions.   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH 6/6] ima: Support appended signatures for appraisal   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH 3/6] ima: Simplify policy_func_show.   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH 5/6] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions.   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH 6/6] ima: Support appended signatures for appraisal   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH 3/6] ima: Simplify policy_func_show.   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH 6/6] ima: Support appended signatures for appraisal   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH 6/6] ima: Support appended signatures for appraisal   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH 0/3] Extend the vTPM proxy driver to pass locality to emulator   Stefan Berger
• [PATCH 1/3] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Add ioctl to get supported flags   Stefan Berger
• [PATCH 2/3] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Implement request_locality   Stefan Berger
• [PATCH 3/3] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Add ioctl to request locality prepended to command   Stefan Berger
• [PATCH] tpm: Fix reference count to main device   Stefan Berger
• [PATCH 2/3] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Implement request_locality   Stefan Berger
• [PATCH 3/3] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Add ioctl to request locality prepended to command   Stefan Berger
• [PATCH v2 0/3] Extend the vTPM proxy driver to pass locality to emulator   Stefan Berger
• [PATCH v2 1/3] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Add ioctl to get supported flags   Stefan Berger
• [PATCH v2 2/3] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Implement request_locality   Stefan Berger
• [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Add ioctl to request locality prepended to command   Stefan Berger
• [PATCH 06/12] audit: Use timespec64 to represent audit timestamps   Arnd Bergmann
• [PATCH] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities   Eric W. Biederman
• [PATCH] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities   Eric W. Biederman
• [PATCH] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities   Eric W. Biederman
• [PATCH] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities   Eric W. Biederman
• [PATCH] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities   Eric W. Biederman
• [PATCH] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities   Eric W. Biederman
• [PATCH v2] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities   Eric W. Biederman
• [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit   Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode   Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH] KEYS: fix freeing uninitialized memory in key_update()   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH] KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH] KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH v2] KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH] KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length   Eric Biggers
• [lkp-robot] [KEYS] bdf7c0f8bf: ltp.add_key02.fail   Eric Biggers
• [LTP] [lkp-robot] [KEYS] bdf7c0f8bf: ltp.add_key02.fail   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH 0/5] KEYS: sanitize key payloads   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH 1/5] KEYS: sanitize add_key() and keyctl() key payloads   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH 2/5] KEYS: user_defined: sanitize key payloads   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH 3/5] KEYS: encrypted: sanitize all key material   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH 4/5] KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH 5/5] KEYS: sanitize key structs before freeing   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH 3/5] KEYS: encrypted: sanitize all key material   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH 2/5] KEYS: user_defined: sanitize key payloads   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH 0/5] KEYS: sanitize key payloads   Eric Biggers
• [PATCH 1/5] KEYS: sanitize add_key() and keyctl() key payloads   Eric Biggers
• [RFC][PATCH] audit: add ambient capabilities to CAPSET and BPRM_FCAPS records   Richard Guy Briggs
• [PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id   Richard Guy Briggs
• [PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id   Richard Guy Briggs
• [RFC][PATCH] audit: add ambient capabilities to CAPSET and BPRM_FCAPS records   Richard Guy Briggs
• [RFC][PATCH] audit: add ambient capabilities to CAPSET and BPRM_FCAPS records   Richard Guy Briggs
• Patchset to Restrict Unprivileged TIOCSTI TTY Command Injection   Matt Brown
• [PATCH 1/4] added SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT kernel config   Matt Brown
• [PATCH 2/4] add tiocsti_restrict variable   Matt Brown
• [PATCH 3/4] restrict unprivileged TIOCSTI tty ioctl   Matt Brown
• [PATCH 4/4] added kernel.tiocsti_restrict sysctl   Matt Brown
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 3/4] restrict unprivileged TIOCSTI tty ioctl   Matt Brown
• [PATCH 1/4] added SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT kernel config   Matt Brown
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH v2 1/2] tiocsti-restrict : Add owner user namespace to tty_struct   Matt Brown
• [PATCH v2 2/2] tiocsti-restrict : make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH v2 1/2] tiocsti-restrict : Add owner user namespace to tty_struct   Matt Brown
• [PATCH v3 0/2] tiocsti-restrict : make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH v3 1/2] tiocsti-restrict : Add owner user namespace to tty_struct   Matt Brown
