[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/3] LSM: Allow per LSM module per "struct task_struct" blob.

Djalal Harouni tixxdz at gmail.com
Wed Apr 12 16:22:01 UTC 2017


On Tue, Apr 11, 2017 at 6:43 AM, Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 1:00 PM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz at gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 9:26 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>>> I think that would be the prudent approach. There is still
>>> the possibility that blob sharing (or full stacking, if you
>>> prefer) won't be accepted any time soon.
>>
>> Ok Casey! I will wait for more feedback, and if other maintainers do
>> not object, I will convert it back to rhashtables in next iterations
>> making sure that it should be simple to convert later to a blob
>> sharing mechanism.
>
> Would it be possible just to add a single field to task_struct if this
> LSM is built in? I feel like rhashtables is a huge overhead when a
> single field is all that's needed.

Well, yes rhashtables can have an overhead especially when reclaiming
memory back, I could not identify a way how to separate tables unless
we use cgroups as an ID. Anyway this of course could be added in
task_struct and updated to work like the capability security hooks
rather than a proper LSM with its own name. But as noted in the other
response, we may need task->security field for Yama anyway. I'm open
to suggestion ? I may try to converge the task->security blob with
what Casey is proposing and see! otherwise fallback to task_struct as
a last resort!

Thanks!

-- 
tixxdz
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