[PATCH 18/38] Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/net/can/
Marc Kleine-Budde
mkl at pengutronix.de
Fri Apr 14 13:08:13 UTC 2017
On 04/05/2017 06:59 PM, David Howells wrote:
> When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
> prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
> includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
> access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
> device to access or modify the kernel image.
>
> To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
> configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
> specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
> skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
> The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
> default values for those parameters is.
>
> Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
> drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
> some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
> to manually coded parameters.
>
> This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/can/.
>
> Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes at lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl at pengutronix.de>
> cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg at grandegger.com>
> cc: linux-can at vger.kernel.org
> cc: netdev at vger.kernel.org
Who whill take this patch? Or will it be allied as part of the series by
some of my upstreams?
Marc
--
Pengutronix e.K. | Marc Kleine-Budde |
Industrial Linux Solutions | Phone: +49-231-2826-924 |
Vertretung West/Dortmund | Fax: +49-5121-206917-5555 |
Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686 | http://www.pengutronix.de |
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