• [PATCH v3 2/2] tiocsti-restrict : make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH v3 1/2] tiocsti-restrict : Add owner user namespace to tty_struct   Matt Brown
• [PATCH v4 0/2] tiocsti-restrict : make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH v4 1/2] tiocsti-restrict : Add owner user namespace to tty_struct   Matt Brown
• [PATCH v4 2/2] tiocsti-restrict : make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH v5 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH v5 1/2] security: tty: Add owner user namespace to tty_struct   Matt Brown
• [PATCH v5 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH v5 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Matt Brown
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_status_get_seq() function   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH 1/3] selinux: Implement LSM notification system   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH 2/3] selinux: add checksum to policydb   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH 3/3] selinux: expose policy SHA256 checksum via selinuxfs   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH 1/3] selinux: Implement LSM notification system   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH 2/3] selinux: add checksum to policydb   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH 2/3] selinux: add checksum to policydb   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH 2/3] selinux: add checksum to policydb   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH 2/3] selinux: add checksum to policydb   Sebastien Buisson
• [PATCH] selinux: hooks: security content must be properly cleared   Pirabarlen Cheenaramen
• [PATCH 0/9] convert genericirq.tmpl and kernel-api.tmpl to DocBook   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
• [PATCH v4 2/6] usb: fix some references for /proc/bus/usb   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
• [PATCH 28/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/staging/media/   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
• [PATCH 13/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/media/   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
• [PATCH 34/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in fs/pstore/   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down   Kees Cook
• [PATCH RFC v2 0/3] security: Add ModAutoRestrict LSM   Kees Cook
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/3] LSM: Allow per LSM module per "struct task_struct" blob.   Kees Cook
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/3] LSM: Allow per LSM module per "struct task_struct" blob.   Kees Cook
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/4] added SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT kernel config   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 01/11] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 02/11] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 05/11] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp()   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 06/11] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock events per process hierarchy   Kees Cook
• [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 06/11] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock events per process hierarchy   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 08/11] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 10/11] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 06/11] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock events per process hierarchy   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 10/11] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 09/11] seccomp: Enhance test_harness with an assert step mechanism   Kees Cook
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 09/11] seccomp: Enhance test_harness with an assert step mechanism   Kees Cook
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 09/11] seccomp: Enhance test_harness with an assert step mechanism   Kees Cook
• [PATCH net-next v6 05/11] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp()   Kees Cook
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restriction   Kees Cook
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Kees Cook
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Kees Cook
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Kees Cook
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Kees Cook
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Kees Cook
• converting Documentation/security/* to .rst   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 0/9] convert genericirq.tmpl and kernel-api.tmpl to DocBook   Jonathan Corbet
• [PATCH 1/4] added SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT kernel config   Alan Cox
• [PATCH v5 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Alan Cox
• [PATCH v4 1/2] tiocsti-restrict : Add owner user namespace to tty_struct   Alan Cox
• [PATCH 09/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/i2c/   Jean Delvare
• [PATCH 00/12] Delete CURRENT_TIME, CURRENT_TIME_SEC and current_fs_time   Deepa Dinamani
• [PATCH 01/12] fs: f2fs: Use ktime_get_real_seconds for sit_info times   Deepa Dinamani
• [PATCH 02/12] trace: Make trace_hwlat timestamp y2038 safe   Deepa Dinamani
• [PATCH 03/12] fs: cifs: Replace CURRENT_TIME by other appropriate apis   Deepa Dinamani
• [PATCH 04/12] fs: ceph: CURRENT_TIME with ktime_get_real_ts()   Deepa Dinamani
• [PATCH 05/12] fs: ufs: Use ktime_get_real_ts64() for birthtime   Deepa Dinamani
• [PATCH 06/12] audit: Use timespec64 to represent audit timestamps   Deepa Dinamani
• [PATCH 07/12] fs: btrfs: Use ktime_get_real_ts for root ctime   Deepa Dinamani
