[PATCH v2 2/2] fs: avoid fdput() after failed fdget() in kernel_read_file_from_fd()

Scott Branden scott.branden at broadcom.com
Fri May 22 22:14:59 UTC 2020



On 2020-05-22 2:59 p.m., Scott Branden wrote:
> Hi Luis,
>
> On 2020-05-13 7:19 a.m., Luis Chamberlain wrote:
>> On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 7:13 AM Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof at kernel.org> 
>> wrote:
>>> On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 06:49:50AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
>>>> On Tue, May 12, 2020 at 01:43:05PM -0600, Shuah Khan wrote:
>>>>> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
>>>>> index 06b4c550af5d..ea24bdce939d 100644
>>>>> --- a/fs/exec.c
>>>>> +++ b/fs/exec.c
>>>>> @@ -1021,8 +1021,8 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void 
>>>>> **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
>>>>>              goto out;
>>>>>
>>>>>      ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, size, max_size, id);
>>>>> -out:
>>>>>      fdput(f);
>>>>> +out:
>>>>>      return ret;
>>>> Incidentally, why is that thing exported?
>>> Both kernel_read_file_from_fd() and kernel_read_file() are exported
>>> because they have users, however kernel_read_file() only has security
>>> stuff as a user. Do we want to get rid of the lsm hook for it?
>> Alright, yeah just the export needs to be removed. I have a patch
>> series dealing with these callers so will add it to my queue.
> When will these changes make it into linux-next?
> It is difficult for me to complete my patch series without these other 
> misc. changes in place.
Sorry, I see the patch series is still being worked on (missing 
changelog, comments, etc).
Hopefully the patches stabilize so I can apply my changes on top fairly 
soon.
>>
>>    Luis
> Regards,
>  Scott



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