May 2020 Archives by thread

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Starting: Fri May 1 03:46:25 UTC 2020
Ending: Sun May 31 23:59:53 UTC 2020
Messages: 704

• [PATCH bpf] security: Fix the default value of fs_context_parse_param hook   James Morris
  • [PATCH bpf] security: Fix the default value of fs_context_parse_param hook   Alexei Starovoitov
• [PATCH] capabilities: add description for CAP_SETFCAP   James Morris
• [PATCH v3 0/5] Add support for RESOLVE_MAYEXEC   James Morris
• [PATCH v3 2/5] fs: Add a MAY_EXECMOUNT flag to infer the noexec mount property   James Morris
  • [PATCH v3 2/5] fs: Add a MAY_EXECMOUNT flag to infer the noexec mount property   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v3 1/5] fs: Add support for a RESOLVE_MAYEXEC flag on openat2(2)   James Morris
  • [PATCH v3 1/5] fs: Add support for a RESOLVE_MAYEXEC flag on openat2(2)   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v3 3/5] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through RESOLVE_MAYEXEC   James Morris
  • [PATCH v3 3/5] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through RESOLVE_MAYEXEC   Mickaël Salaün
    • [PATCH v3 3/5] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through RESOLVE_MAYEXEC   James Morris
• [PATCH bpf] security: Fix the default value of fs_context_parse_param hook   Mikko Ylinen
• [PATCH] vfs: allow unprivileged whiteout creation   Miklos Szeredi
  • [PATCH] vfs: allow unprivileged whiteout creation   Ondrej Mosnacek
    • [PATCH] vfs: allow unprivileged whiteout creation   Miklos Szeredi
  • [PATCH] vfs: allow unprivileged whiteout creation   Stephen Smalley
    • [PATCH] vfs: allow unprivileged whiteout creation   Miklos Szeredi
      • [PATCH] vfs: allow unprivileged whiteout creation   Stephen Smalley
• fuse doesn't use security_inode_init_security?   Miklos Szeredi
  • fuse doesn't use security_inode_init_security?   Stephen Smalley
    • fuse doesn't use security_inode_init_security?   Chirantan Ekbote
      • fuse doesn't use security_inode_init_security?   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] kunit: Kconfig: enable a KUNIT_RUN_ALL fragment   Anders Roxell
  • [PATCH] kunit: Kconfig: enable a KUNIT_RUN_ALL fragment   Marco Elver
    • [PATCH] kunit: Kconfig: enable a KUNIT_RUN_ALL fragment   Anders Roxell
  • [PATCH] kunit: Kconfig: enable a KUNIT_RUN_ALL fragment   Brendan Higgins
    • [PATCH] kunit: Kconfig: enable a KUNIT_RUN_ALL fragment   David Gow
      • [PATCH] kunit: Kconfig: enable a KUNIT_RUN_ALL fragment   Anders Roxell
• [PATCH v3 0/5] Add support for RESOLVE_MAYEXEC   Christian Heimes
  • [PATCH v3 0/5] Add support for RESOLVE_MAYEXEC   Mickaël Salaün
• [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.7 (#2)   Paul Moore
• [PATCH] selinux: Fix use of KEY_NEED_* instead of KEY__* perms [v2]   Paul Moore
• [PATCH v4 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on openat2(2)   Deven Bowers
• [RFC][PATCH 0/2] Add support for using reserved memory for ima buffer pass   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [RFC][PATCH 1/2] Add a layer of abstraction to use the memory reserved by device tree for ima buffer pass.   Prakhar Srivastava
    • [RFC][PATCH 1/2] Add a layer of abstraction to use the memory reserved by device tree for ima buffer pass.   Rob Herring
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/2] Add a layer of abstraction to use the memory reserved by device tree for ima buffer pass.   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [RFC][PATCH 2/2] Add support for ima buffer pass using reserved memory arm64   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [RFC][PATCH 0/2] Add support for using reserved memory for ima buffer pass   Mark Rutland
    • [RFC][PATCH 0/2] Add support for using reserved memory for ima buffer pass   Prakhar Srivastava
      • [RFC][PATCH 0/2] Add support for using reserved memory for ima buffer pass   Rob Herring
      • [RFC][PATCH 0/2] Add support for using reserved memory for ima buffer pass   Prakhar Srivastava
      • [RFC][PATCH 0/2] Add support for using reserved memory for ima buffer pass   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [RFC PATCH] ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy   Mimi Zohar
  • [RFC PATCH] ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy   Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
    • [RFC PATCH] ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy   Mimi Zohar
  • [RFC PATCH] ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy   Jann Horn
    • [RFC PATCH] ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH v2 0/6] Enable as many KUnit tests as possible   Anders Roxell
• [PATCH v2 1/6] kunit: Kconfig: enable a KUNIT_RUN_ALL fragment   Anders Roxell
  • [PATCH v2 1/6] kunit: Kconfig: enable a KUNIT_RUN_ALL fragment   David Gow
    • [PATCH v2 1/6] kunit: Kconfig: enable a KUNIT_RUN_ALL fragment   Anders Roxell
      • [PATCH v2 1/6] kunit: Kconfig: enable a KUNIT_RUN_ALL fragment   David Gow
• [PATCH v2 2/6] kunit: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_RUN_ALL   Anders Roxell
  • [PATCH v2 2/6] kunit: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_RUN_ALL   David Gow
• [PATCH v2 3/6] lib: Kconfig.debug: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_RUN_ALL   Anders Roxell
  • [PATCH v2 3/6] lib: Kconfig.debug: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_RUN_ALL   David Gow
• [PATCH v2 4/6] drivers: base: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_RUN_ALL   Anders Roxell
  • [PATCH v2 4/6] drivers: base: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_RUN_ALL   David Gow
• [PATCH v2 5/6] fs: ext4: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_RUN_ALL   Anders Roxell
  • [PATCH v2 5/6] fs: ext4: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_RUN_ALL   David Gow
• [PATCH v2 6/6] security: apparmor: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_RUN_ALL   Anders Roxell
  • [PATCH v2 6/6] security: apparmor: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_RUN_ALL   David Gow
• [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v5 1/6] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on openat2(2)   Mickaël Salaün
    • [PATCH v5 1/6] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on openat2(2)   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v5 1/6] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on openat2(2)   Christian Heimes
      • [PATCH v5 1/6] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on openat2(2)   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v5 1/6] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on openat2(2)   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v5 2/6] fs: Add a MAY_EXECMOUNT flag to infer the noexec mount property   Mickaël Salaün
    • [PATCH v5 2/6] fs: Add a MAY_EXECMOUNT flag to infer the noexec mount property   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v5 2/6] fs: Add a MAY_EXECMOUNT flag to infer the noexec mount property   Lev R. Oshvang .
      • [PATCH v5 2/6] fs: Add a MAY_EXECMOUNT flag to infer the noexec mount property   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v5 2/6] fs: Add a MAY_EXECMOUNT flag to infer the noexec mount property   Lev R. Oshvang .
  • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Mickaël Salaün
    • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Randy Dunlap
      • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Mickaël Salaün
      • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Randy Dunlap
    • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Mickaël Salaün
    • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   David Laight
      • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Mickaël Salaün
      • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Tetsuo Handa
      • How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC)   Kees Cook
      • How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC)   Florian Weimer
      • How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC)   Kees Cook
      • How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC)   Florian Weimer
      • How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC)   Kees Cook
      • How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC)   Florian Weimer
      • How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC)   Mickaël Salaün
      • How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC)   Kees Cook
      • How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC)   Mickaël Salaün
      • [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v5 4/6] selftest/openat2: Add tests for O_MAYEXEC enforcing   Mickaël Salaün
    • [PATCH v5 4/6] selftest/openat2: Add tests for O_MAYEXEC enforcing   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v5 4/6] selftest/openat2: Add tests for O_MAYEXEC enforcing   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v5 5/6] doc: Add documentation for the fs.open_mayexec_enforce sysctl   Mickaël Salaün
    • [PATCH v5 5/6] doc: Add documentation for the fs.open_mayexec_enforce sysctl   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v5 5/6] doc: Add documentation for the fs.open_mayexec_enforce sysctl   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v5 6/6] ima: add policy support for the new file open MAY_OPENEXEC flag   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC   Mickaël Salaün
    • [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC   Lev R. Oshvang .
      • [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC   David Laight
    • [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC   Mickaël Salaün
      • [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC   David Laight
      • [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC   Mickaël Salaün
      • [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC   David Laight
      • [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC   Mickaël Salaün
      • [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC   Lev R. Oshvang .
