[PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF
Golden_Miller83 at protonmail.ch
Tue May 12 12:50:05 UTC 2020
On Tuesday, May 12, 2020 2:36 AM, Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, May 11, 2020 at 05:12:10PM -0700, sdf at google.com wrote:
> > On 05/08, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > > From: Alexei Starovoitov ast at kernel.org
> > > [..]
> > > @@ -3932,7 +3977,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(bpf, int, cmd, union bpf_attr
> > > __user *, uattr, unsigned int, siz
> > > union bpf_attr attr;
> > > int err;
> > > - if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > >
> > > - if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_capable())
> > > return -EPERM;
> > > This is awesome, thanks for reviving the effort!
> > >
> > One question I have about this particular snippet:
> > Does it make sense to drop bpf_capable checks for the operations
> > that work on a provided fd?
> Above snippet is for the case when sysctl switches unpriv off.
> It was a big hammer and stays big hammer.
> I certainly would like to improve the situation, but I suspect
> the folks who turn that sysctl knob on are simply paranoid about bpf
> and no amount of reasoning would turn them around.
Without CAP_BPF, sysctl was the only option to keep you safe from flow
of bpf vulns. You didn't had to be paranoid about that.
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