• [PATCH 08/12] fs: ubifs: Replace CURRENT_TIME_SEC with current_time   Deepa Dinamani
• [PATCH 09/12] lustre: Replace CURRENT_TIME macro   Deepa Dinamani
• [PATCH 10/12] apparmorfs: Replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time()   Deepa Dinamani
• [PATCH 11/12] time: Delete CURRENT_TIME_SEC and CURRENT_TIME   Deepa Dinamani
• [PATCH 12/12] time: Delete current_fs_time() function   Deepa Dinamani
• [PATCH 02/12] trace: Make trace_hwlat timestamp y2038 safe   Deepa Dinamani
• [PATCH 06/12] audit: Use timespec64 to represent audit timestamps   Deepa Dinamani
• selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable bug in range_read()   SF Markus Elfring
• [PATCH 0/3] SELinux: Fine-tuning for two function implementations   SF Markus Elfring
• [PATCH 1/3] selinux: Return directly after a failed memory allocation in policydb_index()   SF Markus Elfring
• [PATCH 2/3] selinux: Return an error code only as a constant in sidtab_insert()   SF Markus Elfring
• [PATCH 3/3] selinux: Use an other error code for an input validation failure in sidtab_insert()   SF Markus Elfring
• [PATCH] selinux: Fix SBLABEL_MNT for NFS mounts   J. Bruce Fields
• [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode   Matt Fleming
• [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown   Justin Forbes
• [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown   Justin Forbes
• [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode   Thomas Gleixner
• [PATCH 02/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in arch/x86/mm/   Thomas Gleixner
• [PATCH 06/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/clocksource/   Thomas Gleixner
• [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   Thomas Gleixner
• [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down   Thomas Gleixner
• [PATCH 06/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/clocksource/   Thomas Gleixner
• [PATCH 06/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/clocksource/   Thomas Gleixner
• [PATCH 06/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/clocksource/   Thomas Gleixner
• [PATCH v5 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   One Thousand Gnomes
• [PATCH v5 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   One Thousand Gnomes
• [PATCH v5 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   One Thousand Gnomes
• [PATCH v5 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   One Thousand Gnomes
• [PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id   Steve Grubb
• [PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id   Steve Grubb
• [PATCH 2/3] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Implement request_locality   Jason Gunthorpe
• [RFC][PATCH] audit: add ambient capabilities to CAPSET and BPRM_FCAPS records   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH v4 2/6] usb: fix some references for /proc/bus/usb   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Serge E. Hallyn
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH v3 1/2] tiocsti-restrict : Add owner user namespace to tty_struct   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH v3 1/2] tiocsti-restrict : Add owner user namespace to tty_struct   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH v3 2/2] tiocsti-restrict : make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH v4 1/2] tiocsti-restrict : Add owner user namespace to tty_struct   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH v4 2/2] tiocsti-restrict : make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH v2] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH v2 resend] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities   Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH] TOMOYO: Switch from per "struct cred" blob to per "struct task_struct" blob.   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH RFC 04/11] LSM: general but not extreme module stacking   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH] selinux: fix double free in selinux_parse_opts_str()   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH v1] LSM: Enable multiple calls to security_add_hooks() for the same LSM   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH RFC v2 0/3] security: Add ModAutoRestrict LSM   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 1/3] LSM: Allow per LSM module per "struct task_struct" blob.   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 2/3] security: add the ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 3/3] Documentation: add ModAutoRestrict LSM documentation   Djalal Harouni
• [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 07/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 2/3] security: add the ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 1/3] LSM: Allow per LSM module per "struct task_struct" blob.   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 2/3] security: add the ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 1/3] LSM: Allow per LSM module per "struct task_struct" blob.   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 0/3] security: Add ModAutoRestrict LSM   Djalal Harouni
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/3] LSM: Allow per LSM module per "struct task_struct" blob.   Djalal Harouni
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/3] LSM: Allow per LSM module per "struct task_struct" blob.   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH v3 0/2] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restrictions   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH v3 1/2] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restriction   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Djalal Harouni