      • [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC   Mimi Zohar
• [RFC PATCH v1] ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy   Mimi Zohar
  • [RFC PATCH v1] ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy   Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
• [PATCH] securityfs: Add missing d_delete() call on removal   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH] securityfs: Add missing d_delete() call on removal   Al Viro
    • [PATCH] securityfs: Add missing d_delete() call on removal   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH] securityfs: Add missing d_delete() call on removal   Al Viro
      • [PATCH] securityfs: Add missing d_delete() call on removal   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH] securityfs: Add missing d_delete() call on removal   Al Viro
      • [PATCH] securityfs: Add missing d_delete() call on removal   Kees Cook
• [PATCH v4 0/4] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Sumit Garg
  • [PATCH v4 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework   Sumit Garg
    • [PATCH v4 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [PATCH v4 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework   Sumit Garg
      • [PATCH v4 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v4 2/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys   Sumit Garg
    • [PATCH v4 2/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [PATCH v4 2/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys   Sumit Garg
      • [PATCH v4 2/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v4 3/4] doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source   Sumit Garg
    • [PATCH v4 3/4] doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v4 4/4] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys   Sumit Garg
    • [PATCH v4 4/4] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v4 0/4] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Sumit Garg
• [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Richard Hughes
  • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Andy Shevchenko
    • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Richard Hughes
  • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Javier Martinez Canillas
    • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Andy Shevchenko
      • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Javier Martinez Canillas
  • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Mario.Limonciello at dell.com
    • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Richard Hughes
      • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Mario.Limonciello at dell.com
      • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Richard Hughes
      • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Mario.Limonciello at dell.com
      • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Mika Westerberg
      • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Richard Hughes
      • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Mika Westerberg
      • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Richard Hughes
      • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Mika Westerberg
      • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Richard Hughes
      • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Mika Westerberg
      • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Richard Hughes
      • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Mario.Limonciello at dell.com
      • [PATCH] platform/x86: Export LPC attributes for the system SPI chip   Mika Westerberg
• [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Roberto Sassu
• [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Mimi Zohar
  • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Mimi Zohar
    • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Roberto Sassu
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Mimi Zohar
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Roberto Sassu
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Mimi Zohar
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Roberto Sassu
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Mimi Zohar
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Roberto Sassu
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Mimi Zohar
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Roberto Sassu
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Mimi Zohar
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Roberto Sassu
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Mimi Zohar
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Roberto Sassu
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Mimi Zohar
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Roberto Sassu
      • [RFC][PATCH 1/3] evm: Move hooks outside LSM infrastructure   Mimi Zohar
• [ANNOUNCE][CFP] Linux Security Summit Europe 2020   Elena Reshetova
• [PATCH] ima: Allow imasig requirement to be satisfied by EVM portable signatures   Roberto Sassu
• [PATCH v5 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface   James Morris
• [PATCH] ima: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array   Gustavo A. R. Silva
• [GIT PULL] security: Fix the default value of fs_context_parse_param hook   James Morris
  • [GIT PULL] security: Fix the default value of fs_context_parse_param hook   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [PATCH] integrity: evm: Fix RCU list related warnings.   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH v4 1/7] ima: Switch to ima_hash_algo for boot aggregate   Jerry Snitselaar
  • [PATCH v4 1/7] ima: Switch to ima_hash_algo for boot aggregate   Mimi Zohar
• clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 01/11] fs: call file_{start,end}_write from __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 02/11] fs: check FMODE_WRITE in __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 03/11] fs: remove the call_{read,write}_iter functions   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 04/11] fs: implement kernel_write using __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 05/11] fs: remove __vfs_write   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 06/11] fs: don't change the address limit for ->write_iter in __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 07/11] fs: add a __kernel_read helper   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 08/11] integrity/ima: switch to using __kernel_read   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 09/11] fs: implement kernel_read using __kernel_read   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 10/11] fs: remove __vfs_read   Christoph Hellwig
    • [PATCH 10/11] fs: remove __vfs_read   Ira Weiny
      • [PATCH 10/11] fs: remove __vfs_read   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 11/11] fs: don't change the address limit for ->read_iter in __kernel_read   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH v29 11/20] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver   Sean Christopherson
• [PATCH v5 bpf-next 0/3] Introduce CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
  • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 1/3] bpf, capability: Introduce CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
  • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
    • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   sdf at google.com
      • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
      • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Jordan Glover
      • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
      • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   sdf at google.com
      • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
    • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Daniel Borkmann
      • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
      • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Daniel Borkmann
      • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
    • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Daniel Borkmann
      • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
      • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Daniel Borkmann
    • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Daniel Borkmann
      • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
  • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 3/3] selftests/bpf: use CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON in tests   Alexei Starovoitov
  • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 0/3] Introduce CAP_BPF   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v5 bpf-next 0/3] Introduce CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
• [PATCH -next] Smack: Remove unused inline function smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt   YueHaibing
  • [PATCH -next] Smack: Remove unused inline function smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 0/5] exec: Control flow simplifications   Eric W. Biederman
  • [PATCH 1/5] exec: Call cap_bprm_set_creds directly from prepare_binprm   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH 1/5] exec: Call cap_bprm_set_creds directly from prepare_binprm   Linus Torvalds
  • [PATCH 2/5] exec: Directly call security_bprm_set_creds from __do_execve_file   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH 2/5] exec: Directly call security_bprm_set_creds from __do_execve_file   Linus Torvalds
      • [PATCH 2/5] exec: Directly call security_bprm_set_creds from __do_execve_file   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 2/5] exec: Directly call security_bprm_set_creds from __do_execve_file   Linus Torvalds
    • [PATCH 2/5] exec: Directly call security_bprm_set_creds from __do_execve_file   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 2/5] exec: Directly call security_bprm_set_creds from __do_execve_file   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 2/5] exec: Directly call security_bprm_set_creds from __do_execve_file   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Linus Torvalds
    • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Linus Torvalds
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Rob Landley
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Rob Landley
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Linus Torvalds
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Rob Landley
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Linus Torvalds
      • [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Eric W. Biederman
  • [PATCH 4/5] exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binfmt unconditionally   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH 4/5] exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binfmt unconditionally   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 5/5] exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH 5/5] exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: Control flow simplifications   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gids   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gids   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gids   Linus Torvalds
      • [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gids   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds   James Morris
    • [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds   James Morris
      • [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH v2 4/8] exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binfmt unconditionally   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 4/8] exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binfmt unconditionally   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 4/8] exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binfmt unconditionally   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 4/8] exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binfmt unconditionally   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v2 5/8] exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 5/8] exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 5/8] exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler   James Morris
    • [PATCH v2 6/8] exec/binfmt_script: Don't modify bprm->buf and then return -ENOEXEC   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 6/8] exec/binfmt_script: Don't modify bprm->buf and then return -ENOEXEC   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 6/8] exec/binfmt_script: Don't modify bprm->buf and then return -ENOEXEC   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Generic execfd support   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Generic execfd support   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Generic execfd support   Linus Torvalds
      • [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Generic execfd support   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Generic execfd support   Rob Landley
      • [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Generic execfd support   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Generic execfd support   Rob Landley
      • [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Generic execfd support   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Generic execfd support   Rob Landley
      • [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Generic execfd support   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH v2 8/8] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 8/8] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: Control flow simplifications   Linus Torvalds
    • [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: Control flow simplifications   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: Control flow simplifications   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: Control flow simplifications   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: Control flow simplifications   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: Control flow simplifications   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH 0/11] exec: cred calculation simplifications   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 01/11] exec: Reduce bprm->per_clear to a single bit   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 01/11] exec: Reduce bprm->per_clear to a single bit   Linus Torvalds
      • [PATCH 01/11] exec: Reduce bprm->per_clear to a single bit   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 02/11] exec: Introduce active_per_clear the per file version of per_clear   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 02/11] exec: Introduce active_per_clear the per file version of per_clear   Linus Torvalds
      • [PATCH 03/11] exec: Compute file based creds only once   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 04/11] exec: Move uid/gid handling from creds_from_file into bprm_fill_uid   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 04/11] exec: Move uid/gid handling from creds_from_file into bprm_fill_uid   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 05/11] exec: In bprm_fill_uid use CAP_SETGID to see if a gid change is safe   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 06/11] exec: Don't set secureexec when the uid or gid changes are abandoned   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 07/11] exec: Set saved, fs, and effective ids together in bprm_fill_uid   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 08/11] exec: In bprm_fill_uid remove unnecessary no new privs check   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 09/11] exec: In bprm_fill_uid only set per_clear when honoring suid or sgid   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 09/11] exec: In bprm_fill_uid only set per_clear when honoring suid or sgid   Linus Torvalds
