[PATCH 1/2] exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear
keescook at chromium.org
Fri May 29 21:06:33 UTC 2020
On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 11:46:40AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> There is a small bug in the code that recomputes parts of bprm->cred
> for every bprm->file. The code never recomputes the part of
> clear_dangerous_personality_flags it is responsible for.
> Which means that in practice if someone creates a sgid script
> the interpreter will not be able to use any of:
> This accentially clearing of personality flags probably does
> not matter in practice because no one has complained
> but it does make the code more difficult to understand.
> Further remaining bug compatible prevents the recomputation from being
> removed and replaced by simply computing bprm->cred once from the
> final bprm->file.
> Making this change removes the last behavior difference between
> computing bprm->creds from the final file and recomputing
> bprm->cred several times. Which allows this behavior change
> to be justified for it's own reasons, and for any but hunts
> looking into why the behavior changed to wind up here instead
> of in the code that will follow that computes bprm->cred
> from the final bprm->file.
> This small logic bug appears to have existed since the code
> started clearing dangerous personality bits.
> History Tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
> Fixes: 1bb0fa189c6a ("[PATCH] NX: clean up legacy binary support")
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm at xmission.com>
Yup, this looks good. Pointless nit because it's removed in the next
patch, but pf_per_clear is following the same behavioral pattern as
active_secureexec, it could be named active_per_clear, but since this
already been bikeshed in v1, it's fine! :)
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
I wish we had more robust execve tests. :(
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