June 2019 Archives by thread

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Starting: Sat Jun 1 01:18:32 UTC 2019
Ending: Sun Jun 30 15:39:59 UTC 2019
Messages: 1172

• [PATCH v5 2/3] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time   Andrew Morton
  • [PATCH v5 2/3] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH v5 2/3] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v5 2/3] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time   Kaiwan N Billimoria
      • [PATCH v5 2/3] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH v5 2/3] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time   Kaiwan N Billimoria
• [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 01/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 02/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 03/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 25/58] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 25/58] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 46/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 46/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Kees Cook
• [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Xing, Cedric
  • [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Xing, Cedric
  • [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Stephen Smalley
    • [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Xing, Cedric
• [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 01/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 02/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 03/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 06/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 07/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 08/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 09/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 10/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 11/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 12/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 13/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 14/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 15/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 16/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 17/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 18/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 19/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 20/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 21/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 23/58] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 24/58] Audit: Convert osid to an lsm_export structure   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 25/58] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 26/58] NET: Change the UNIXCB from a secid to an lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 27/58] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 28/58] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 29/58] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 30/58] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 31/58] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 32/58] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 33/58] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 34/58] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 35/58] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH 35/58] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks   Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH 36/58] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 37/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 38/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 39/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 40/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 41/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 42/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 43/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 44/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 45/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 46/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 47/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 48/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 49/58] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 50/58] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 51/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_setsecctx hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 52/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_setsecctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 53/58] kernfs: remove lsm_context scaffolding   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 54/58] LSM: Remove unused macro   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 55/58] LSM: Special handling for secctx lsm hooks   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 56/58] SELinux: Use blob offset in current_sid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 57/58] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 58/58] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Stephen Smalley
    • [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   James Morris
      • [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   José Bollo
    • [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   John Johansen
      • [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   James Morris
      • [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   John Johansen
      • [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   James Morris
      • [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   John Johansen
      • [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   James Morris
• [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()   Xing, Cedric
  • [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect()   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Xing, Cedric
  • [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH 2/2] ima: use the lsm policy update notifier   Janne Karhunen
• SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)   Dr. Greg
• [PATCH v2 2/3] ima: don't ignore INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN EVM status   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v2 2/3] ima: don't ignore INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN EVM status   Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH v2 2/3] ima: don't ignore INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN EVM status   James Bottomley
    • [PATCH v2 2/3] ima: don't ignore INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN EVM status   Chuck Lever
    • [PATCH v2 2/3] ima: don't ignore INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN EVM status   Roberto Sassu
      • [PATCH v2 2/3] ima: don't ignore INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN EVM status   James Bottomley
      • [PATCH v2 2/3] ima: don't ignore INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN EVM status   Roberto Sassu
      • [PATCH v2 2/3] ima: don't ignore INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN EVM status   James Bottomley
• [PATCH v4 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk   Rob Landley
    • [PATCH v4 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk   Roberto Sassu
      • [PATCH v4 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk   Mimi Zohar
• [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Stephen Smalley
  • [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Dave Hansen
• [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Stephen Smalley
  • [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Sean Christopherson
• [PATCH 1/2] LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers   Paul Moore
• [PATCH 3/7] vfs: Add a mount-notification facility   David Howells
• possible deadlock in process_measurement   syzbot
• [PATCH v4] Allow to exclude specific file types in LoadPin   Ke Wu
• [RFC 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   jaskarankhurana at linux.microsoft.com
• [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()   Dave Hansen
  • [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()   Dave Hansen
    • [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()   Sean Christopherson
• SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)   Jarkko Sakkinen
• SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)   Jarkko Sakkinen
• SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)   Jarkko Sakkinen
• SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)   Jarkko Sakkinen
• SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)   Jarkko Sakkinen
• SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)   Sean Christopherson
  • SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)   Jarkko Sakkinen
• SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)   Andy Lutomirski
• possible deadlock in __do_page_fault (2)   syzbot
  • possible deadlock in __do_page_fault (2)   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH] Smack: Restore the smackfsdef mount option and add missing prefixes   James Morris
  • [PATCH] Smack: Restore the smackfsdef mount option and add missing prefixes   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH] Smack: Restore the smackfsdef mount option and add missing prefixes   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH] Smack: Restore the smackfsdef mount option and add missing prefixes   Linus Torvalds
      • [PATCH] Smack: Restore the smackfsdef mount option and add missing prefixes   Al Viro
• [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [RFC PATCH 1/9] x86/sgx: Remove unused local variable in sgx_encl_release()   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Andy Lutomirski
    • [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect()   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications   David Howells
• [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect()   Andy Lutomirski
• [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Andy Lutomirski
    • [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Xing, Cedric
    • [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Sean Christopherson
• [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 1/8] security: Override creds in __fput() with last fputter's creds [ver #2]   David Howells
    • [PATCH 1/8] security: Override creds in __fput() with last fputter's creds [ver #2]   Andy Lutomirski
  • [PATCH 2/8] General notification queue with user mmap()'able ring buffer [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 3/8] keys: Add a notification facility [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 4/8] vfs: Add a mount-notification facility [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 5/8] vfs: Add superblock notifications [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 6/8] fsinfo: Export superblock notification counter [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 7/8] block: Add block layer notifications [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 8/8] Add sample notification program [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Andy Lutomirski
    • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   David Howells
    • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   David Howells
      • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Casey Schaufler
• security/loadpin: Allow to exclude specific file types   Ke Wu
• possible deadlock in __do_page_fault (2)   syzbot
• [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES   Andy Lutomirski
• [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Andy Lutomirski
• [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Sean Christopherson
  • [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Xing, Cedric
    • [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Sean Christopherson
• possible deadlock in get_user_pages_unlocked (2)   syzbot
  • [IMA] Re: possible deadlock in get_user_pages_unlocked (2)   Eric Biggers
• [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Andy Lutomirski
  • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH 1/2] LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers   Janne Karhunen
  • [PATCH 2/2] ima: use the lsm policy update notifier   Janne Karhunen
    • [PATCH 2/2] ima: use the lsm policy update notifier   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH 2/2] ima: use the lsm policy update notifier   Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH 1/2] LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers   Paul Moore
• [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES   Ayoun, Serge
  • [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES   Sean Christopherson
• [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Andy Lutomirski
  • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Casey Schaufler
    • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Greg KH
      • [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   Stephen Smalley
• [RFC 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Sasha Levin
• [PATCH 1/2] LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers   Janne Karhunen
  • [PATCH 1/2] LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH 1/2] LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers   Paul Moore
      • [PATCH 1/2] LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers   James Morris
      • [PATCH 1/2] LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers   Paul Moore
      • [PATCH 1/2] LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers   James Morris
      • [PATCH 1/2] LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers   Janne Karhunen
• Rational model for UID based controls   David Howells
  • Rational model for UID based controls   Casey Schaufler
    • Rational model for UID based controls   David Howells
• [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]   David Howells
• KASAN: use-after-free Read in tomoyo_realpath_from_path   syzbot
  • KASAN: use-after-free Read in tomoyo_realpath_from_path   Tetsuo Handa
  • KASAN: use-after-free Read in tomoyo_realpath_from_path   Tetsuo Handa
  • KASAN: use-after-free Read in tomoyo_realpath_from_path   Tetsuo Handa
    • [PATCH] tomoyo: Don't check open/getattr permission on sockets.   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH] tomoyo: Don't check open/getattr permission on sockets.   Tetsuo Handa
      • [PATCH] tomoyo: Don't check open/getattr permission on sockets.   Al Viro
      • [PATCH v2] tomoyo: Don't check open/getattr permission on sockets.   Tetsuo Handa
• [RFC PATCH v2 0/5] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Sean Christopherson
  • [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks   Cedric Xing
    • [RFC PATCH v1 1/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Cedric Xing
    • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Cedric Xing
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Dr. Greg
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Dr. Greg
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Dr. Greg
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Dr. Greg
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Call new LSM hooks from SGX subsystem   Cedric Xing
    • [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()   Sean Christopherson
  • [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Sean Christopherson
  • [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Xing, Cedric
    • [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Sean Christopherson
      • [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Sean Christopherson
  • [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Stephen Smalley
• [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Sean Christopherson
  • [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Stephen Smalley
    • [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Sean Christopherson
  • [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Sean Christopherson
  • [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Stephen Smalley
    • [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Sean Christopherson
  • [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 01/10] security: Override creds in __fput() with last fputter's creds [ver #3]   David Howells
    • [PATCH 01/10] security: Override creds in __fput() with last fputter's creds [ver #3]   Andy Lutomirski
      • [PATCH 01/10] security: Override creds in __fput() with last fputter's creds [ver #3]   David Howells
      • [PATCH 01/10] security: Override creds in __fput() with last fputter's creds [ver #3]   Andy Lutomirski
      • [PATCH 01/10] security: Override creds in __fput() with last fputter's creds [ver #3]   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH 01/10] security: Override creds in __fput() with last fputter's creds [ver #3]   Andy Lutomirski
  • [PATCH 02/10] General notification queue with user mmap()'able ring buffer [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 03/10] keys: Add a notification facility [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 04/10] vfs: Add a mount-notification facility [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 05/10] vfs: Add superblock notifications [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 06/10] fsinfo: Export superblock notification counter [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 07/10] Add a general, global device notification watch list [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 08/10] block: Add block layer notifications [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 09/10] usb: Add USB subsystem notifications [ver #3]   David Howells