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restriction   Djalal Harouni
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restriction   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 0/6] proc: support private proc instances per pidnamespace   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 1/6] proc: add proc_fs_info struct to store proc information   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 2/6] proc: move /proc/{self|thread-self} dentries to proc_fs_info   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 3/6] proc: add helpers to set and get proc hidepid and gid mount options   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 4/6] proc: support mounting private procfs instances inside same pid namespace   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 5/6] proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'limit_pids=1' mount option   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH RFC v2 6/6] proc: flush task dcache entries from all procfs instances   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Djalal Harouni
• [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   Bjorn Helgaas
• [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown   Austin S. Hemmelgarn
• [PATCH v4 1/4] KEYS: Insert incompressible bytes to reserve space in bzImage   Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
• [PATCH v4 1/4] KEYS: Insert incompressible bytes to reserve space in bzImage   Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 3/4] restrict unprivileged TIOCSTI tty ioctl   Jann Horn
• [PATCH v2 1/2] tiocsti-restrict : Add owner user namespace to tty_struct   Jann Horn
• [PATCH v2 1/2] tiocsti-restrict : Add owner user namespace to tty_struct   Jann Horn
• [PATCH v5 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Jann Horn
• [PATCH v5 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Jann Horn
• [PATCH v5 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   Jann Horn
• [PATCH v13 00/10] Make keyring link restrictions accessible from userspace   David Howells
• [PATCH] KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length   David Howells
• [PATCH] KEYS: fix freeing uninitialized memory in key_update()   David Howells
• [PATCH] KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings   David Howells
• [PATCH v13 00/10] Make keyring link restrictions accessible from userspace   David Howells
• [PATCH] KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length   David Howells
• [PATCH v13 00/10] Make keyring link restrictions accessible from userspace   David Howells
• [PATCH v13 00/10] Make keyring link restrictions accessible from userspace   David Howells
• [PATCH v13 00/10] Make keyring link restrictions accessible from userspace   David Howells
• [PATCH] KEYS: Fix integrity calls to keyring_alloc   David Howells
• [PATCH] KEYS: Fix integrity calls to keyring_alloc   David Howells
• [PATCH 27/39] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/scsi/   David Howells
• [PATCH 00/38] Annotate hw config module params for future lockdown   David Howells
• [PATCH 01/38] Annotate module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   David Howells
• [PATCH 02/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in arch/x86/mm/   David Howells
• [PATCH 03/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/char/ipmi/   David Howells
• [PATCH 04/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/char/mwave/   David Howells
• [PATCH 05/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/char/   David Howells
• [PATCH 06/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/clocksource/   David Howells
• [PATCH 07/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/cpufreq/   David Howells
• [PATCH 08/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/gpio/   David Howells
• [PATCH 09/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/i2c/   David Howells
• [PATCH 10/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/iio/   David Howells
• [PATCH 11/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/input/   David Howells
• [PATCH 12/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/isdn/   David Howells
• [PATCH 13/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/media/   David Howells
• [PATCH 14/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/misc/   David Howells
• [PATCH 15/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/mmc/host/   David Howells
• [PATCH 16/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/net/appletalk/   David Howells
• [PATCH 17/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/net/arcnet/   David Howells
• [PATCH 18/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/net/can/   David Howells
• [PATCH 19/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/net/ethernet/   David Howells
• [PATCH 20/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/net/hamradio/   David Howells
• [PATCH 21/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/net/irda/   David Howells
• [PATCH 22/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/net/wan/   David Howells
• [PATCH 23/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/net/wireless/   David Howells
• [PATCH 24/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/parport/   David Howells
• [PATCH 25/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/pci/hotplug/   David Howells
• [PATCH 26/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/pcmcia/   David Howells
• [PATCH 27/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/scsi/   David Howells
• [PATCH 28/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/staging/media/   David Howells
• [PATCH 29/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/staging/speakup/   David Howells
• [PATCH 30/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/staging/vme/   David Howells
