[PATCH 2/3] selinux: add checksum to policydb

[Stephen Smalley]

On Thu, 2017-04-27 at 10:41 +0200, Sebastien Buisson wrote:
> 2017-04-26 20:30 GMT+02:00 Stephen Smalley <sds at tycho.nsa.gov>:
> > This seems like an odd place to trigger the computation.
> 
> I noticed that the policy as exposed via /sys/fs/selinux/policy can
> also be modified in security_set_bools().

That's true, but does that matter for your use case?  Do you care about
non-persistent boolean changes? What is the property you want to
ensure?

>  So in order to limit the
> places from where to compute the policy checksum, I moved the call to
> checksum computation to selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback().
> That being said, maybe the hash of /sys/fs/selinux/policy is not the
> checksum we want. See your comments and my answers below.
> 
> > Why aren't you
> > just computing it when the policy is loaded directly in
> > security_load_policy()?  You already have the (data, len) on entry
> > to
> > that function.  Just compute it at load time, save it, and be
> > done.  No
> > need for a notifier then for your use case unless I am missing
> > something.
> 
> You are right. Getting from the Lustre client code the SELinux
> internally computed checksum is cheap, so no need to be notified
> every
> time the policy changes, and no need to store the checksum in Lustre
> at that time.
> I will drop the "Implement LSM notification system" patch from this
> series, as I cannot justify its usefulness from a Lustre client
> standpoint anymore.
> 
> > I suppose the question is which checksum do you want - the hash of
> > the
> > policy file that was written to /sys/fs/selinux/load by userspace,
> > or
> > the hash of the policy file that the kernel generates on demand if
> > you
> > open /sys/fs/selinux/policy.  Those can differ in non-semantic ways
> > due
> > to ordering differences, for example.  I think the former is more
> > likely to be of interest to userspace (e.g. to compare the hash
> > value
> > against the hash of the policy file), and is cheaper since you
> > already
> > have a (data, len) pair on entry to security_load_policy() that you
> > can
> > hash immediately rather than requiring the kernel to regenerate the
> > image from the policydb.
> 
> OK, I understand now why I was seeing differences between the
> checksum
> computed on a (data, len) pair on entry to security_load_policy(),
> and
> the checksum computed on a (data, len) pair got from
> security_read_policy().
> I thought it was a problem to have a difference between the
> internally
> computed checksum and the one a user can get by calling sha256sum on
> /sys/fs/selinux/policy. But now I see it makes sense to reflect what
> was loaded by userspace. So I will simplify this patch accordingly.

Ok, that should work as long as you just want to validate that all the
clients loaded the same policy file, and aren't concerned about non-
persistent policy boolean changes.

You needed to get (global) enforcing mode too, didn't you?  That's
separate from the policy.

Make sure you make the hash algorithm explicit in both what is returned
by the hook to lustre and by what is exported via selinuxfs.  Can
likely just encode the hash algorithm name in the string when you
generate it.

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