[PATCH 2/5] exec: Directly call security_bprm_set_creds from __do_execve_file

[Kees Cook]

On Sat, May 09, 2020 at 02:41:17PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> 
> Now that security_bprm_set_creds is no longer responsible for calling
> cap_bprm_set_creds, security_bprm_set_creds only does something for
> the primary file that is being executed (not any interpreters it may
> have).  Therefore call security_bprm_set_creds from __do_execve_file,
> instead of from prepare_binprm so that it is only called once, and
> remove the now unnecessary called_set_creds field of struct binprm.
> 
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm at xmission.com>
> ---
>  fs/exec.c                  | 11 +++++------
>  include/linux/binfmts.h    |  6 ------
>  security/apparmor/domain.c |  3 ---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c   |  2 --
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c |  3 ---
>  security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c   |  6 ------
>  6 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index 765bfd51a546..635b5085050c 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -1635,12 +1635,6 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  
>  	bprm_fill_uid(bprm);
>  
> -	/* fill in binprm security blob */
> -	retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
> -	if (retval)
> -		return retval;
> -	bprm->called_set_creds = 1;
> -
>  	retval = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
>  	if (retval)
>  		return retval;
> @@ -1858,6 +1852,11 @@ static int __do_execve_file(int fd, struct filename *filename,
>  	if (retval < 0)
>  		goto out;
>  
> +	/* fill in binprm security blob */
> +	retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
> +	if (retval)
> +		goto out;
> +
>  	retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
>  	if (retval < 0)
>  		goto out;
> 

Here I go with a Sunday night review, so hopefully I'm thinking better
than Friday night's review, but I *think* this patch is broken from
the LSM sense of the world in that security_bprm_set_creds() is getting
called _before_ the creds actually get fully set (in prepare_binprm()
by the calls to bprm_fill_uid(), cap_bprm_set_creds(), and
check_unsafe_exec()).

As a specific example, see the setting of LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS in
bprm->unsafe during check_unsafe_exec(), which must happen after
bprm_fill_uid(bprm) and cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm), to have a "true" view
of the execution privileges. Apparmor checks for this flag in its
security_bprm_set_creds() hook. Similarly do selinux, smack, etc...

The security_bprm_set_creds() boundary for LSM is to see the "final"
state of the process privileges, and that needs to happen after
bprm_fill_uid(), cap_bprm_set_creds(), and check_unsafe_exec() have all
finished.

So, as it stands, I don't think this will work, but perhaps it can still
be rearranged to avoid the called_set_creds silliness. I'll look more
this week...

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook