[PATCH 2/3] selinux: add checksum to policydb

[Stephen Smalley]

On Fri, 2017-04-28 at 18:08 +0200, Sebastien Buisson wrote:
> 2017-04-28 17:50 GMT+02:00 Stephen Smalley <sds at tycho.nsa.gov>:
> > You seem to be conflating kernel policy with userspace policy.
> > security_load_policy() is provided with the kernel policy image,
> > which
> > is the result of linking the kernel-relevant portions of all policy
> > modules together. A hash of that image will change if you insert a
> > policy module that affects the kernel policy in any way.  But a
> > change
> > that only affects userspace policy isn't ever going to be reflected
> > in
> > the kernel.  It doesn't matter where or when you compute your
> > checksum
> > within the kernel; it isn't ever going to reflect those userspace
> > policy changes.
> 
> Here is the content of the module is used for my tests:
> 
> #============= user_t ==============
> allow user_t mnt_t:dir { write add_name };
> allow user_t mnt_t:file { write create };
> 
> After loading the .pp corresponding to it, I can see that with the
> method of computing the checksum on the (data, len) pair on entry to
> security_load_policy(), the checksum does not change. However, when
> using the (data, len) pair got from
> security_read_policy(), the checksum changes. And when I remove the
> module, the checksum is back to its previous value.
> So this is what makes me think there is a difference. Am I missing
> something?

Policy is loaded via security_load_policy(), so the policy image has to
go through it in the first place to be loaded (ignoring kernel exploits
or direct /dev/mem access).  You couldn't have loaded the modified
policy with your new rules without the modified policy getting
processed by security_load_policy().  So I'm assuming there is a bug in
your code or your testing.


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