[PATCH v17 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
Casey Schaufler
casey at schaufler-ca.com
Thu May 14 22:11:31 UTC 2020
The IMA interfaces ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy()
call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions
to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds at tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com>
cc: linux-integrity at vger.kernel.org
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 11 ++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 ++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 ++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 32 +++++++++++----------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 ++++++------
5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index f9e3ca96fa52..a85aa57d28c5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -230,9 +230,9 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */
/* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -258,8 +258,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
/* IMA policy related functions */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring);
void ima_init_policy(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index f6bc00914aa5..b481bbc2e55f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @blob: LSM data of the task being validated
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
* MAY_APPEND)
* @func: caller identifier
@@ -182,16 +182,16 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
*
*/
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
- return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr,
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr,
template_desc, keyring);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 3dfb573c7171..bf66e3e6f398 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -54,10 +54,8 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
return 0;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
- return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], func,
- mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL,
- NULL);
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &blob, func, mask,
+ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2dec956b6852..d6133f4451d1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -188,8 +188,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
}
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+ struct lsmblob *blob, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
- action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr,
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr,
&template_desc, NULL);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
@@ -386,8 +386,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob,
NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
@@ -413,16 +412,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
- NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
+ MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
- NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob, NULL, 0,
+ MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
/**
@@ -440,8 +437,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -622,9 +618,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
- size, MAY_READ, func);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, buf, size,
+ MAY_READ, func);
}
/**
@@ -720,9 +715,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
*/
if (func) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding */
- action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], 0,
- func, &pcr, &template, keyring);
+ action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), &blob, 0, func,
+ &pcr, &template, keyring);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 2f084a388142..a89f0c3cadfe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
* @rule: a pointer to a rule
* @inode: a pointer to an inode
* @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
- * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
+ * @blob: the lsm data of the task to be validated
* @func: LIM hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
*/
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
const char *keyring)
{
@@ -500,7 +500,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid);
rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
@@ -544,7 +543,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
* @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
* being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated
* @func: IMA hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -559,8 +558,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
* than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
*/
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring)
{
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;
- if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+ if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, blob, func, mask,
keyring))
continue;
--
2.24.1
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