• [PATCH 31/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/tty/   David Howells
• [PATCH 32/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/video/   David Howells
• [PATCH 33/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/watchdog/   David Howells
• [PATCH 34/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in fs/pstore/   David Howells
• [PATCH 35/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in sound/drivers/   David Howells
• [PATCH 36/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in sound/isa/   David Howells
• [PATCH 37/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in sound/oss/   David Howells
• [PATCH 38/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in sound/pci/   David Howells
• [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown   David Howells
• [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit   David Howells
• [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   David Howells
• [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode   David Howells
• [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode   David Howells
• [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot   David Howells
• [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown   David Howells
• [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit   David Howells
• [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   David Howells
• [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode   David Howells
• [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode   David Howells
• [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot   David Howells
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   David Howells
• [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown   David Howells
• [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown   David Howells
• [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit   David Howells
• [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   David Howells
• [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode   David Howells
• [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode   David Howells
• [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot   David Howells
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   David Howells
• [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 21/24] scsi: Lock down the eata driver   David Howells
• [PATCH 22/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 23/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL   David Howells
• [PATCH 24/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   David Howells
• [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown   David Howells
• [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit   David Howells
• [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   David Howells
• [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code   David Howells
• [PATCH 2/5] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit   David Howells
• [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   David Howells
• [PATCH 4/5] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode   David Howells
• [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode   David Howells
• [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code   David Howells
• [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   David Howells
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   David Howells
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   David Howells
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 08/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/gpio/   David Howells
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   David Howells
• Why kernel lockdown?   David Howells
• [GIT PULL] KEYS: Blacklisting, restrictions and DH   David Howells
• [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 06/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/clocksource/   David Howells
• [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode   David Howells
• [PATCH 06/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/clocksource/   David Howells
• [PATCH 02/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in arch/x86/mm/   David Howells
• [PATCH 06/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/clocksource/   David Howells
• [PATCH 18/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/net/can/   David Howells
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down   David Howells
• [PATCH 06/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/clocksource/   David Howells
• [PATCH 06/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/clocksource/   David Howells
• [PATCH 5/6] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions.   David Howells
• [PATCH 2/5] KEYS: user_defined: sanitize key payloads   David Howells
• [PATCH 3/5] KEYS: encrypted: sanitize all key material   David Howells
• [PATCH 2/5] KEYS: user_defined: sanitize key payloads   David Howells
• [PATCH 3/5] KEYS: encrypted: sanitize all key material   David Howells
• [PATCH v4 3/4] KEYS: Support for inserting a certificate into x86 bzImage   David Howells
• [PATCH v4 4/4] KEYS: Print insert-sys-cert information to stdout instead of stderr   David Howells
• [PATCH 0/5] KEYS: sanitize key payloads   David Howells
• [PATCH v4 3/4] KEYS: Support for inserting a certificate into x86 bzImage   David Howells
• [LTP] [lkp-robot] [KEYS] bdf7c0f8bf: ltp.add_key02.fail   Cyril Hrubis
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down   Ben Hutchings
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down   Ben Hutchings
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down   Ben Hutchings