      • [PATCH 09/11] exec: In bprm_fill_uid only set per_clear when honoring suid or sgid   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 10/11] exec: In bprm_fill_uid set secureexec at same time as per_clear   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 11/11] exec: Remove the label after_setid from bprm_fill_uid   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 0/2] exec: Remove the computation of bprm->cred   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 1/2] exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 1/2] exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 1/2] exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 1/2] exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 2/2] exec: Compute file based creds only once   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 2/2] exec: Compute file based creds only once   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 2/2] exec: Compute file based creds only once   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 2/2] exec: Compute file based creds only once   Kees Cook
• [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)   Mickaël Salaün
  • [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)   Deven Bowers
    • [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)   Deven Bowers
      • [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)   Mickaël Salaün
      • [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)   Jaskaran Singh Khurana
      • [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)   Jaskaran Singh Khurana
      • [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v3 0/6] Enable as many KUnit tests as possible   Anders Roxell
  • [PATCH v3 0/6] Enable as many KUnit tests as possible   Anders Roxell
    • [PATCH v3 0/6] Enable as many KUnit tests as possible   Brendan Higgins
      • [PATCH v3 0/6] Enable as many KUnit tests as possible   Shuah Khan
• [PATCH v3 1/6] kunit: Kconfig: enable a KUNIT_ALL_TESTS fragment   Anders Roxell
  • [PATCH v3 1/6] kunit: Kconfig: enable a KUNIT_ALL_TESTS fragment   Brendan Higgins
• [PATCH v3 2/6] kunit: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS   Anders Roxell
• [PATCH v3 3/6] lib: Kconfig.debug: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS   Anders Roxell
• [PATCH v3 4/6] drivers: base: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS   Anders Roxell
• [PATCH v3 5/6] fs: ext4: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS   Anders Roxell
  • [PATCH v3 5/6] fs: ext4: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS   Theodore Y. Ts'o
• [PATCH v3 6/6] security: apparmor: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS   Anders Roxell
  • [PATCH v3 6/6] security: apparmor: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS   John Johansen
• [PATCH] lockdown: Allow unprivileged users to see lockdown status   Jeremy Cline
  • [PATCH] lockdown: Allow unprivileged users to see lockdown status   James Morris
• [PATCH v17 00/10] Landlock LSM   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v17 01/10] landlock: Add object management   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v17 03/10] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v17 04/10] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v17 05/10] fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control   Mickaël Salaün
    • [PATCH v17 05/10] fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control   James Morris
      • [PATCH v17 05/10] fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control   Mickaël Salaün
      • [PATCH v17 05/10] fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v17 05/10] fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control   Mickaël Salaün
      • [PATCH v17 05/10] fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control   James Morris
      • [PATCH v17 05/10] fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control   Mickaël Salaün
      • [PATCH v17 05/10] fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control   James Morris
  • [PATCH v17 06/10] landlock: Add syscall implementation   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v17 07/10] arch: Wire up landlock() syscall   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v17 08/10] selftests/landlock: Add initial tests   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v17 09/10] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v17 10/10] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v17 00/10] Landlock LSM   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v17 02/10] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v17 02/10] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management   James Morris
    • [PATCH v17 02/10] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management   Mickaël Salaün
• [bug report] evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()   Dan Carpenter
  • [bug report] evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()   Roberto Sassu
    • [bug report] evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()   Dan Carpenter
      • [bug report] evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()   Roberto Sassu
      • [bug report] evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()   Dan Carpenter
      • [bug report] evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()   Roberto Sassu
      • [PATCH] evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()   Dan Carpenter
      • [PATCH] evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()   Roberto Sassu
      • [PATCH v2] evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()   Dan Carpenter
      • [PATCH v2] evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()   Roberto Sassu
      • [PATCH v2] evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()   Krzysztof Struczynski
      • [PATCH v2] evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH net] netlabel: cope with NULL catmap   Paolo Abeni
  • [PATCH net] netlabel: cope with NULL catmap   Paul Moore
  • [PATCH net] netlabel: cope with NULL catmap   David Miller
• [PATCH] keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask   David Howells
  • [PATCH] keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask   Paul Moore
    • [PATCH] keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask   David Howells
  • [PATCH] keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask   Stephen Smalley
    • [PATCH] keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask   David Howells
      • [PATCH] keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH] keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask   Stephen Smalley
    • [PATCH] keys: Move permissions checking decisions into the checking code   David Howells
      • [PATCH] keys: Move permissions checking decisions into the checking code   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH] keys: Move permissions checking decisions into the checking code   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH] keys: Move permissions checking decisions into the checking code   David Howells
