[PATCH v3 2/2] tiocsti-restrict : make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN

[Serge E. Hallyn]

Quoting Matt Brown (matt at nmatt.com):
> This introduces the tiocsti_restrict sysctl, whose default is controlled via
> CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT. When activated, this control restricts
> all TIOCSTI ioctl calls from non CAP_SYS_ADMIN users.
> 
> This patch was inspired from GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY.
> 
> This patch would have prevented
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1411256 under the following
> conditions:
> * non-privileged container
> * container run inside new user namespace
> 
> Possible effects on userland:
> 
> There could be a few user programs that would be effected by this
> change.
> See: <https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=ioctl%5C%28.*TIOCSTI>
> notable programs are: agetty, csh, xemacs and tcsh
> 
> However, I still believe that this change is worth it given that the
> Kconfig defaults to n. This will be a feature that is turned on for the
> same reason that people activate it when using grsecurity. Users of this
> opt-in feature will realize that they are choosing security over some OS
> features like unprivileged TIOCSTI ioctls, as should be clear in the
> Kconfig help message.
> 
> Threat Model/Patch Rational:
> 
> >From grsecurity's config for GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY.
> 
>  | There are very few legitimate uses for this functionality and it
>  | has made vulnerabilities in several 'su'-like programs possible in
>  | the past.  Even without these vulnerabilities, it provides an
>  | attacker with an easy mechanism to move laterally among other
>  | processes within the same user's compromised session.
> 
> So if one process within a tty session becomes compromised it can follow
> that additional processes, that are thought to be in different security
> boundaries, can be compromised as a result. When using a program like su
> or sudo, these additional processes could be in a tty session where TTY file
> descriptors are indeed shared over privilege boundaries.
> 
> This is also an excellent writeup about the issue:
> <http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/TtyPushbackPrivilegeEscalation/>
> 
> When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally opened
> the tty.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <matt at nmatt.com>

Thanks.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com>

> ---
>  Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  drivers/tty/tty_io.c            |  6 ++++++
>  include/linux/tty.h             |  2 ++
>  kernel/sysctl.c                 | 12 ++++++++++++
>  security/Kconfig                | 13 +++++++++++++
>  5 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> index bac23c1..c15c660 100644
> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
>  - sysctl_writes_strict
>  - tainted
>  - threads-max
> +- tiocsti_restrict
>  - unknown_nmi_panic
>  - watchdog
>  - watchdog_thresh
> @@ -987,6 +988,26 @@ available RAM pages threads-max is reduced accordingly.
>  
>  ==============================================================
>  
> +tiocsti_restrict:
> +
> +This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented
> +from using the TIOCSTI ioctl to inject commands into otherprocesses
> +which share a tty session.
> +
> +When tiocsti_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions(accept
> +the default restriction of only being able to injection commands into
> +one's own tty). When tiocsti_restrict is set to (1), users must
> +have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use the TIOCSTI ioctl.
> +
> +When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability
> +CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally
> +opened the tty.
> +
> +The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT sets the
> +default value of tiocsti_restrict.
> +
> +==============================================================
> +
>  unknown_nmi_panic:
>  
>  The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the
> diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> index 03d5ea2..5667a5e 100644
> --- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> @@ -2298,11 +2298,17 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
>   *	FIXME: may race normal receive processing
>   */
>  
> +int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT);
> +
>  static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p)
>  {
>  	char ch, mbz = 0;
>  	struct tty_ldisc *ld;
>  
> +	if (tiocsti_restrict && !ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> +		pr_warn_ratelimited("TIOCSTI ioctl call blocked for non-privileged process\n");
> +		return -EPERM;
> +	}
>  	if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  	if (get_user(ch, p))
> diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h
> index d902d42..2fd7f49 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tty.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tty.h
> @@ -344,6 +344,8 @@ struct tty_file_private {
>  	struct list_head list;
>  };
>  
> +extern int tiocsti_restrict;
> +
>  /* tty magic number */
>  #define TTY_MAGIC		0x5401
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> index acf0a5a..68d1363 100644
> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
>  #include <linux/kexec.h>
>  #include <linux/bpf.h>
>  #include <linux/mount.h>
> +#include <linux/tty.h>
>  
>  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
>  #include <asm/processor.h>
> @@ -833,6 +834,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
>  		.extra2		= &two,
>  	},
>  #endif
> +#if defined CONFIG_TTY
> +	{
> +		.procname	= "tiocsti_restrict",
> +		.data		= &tiocsti_restrict,
> +		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
> +		.mode		= 0644,
> +		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
> +		.extra1		= &zero,
> +		.extra2		= &one,
> +	},
> +#endif
>  	{
>  		.procname	= "ngroups_max",
>  		.data		= &ngroups_max,
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 3ff1bf9..7d13331 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -18,6 +18,19 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
>  
>  	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
>  
> +config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT
> +	bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection"
> +	default n
> +	help
> +	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands
> +	  into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI
> +	  ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> +
> +	  If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
> +	  unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
> +
> +	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
> +
>  config SECURITY
>  	bool "Enable different security models"
>  	depends on SYSFS
> -- 
> 2.10.2
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