• [PATCH v3 1/2] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restriction   Ben Hutchings
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restriction   Ben Hutchings
• [PATCH 35/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in sound/drivers/   Takashi Iwai
• Greetings.   Sarah JOHNSON
• [GIT PULL] AppArmor fixes for 4.12   John Johansen
• [PATCH 1/6] apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings   John Johansen
• [PATCH 2/6] security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages   John Johansen
• [PATCH 3/6] apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK   John Johansen
• [PATCH 4/6] apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836   John Johansen
• [PATCH 5/6] apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot   John Johansen
• [PATCH 6/6] apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly   John Johansen
• [PATCH 1/3] selinux: Implement LSM notification system   Daniel Jurgens
• [PATCH 31/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/tty/   Greg KH
• [PATCH 05/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/char/   Greg KH
• [PATCH 14/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/misc/   Greg KH
• [PATCH 28/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/staging/media/   Greg KH
• [PATCH 29/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/staging/speakup/   Greg KH
• [backport v4.9] tpm_tis: use default timeout value if chip reports it as zero   Greg KH
• [PATCH 1/4] added SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT kernel config   Greg KH
• [PATCH 2/4] add tiocsti_restrict variable   Greg KH
• [PATCH 3/4] restrict unprivileged TIOCSTI tty ioctl   Greg KH
• [tpmdd-devel] [backport v4.9] tpm_tis: use default timeout value if chip reports it as zero   Greg KH
• EXTREMELY IMPORTANT   Ms. Katherine
• [PATCH v4 0/4] Certificate insertion support for x86 bzImages   Mehmet Kayaalp
• [PATCH v4 1/4] KEYS: Insert incompressible bytes to reserve space in bzImage   Mehmet Kayaalp
• [PATCH v4 2/4] KEYS: Add ELF class-independent certificate insertion support   Mehmet Kayaalp
• [PATCH v4 3/4] KEYS: Support for inserting a certificate into x86 bzImage   Mehmet Kayaalp
• [PATCH v4 4/4] KEYS: Print insert-sys-cert information to stdout instead of stderr   Mehmet Kayaalp
• [PATCH v4 1/4] KEYS: Insert incompressible bytes to reserve space in bzImage   Mehmet Kayaalp
• [PATCH 6/6] ima: Support appended signatures for appraisal   Mehmet Kayaalp
• [PATCH v4 3/4] KEYS: Support for inserting a certificate into x86 bzImage   Mehmet Kayaalp
• [PATCH 6/6] ima: Support appended signatures for appraisal   Mehmet Kayaalp
• [PATCH 18/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/net/can/   Marc Kleine-Budde
• [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Jiri Kosina
• [PATCH v4 2/6] usb: fix some references for /proc/bus/usb   Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 07/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/cpufreq/   Viresh Kumar
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH v3 1/2] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restriction   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH RFC v2 5/6] proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'limit_pids=1' mount option   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH RFC v2 4/6] proc: support mounting private procfs instances inside same pid namespace   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH v13 00/10] Make keyring link restrictions accessible from userspace   Mat Martineau
• [PATCH] KEYS: Fix integrity calls to keyring_alloc   Mat Martineau
• [PATCH] KEYS: Fix integrity calls to keyring_alloc   Mat Martineau
• [tpmdd-devel] [backport v4.9] tpm_tis: use default timeout value if chip reports it as zero   Paul Menzel
• selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable bug in range_read()   Paul Moore
• [PATCH] selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable bug   Paul Moore
• [PATCH 06/12] audit: Use timespec64 to represent audit timestamps   Paul Moore
• [PATCH RFC 00/11] LSM: Stacking for major security modules   Paul Moore
• [PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id   Paul Moore
• [PATCH 06/12] audit: Use timespec64 to represent audit timestamps   Paul Moore
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function   Paul Moore
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_status_get_seq() function   Paul Moore
• [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for 4.12   Paul Moore
• [RFC][PATCH] audit: add ambient capabilities to CAPSET and BPRM_FCAPS records   Paul Moore
• [PATCH security-next 2/2] selinux: use pernet operations for hook registration   Paul Moore
• [PATCH security-next 2/2] selinux: use pernet operations for hook registration   Paul Moore
• [PATCH] selinux: fix double free in selinux_parse_opts_str()   Paul Moore
• [PATCH 0/2] security, keys refcount conversions   James Morris
• [PATCH] selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable bug   James Morris
• [PATCH] selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable bug   James Morris
• [GIT PULL] tpmdd updates for 4.12   James Morris
• [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown   James Morris
• [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   James Morris
• [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   James Morris
• [PATCH RFC 00/11] LSM: Stacking for major security modules   James Morris
• [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image   James Morris
• [GIT PULL] AppArmor fixes for 4.12   James Morris
• Out this week   James Morris
• [GIT PULL] KEYS: Blacklisting, restrictions and DH   James Morris
• [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for 4.12   James Morris