      • [PATCH] keys: Move permissions checking decisions into the checking code   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH] keys: Move permissions checking decisions into the checking code   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH] keys: Move permissions checking decisions into the checking code   David Howells
  • [PATCH] keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH] keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask   David Howells
  • [PATCH] keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v6 bpf-next 0/3] Introduce CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
  • [PATCH v6 bpf-next 1/3] bpf, capability: Introduce CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
  • [PATCH v6 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
  • [PATCH v6 bpf-next 3/3] selftests/bpf: use CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON in tests   Alexei Starovoitov
  • [PATCH v6 bpf-next 0/3] Introduce CAP_BPF   Marek Majkowski
    • [PATCH v6 bpf-next 0/3] Introduce CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
      • [PATCH v6 bpf-next 0/3] Introduce CAP_BPF   Marek Majkowski
      • [PATCH v6 bpf-next 0/3] Introduce CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
      • [PATCH v6 bpf-next 0/3] Introduce CAP_BPF   Marek Majkowski
• clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 01/14] cachefiles: switch to kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
    • [PATCH 01/14] cachefiles: switch to kernel_write   David Howells
  • [PATCH 02/14] autofs: switch to kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
    • [PATCH 02/14] autofs: switch to kernel_write   Ian Kent
  • [PATCH 03/14] bpfilter: switch to kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 04/14] fs: unexport __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 05/14] fs: check FMODE_WRITE in __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 06/14] fs: remove the call_{read,write}_iter functions   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 07/14] fs: implement kernel_write using __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 08/14] fs: remove __vfs_write   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 09/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->write_iter in __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 10/14] fs: add a __kernel_read helper   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 11/14] integrity/ima: switch to using __kernel_read   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 12/14] fs: implement kernel_read using __kernel_read   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 13/14] fs: remove __vfs_read   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 14/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->read_iter in __kernel_read   Christoph Hellwig
  • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH v2 2/2] fs: avoid fdput() after failed fdget() in kernel_read_file_from_fd()   Luis Chamberlain
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] fs: avoid fdput() after failed fdget() in kernel_read_file_from_fd()   Luis Chamberlain
    • [PATCH v2 2/2] fs: avoid fdput() after failed fdget() in kernel_read_file_from_fd()   Scott Branden
      • [PATCH v2 2/2] fs: avoid fdput() after failed fdget() in kernel_read_file_from_fd()   Scott Branden
      • [PATCH v2 2/2] fs: avoid fdput() after failed fdget() in kernel_read_file_from_fd()   Luis Chamberlain
• [PATCH 0/3] fs: reduce export usage of kerne_read*() calls   Luis Chamberlain
  • [PATCH 1/3] fs: unexport kernel_read_file()   Luis Chamberlain
  • [PATCH 0/3] fs: reduce export usage of kerne_read*() calls   Christoph Hellwig
    • [PATCH 0/3] fs: reduce export usage of kerne_read*() calls   Luis Chamberlain
      • [PATCH 0/3] fs: reduce export usage of kerne_read*() calls   Christoph Hellwig
      • [PATCH 0/3] fs: reduce export usage of kerne_read*() calls   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH 0/3] fs: reduce export usage of kerne_read*() calls   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 0/3] fs: reduce export usage of kerne_read*() calls   Scott Branden
      • [PATCH 0/3] fs: reduce export usage of kerne_read*() calls   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 0/3] fs: reduce export usage of kerne_read*() calls   Scott Branden
      • [PATCH 0/3] fs: reduce export usage of kerne_read*() calls   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 2/3] security: add symbol namespace for reading file data   Luis Chamberlain
  • [PATCH 2/3] security: add symbol namespace for reading file data   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH 2/3] security: add symbol namespace for reading file data   Greg KH
    • [PATCH 2/3] security: add symbol namespace for reading file data   Luis Chamberlain
      • [PATCH 2/3] security: add symbol namespace for reading file data   Greg KH
      • [PATCH 2/3] security: add symbol namespace for reading file data   Josh Triplett
• [PATCH 3/3] fs: move kernel_read*() calls to its own symbol namespace   Luis Chamberlain
  • [PATCH 3/3] fs: move kernel_read*() calls to its own symbol namespace   Greg KH
• [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support   Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support   Scott Branden
    • [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support   Scott Branden
    • [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support   Scott Branden
      • [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support   Scott Branden
      • [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support   Luis Chamberlain
      • [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support   Scott Branden
      • [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v5 1/7] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH v7 bpf-next 0/3] Introduce CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
  • [PATCH v7 bpf-next 1/3] bpf, capability: Introduce CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
  • [PATCH v7 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF   Alexei Starovoitov
  • [PATCH v7 bpf-next 3/3] selftests/bpf: use CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON in tests   Alexei Starovoitov
  • [PATCH v7 bpf-next 0/3] Introduce CAP_BPF   Daniel Borkmann
• [PATCH RESEND] lockdown: Allow unprivileged users to see lockdown status   Jeremy Cline
  • [PATCH RESEND] lockdown: Allow unprivileged users to see lockdown status   James Morris
• WARNING: suspicious RCU usage with PROVE_RCU_LIST=y   Amol Grover
  • WARNING: suspicious RCU usage with PROVE_RCU_LIST=y   John Johansen
• [PATCH] security: fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook   James Morris
• [PATCH v17 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v17 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking   Stephen Smalley
  • [PATCH v17 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 20/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple subject LSM attributes   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v17 20/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple subject LSM attributes   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH v17 20/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple subject LSM attributes   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v17 20/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple subject LSM attributes   Paul Moore
      • [PATCH v17 20/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple subject LSM attributes   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v17 20/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple subject LSM attributes   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v17 20/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple subject LSM attributes   Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v17 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object LSM attributes   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v17 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH v30 10/20] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v30 10/20] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver   Sean Christopherson
    • [PATCH v30 10/20] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [PATCH v30 10/20] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v30 10/20] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver   Sean Christopherson
• [PATCH v30 11/20] x86/sgx: Add provisioning   Jarkko Sakkinen
• linux-next boot error: general protection fault in tomoyo_get_local_path   syzbot
  • linux-next boot error: general protection fault in tomoyo_get_local_path   Tetsuo Handa
    • linux-next boot error: general protection fault in tomoyo_get_local_path   Tetsuo Handa
      • linux-next boot error: general protection fault in tomoyo_get_local_path   Al Viro
      • linux-next boot error: general protection fault in tomoyo_get_local_path   Eric W. Biederman
      • linux-next boot error: general protection fault in tomoyo_get_local_path   Al Viro
    • linux-next boot error: general protection fault in tomoyo_get_local_path   Eric W. Biederman
      • linux-next boot error: general protection fault in tomoyo_get_local_path   Alexey Gladkov
      • [PATCH] proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument   Alexey Gladkov
      • [PATCH v2] proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument   Alexey Gladkov
      • [PATCH v2] proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v2] proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument   Alexey Gladkov
      • [PATCH v2] proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH v3] proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument   Alexey Gladkov
      • [PATCH v3] proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH v4] proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument   Alexey Gladkov
• [PATCH -next] apparmor: Use true and false for bool variable   John Johansen
• [PATCH 0/4] Relocate execve() sanity checks   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 3/4] exec: Relocate path_noexec() check   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 4/4] fs: Include FMODE_EXEC when converting flags to f_mode   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 0/4] Relocate execve() sanity checks   Eric W. Biederman
    • [PATCH 0/4] Relocate execve() sanity checks   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 0/4] Relocate execve() sanity checks   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 0/4] Relocate execve() sanity checks   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 0/4] Relocate execve() sanity checks   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 0/4] Relocate execve() sanity checks   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 0/4] Relocate execve() sanity checks   John Johansen
• [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Christian Brauner
    • [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Jann Horn
      • [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Christian Brauner
      • [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Christian Brauner
      • [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Andreas Schwab
      • [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Andreas Schwab
      • [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Christian Brauner
      • [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Christian Brauner
      • [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Geert Uytterhoeven
      • [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES   Christian Brauner
• [PATCH 2/4] exec: Relocate S_ISREG() check   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 09/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->write_iter in __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH v3 0/3] perf: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control   Alexey Budankov
• WARNING: suspicious RCU usage with PROVE_RCU_LIST=y   John Johansen
• (DONATION) $2 Million Has Been Donated   pedro hills
• [PATCH v3 2/3] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control   Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
  • [PATCH v3 2/3] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control   Alexey Budankov
    • [PATCH v3 2/3] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control   Alexey Budankov
      • [PATCH v3 2/3] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control   Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
• [PATCH v3 3/3] perf docs: introduce security.txt file to document related issues   Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
  • [PATCH v3 3/3] perf docs: introduce security.txt file to document related issues   Alexey Budankov
    • [PATCH v3 3/3] perf docs: introduce security.txt file to document related issues   Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
• [PATCH] security: fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook   Schaufler, Casey
  • [PATCH] security: fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook   Casey Schaufler
• How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC)   Mickaël Salaün
• Geschäftsvorschlag.   gandrade at hontanar.edu.ec
• [PATCH bpf] security: Fix hook iteration for secid_to_secctx   KP Singh
  • [PATCH bpf] security: Fix hook iteration for secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH bpf] security: Fix hook iteration for secid_to_secctx   Alexei Starovoitov
      • [PATCH bpf] security: Fix hook iteration for secid_to_secctx   James Morris
      • [PATCH bpf] security: Fix hook iteration for secid_to_secctx   Alexei Starovoitov
• [GIT PULL] apparmor bug fixes for v5.7-rc6   John Johansen
  • [GIT PULL] apparmor bug fixes for v5.7-rc6   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [PATCH] security: integrity: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array member   Gustavo A. R. Silva
• [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Adrian Reber
  • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Christian Brauner
    • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Andrei Vagin
  • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Christian Brauner
  • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Andrei Vagin
      • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Adrian Reber
      • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Adrian Reber
      • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Nicolas Viennot
      • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Eric W. Biederman
      • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Adrian Reber
      • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Christian Brauner
      • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Nicolas Viennot
      • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Christian Brauner
  • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Jann Horn
    • [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Radostin Stoyanov
• [PATCH] commoncap: Make cap_inode_killpriv ignore other LSM xattr   Dmitry Mastykin
• jjCompliment   mrs chantal
• general protection fault in tomoyo_check_acl   syzbot
  • general protection fault in tomoyo_check_acl   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH bpf-next 0/4] Generalizing bpf_local_storage   KP Singh