• [PULL] Smack changes for 4.12   James Morris
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   James Morris
• [GIT PULL] IMA patches for 4.12   James Morris
• [GIT PULL] Bugfixes for the Keys subsystem   James Morris
• [GIT PULL] tpmdd fixes for 4.12   James Morris
• [PATCH 3/3] selinux: expose policy SHA256 checksum via selinuxfs   James Morris
• [PATCH v1] LSM: Enable multiple calls to security_add_hooks() for the same LSM   James Morris
• [PATCH] KEYS: Fix integrity calls to keyring_alloc   Stephan Müller
• [tpmdd-devel] [RFC PATCH] tpm: msleep() delays - replace with usleep_range() in i2c nuvoton driver   Nayna
• [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Oliver Neukum
• [PATCH] selinux: hooks: security content must be properly cleared   Pirabarlen-Cheenaramen
• [PATCH 02/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in arch/x86/mm/   Steven Rostedt
• [PATCH 02/12] trace: Make trace_hwlat timestamp y2038 safe   Steven Rostedt
• [PATCH 06/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/clocksource/   Jens Rottmann
• [PATCH 06/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/clocksource/   Jens Rottmann
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Rusty Russell
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Rusty Russell
• [GIT PULL] tpmdd updates for 4.12   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [backport v4.9] tpm_tis: use default timeout value if chip reports it as zero   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [backport v4.9] tpm_tis: use default timeout value if chip reports it as zero   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [tpmdd-devel] [backport v4.9] tpm_tis: use default timeout value if chip reports it as zero   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] tpm: Fix reference count to main device   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH 2/3] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Implement request_locality   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [tpmdd-devel] [backport v4.9] tpm_tis: use default timeout value if chip reports it as zero   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH 3/3] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Add ioctl to request locality prepended to command   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [GIT PULL] tpmdd fixes for 4.12   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [GIT PULL] tpmdd fixes for 4.12   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v2 0/3] Extend the vTPM proxy driver to pass locality to emulator   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 07/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH net-next v6 02/11] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH net-next v6 05/11] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp()   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH net-next v6 06/11] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock events per process hierarchy   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH net-next v6 08/11] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH net-next v6 10/11] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH net-next v6 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH net-next v6 09/11] seccomp: Enhance test_harness with an assert step mechanism   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH net-next v6 09/11] seccomp: Enhance test_harness with an assert step mechanism   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH net-next v6 05/11] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp()   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v1] LSM: Enable multiple calls to security_add_hooks() for the same LSM   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v1] LSM: Enable multiple calls to security_add_hooks() for the same LSM   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH 09/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/i2c/   Wolfram Sang
• [PATCH RFC 00/11] LSM: Stacking for major security modules   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC 01/11] procfs: add smack subdir to attrs   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC 02/11] LSM: manage credential security blobs   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC 03/11] LSM: Manage file security blobs   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC 04/11] LSM: general but not extreme module stacking   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC 05/11] LSM: Infrastructure management of the remaining blobs   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC 06/11] Smack: remove socket blob free   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC 07/11] LSM: Mount option data for extreme stacking   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC 09/11] netlabel agreement checking   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC 10/11] Smack: sendmsg compile error fix   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC 11/11] LSM: manage task security blobs   Casey Schaufler
• FW: [PATCH] Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC 00/11] LSM: Stacking for major security modules   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC 00/11] LSM: Stacking for major security modules   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC 00/11] LSM: Stacking for major security modules   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC v2 2/3] security: add the ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC v2 1/3] LSM: Allow per LSM module per "struct task_struct" blob.   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC v2 2/3] security: add the ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH RFC v2 1/3] LSM: Allow per LSM module per "struct task_struct" blob.   Casey Schaufler