  • [PATCH bpf-next 1/4] bpf: Generalize bpf_sk_storage   KP Singh
    • [PATCH bpf-next 1/4] bpf: Generalize bpf_sk_storage   kbuild test robot
  • [PATCH bpf-next 2/4] bpf: Implement bpf_local_storage for inodes   KP Singh
    • [PATCH bpf-next 2/4] bpf: Implement bpf_local_storage for inodes   Alexei Starovoitov
      • [PATCH bpf-next 2/4] bpf: Implement bpf_local_storage for inodes   KP Singh
    • [PATCH bpf-next 2/4] bpf: Implement bpf_local_storage for inodes   Christoph Hellwig
      • [PATCH bpf-next 2/4] bpf: Implement bpf_local_storage for inodes   KP Singh
      • [PATCH bpf-next 2/4] bpf: Implement bpf_local_storage for inodes   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH bpf-next 2/4] bpf: Implement bpf_local_storage for inodes   KP Singh
  • [PATCH bpf-next 3/4] bpf: Allow local storage to be used from LSM programs   KP Singh
  • [PATCH bpf-next 4/4] bpf: Add selftests for local_storage   KP Singh
• [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE   Jann Horn
• [PATCH v18 00/12] Landlock LSM   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v18 01/12] landlock: Add object management   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v18 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v18 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v18 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v18 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v18 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control   Mickaël Salaün
    • [PATCH v18 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control   Amir Goldstein
      • [PATCH v18 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v18 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementation   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v18 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v18 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v18 09/12] arch: Wire up landlock() syscall   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v18 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add initial tests   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v18 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example   Mickaël Salaün
• Spende   Mrs.Judith Rice
• Spende   Mrs.Judith Rice
• clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Christoph Hellwig
  • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Linus Torvalds
    • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Sedat Dilek
    • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Joe Perches
      • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Al Viro
      • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Matthew Wilcox
      • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Al Viro
      • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Deucher, Alexander
      • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Joe Perches
      • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Dave Airlie
      • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Joe Perches
    • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   David Howells
      • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Casey Schaufler
      • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   David Laight
      • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Linus Torvalds
      • clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH] checkpatch/coding-style: Allow 100 column lines   Joe Perches
• [PATCH 01/14] cachefiles: switch to kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH 02/14] autofs: switch to kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH 03/14] bpfilter: switch to kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH 04/14] fs: unexport __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH 05/14] fs: check FMODE_WRITE in __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH 06/14] fs: remove the call_{read,write}_iter functions   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 06/14] fs: remove the call_{read,write}_iter functions   Al Viro
    • [PATCH 06/14] fs: remove the call_{read,write}_iter functions   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH 07/14] fs: implement kernel_write using __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH 08/14] fs: remove __vfs_write   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH 09/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->write_iter in __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 09/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->write_iter in __kernel_write   Linus Torvalds
    • [PATCH 09/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->write_iter in __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
      • [PATCH 09/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->write_iter in __kernel_write   Logan Gunthorpe
  • [PATCH 09/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->write_iter in __kernel_write   Al Viro
    • [PATCH 09/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->write_iter in __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
      • [PATCH 09/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->write_iter in __kernel_write   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH 10/14] fs: add a __kernel_read helper   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH 11/14] integrity/ima: switch to using __kernel_read   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH 12/14] fs: implement kernel_read using __kernel_read   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH 13/14] fs: remove __vfs_read   Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH 14/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->read_iter in __kernel_read   Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 14/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->read_iter in __kernel_read   Al Viro
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.6 04/47] evm: Fix RCU list related warnings   Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 03/26] evm: Fix RCU list related warnings   Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 03/17] evm: Fix RCU list related warnings   Sasha Levin
• Spende von 2.000.000,00 Euro   manuel franco
• new seccomp mode aims to improve performance   zhujianwei (C)
  • new seccomp mode aims to improve performance   Alexei Starovoitov
    • new seccomp mode aims to improve performance   Kees Cook
      • new seccomp mode aims to improve performance   Alexei Starovoitov
      • new seccomp mode aims to improve performance   Kees Cook
      • new seccomp mode aims to improve performance   Alexei Starovoitov
• [PATCH] checkpatch/coding-style: Allow 100 column lines   Markus Elfring
• [PATCH RFC] seccomp: Implement syscall isolation based on memory areas   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH RFC] seccomp: Implement syscall isolation based on memory areas   Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
    • [PATCH RFC] seccomp: Implement syscall isolation based on memory areas   Paul Gofman
      • [PATCH RFC] seccomp: Implement syscall isolation based on memory areas   Matthew Wilcox
      • [PATCH RFC] seccomp: Implement syscall isolation based on memory areas   Paul Gofman
      • [PATCH RFC] seccomp: Implement syscall isolation based on memory areas   Matthew Wilcox
      • [PATCH RFC] seccomp: Implement syscall isolation based on memory areas   Paul Gofman
• [PATCH] checkpatch/coding-style: Allow 100 column lines   Joe Perches

Last message date: Sun May 31 23:59:53 UTC 2020
Archived on: Mon Jun 1 00:24:25 UTC 2020

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