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/3] LSM: Allow per LSM module per "struct task_struct" blob.   Casey Schaufler
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/3] LSM: Allow per LSM module per "struct task_struct" blob.   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function   Casey Schaufler
• [PULL] Smack changes for 4.12   Casey Schaufler
• SELinux "filtering" capabilities?   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem   Casey Schaufler
• SELinux "filtering" capabilities?   Casey Schaufler
• [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH security-next 1/2] smack: use pernet operations for hook registration   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH security-next 1/2] smack: use pernet operations for hook registration   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 1/3] selinux: Implement LSM notification system   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 1/3] selinux: Implement LSM notification system   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 1/3] selinux: Implement LSM notification system   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH v1] LSM: Enable multiple calls to security_add_hooks() for the same LSM   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down   Andy Shevchenko
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down   Andy Shevchenko
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down   Andy Shevchenko
• [PATCH RFC 00/11] LSM: Stacking for major security modules   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH RFC 00/11] LSM: Stacking for major security modules   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_status_get_seq() function   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function   Stephen Smalley
• SELinux "filtering" capabilities?   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH 1/3] selinux: Implement LSM notification system   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH 2/3] selinux: add checksum to policydb   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH 3/3] selinux: expose policy SHA256 checksum via selinuxfs   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH 2/3] selinux: add checksum to policydb   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH 2/3] selinux: add checksum to policydb   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH 2/3] selinux: add checksum to policydb   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH 2/3] selinux: add checksum to policydb   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   Alexei Starovoitov
• [PATCH 07/12] fs: btrfs: Use ktime_get_real_ts for root ctime   David Sterba
• [backport v4.9] tpm_tis: use default timeout value if chip reports it as zero   Maciej S. Szmigiero
• [PATCH 08/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/gpio/   Linus Walleij
• [PATCH security-next 0/2]: switch selinux and smack to pernet ops   Florian Westphal
• [PATCH security-next 1/2] smack: use pernet operations for hook registration   Florian Westphal
• [PATCH security-next 2/2] selinux: use pernet operations for hook registration   Florian Westphal
• [tpmdd-devel] Intel NUC and fTPM issue on 4.9.2   Winkler, Tomas
• [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Rafael J. Wysocki
• [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Rafael J. Wysocki
• [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Rafael J. Wysocki
• [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Rafael J. Wysocki
• [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Rafael J. Wysocki
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   Dave Young
• [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Dave Young
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   Dave Young
• [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Dave Young
• [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Dave Young
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   Dave Young
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   Dave Young
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   Dave Young
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set   Mimi Zohar
• [GIT PULL] IMA patches for 4.12   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 3/6] ima: Simplify policy_func_show.   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 5/6] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions.   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 3/6] ima: Simplify policy_func_show.   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 6/6] ima: Support appended signatures for appraisal   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 32/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/video/   Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz
• No subject   wendyqzx at gmail.com
• No subject   wendyqzx at gmail.com
• [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   joeyli
• [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down   joeyli
• 49277 linux-security-module   76564 at max.arc.nasa.gov
• No subject   76564 at max.arc.nasa.gov
• [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN   matt at nmatt.com
• [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down   poma
• [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction   kbuild test robot
• [PATCH 6/6] ima: Support appended signatures for appraisal   kbuild test robot
• [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Add ioctl to request locality prepended to command   kbuild test robot
• 31050 linux-security-module   linux1 at telus.net

Last message date: Sun Apr 30 23:28:52 UTC 2017
Archived on: Sun Apr 30 23:29:24 UTC 2017

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