    • [PATCH 09/10] usb: Add USB subsystem notifications [ver #3]   Alan Stern
      • [PATCH 09/10] usb: Add USB subsystem notifications [ver #3]   Greg Kroah-Hartman
      • [PATCH 09/10] usb: Add USB subsystem notifications [ver #3]   Alan Stern
      • [PATCH 09/10] usb: Add USB subsystem notifications [ver #3]   Greg Kroah-Hartman
  • [PATCH 10/10] Add sample notification program [ver #3]   David Howells
    • [PATCH 10/10] Add sample notification program [ver #3]   Eugeniu Rosca
      • [PATCH 10/10] Add sample notification program [ver #3]   David Howells
      • [PATCH 10/10] Add sample notification program [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   Stephen Smalley
    • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   David Howells
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   David Howells
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   David Howells
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]   Christian Brauner
• [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v3 1/2] evm: add option to set a random HMAC key at early boot   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status   Roberto Sassu
    • [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status   Roberto Sassu
      • [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status   Roberto Sassu
      • [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status   Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2   Roberto Sassu
    • [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2   Janne Karhunen
    • [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2   Roberto Sassu
      • [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2   Janne Karhunen
      • [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2   Roberto Sassu
      • [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2   Janne Karhunen
• [PATCH v6 1/3] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH v6 1/3] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v6 1/3] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v6 1/3] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH v6 2/3] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH v6 2/3] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time   Kees Cook
• [PATCH v6 3/3] lib: introduce test_meminit module   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH v6 3/3] lib: introduce test_meminit module   Kees Cook
• [PATCH v7 0/3] add new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline to measure kexec boot cmdline args   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCH v7 1/3] Add a new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline to measure cmdline args   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCH v7 2/3] add a new ima template field buf   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCH v7 3/3] call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the cmdline args   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCH v7 0/3] add new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline to measure kexec boot cmdline args   Mimi Zohar
    • [PATCH v7 0/3] add new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline to measure kexec boot cmdline args   prakhar srivastava
• [GIT PULL] apparmor bug fixes for v5.3-rc4   John Johansen
  • [GIT PULL] apparmor bug fixes for v5.3-rc4   Linus Torvalds
• Thanks and I wait for your answer   Martins Henry
• [PATCH 09/10] usb: Add USB subsystem notifications [ver #3]   Alan Stern
• [RFC][PATCH 00/13] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 01/13] security: Override creds in __fput() with last fputter's creds [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 02/13] uapi: General notification ring definitions [ver #4]   David Howells
    • [PATCH 02/13] uapi: General notification ring definitions [ver #4]   Darrick J. Wong
      • [PATCH 02/13] uapi: General notification ring definitions [ver #4]   David Howells
      • [PATCH 02/13] uapi: General notification ring definitions [ver #4]   David Howells
      • [PATCH 02/13] uapi: General notification ring definitions [ver #4]   Randy Dunlap
      • [PATCH 02/13] uapi: General notification ring definitions [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 03/13] security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 04/13] security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 05/13] General notification queue with user mmap()'able ring buffer [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 06/13] keys: Add a notification facility [ver #4]   David Howells
    • [PATCH 06/13] keys: Add a notification facility [ver #4]   Jonathan Corbet
      • [PATCH 06/13] keys: Add a notification facility [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 07/13] vfs: Add a mount-notification facility [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 08/13] vfs: Add superblock notifications [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 09/13] fsinfo: Export superblock notification counter [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 10/13] Add a general, global device notification watch list [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 11/13] block: Add block layer notifications [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 12/13] usb: Add USB subsystem notifications [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 13/13] Add sample notification program [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [RFC][PATCH 00/13] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #4]   Stephen Smalley
    • [RFC][PATCH 00/13] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #4]   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/13] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #4]   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/13] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #4]   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/13] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #4]   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/13] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #4]   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/13] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #4]   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/13] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #4]   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/13] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #4]   David Howells
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/13] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #4]   Andy Lutomirski
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/13] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #4]   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC][PATCH 00/13] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #4]   David Howells
  • What do LSMs *actually* need for checks on notifications?   David Howells
    • What do LSMs *actually* need for checks on notifications?   Stephen Smalley
      • What do LSMs *actually* need for checks on notifications?   David Howells
      • What do LSMs *actually* need for checks on notifications?   Stephen Smalley
    • What do LSMs *actually* need for checks on notifications?   Casey Schaufler
      • What do LSMs *actually* need for checks on notifications?   David Howells
      • What do LSMs *actually* need for checks on notifications?   Casey Schaufler
      • What do LSMs *actually* need for checks on notifications?   David Howells
• [PATCH] x86/ima: fix the Kconfig dependency for IMA_ARCH_POLICY   Nayna Jain
• [PATCH 1/1 v2] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Sasha Levin
• [RFC PATCH v3 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Khurana
  • [RFC PATCH v3 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation   Jaskaran Khurana
    • [RFC PATCH v3 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation   Milan Broz
      • [RFC PATCH v3 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation   Jaskaran Singh Khurana
      • [RFC PATCH v3 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation   Jaskaran Singh Khurana
      • [RFC PATCH v3 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation   James Morris
  • [RFC PATCH v3 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Milan Broz
• [PATCH v3 18/33] docs: netlabel: convert docs to ReST and rename to *.rst   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
  • [PATCH v3 18/33] docs: netlabel: convert docs to ReST and rename to *.rst   Paul Moore
• [PATCH v11 00/13] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v11 01/13] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions   Thiago Jung Bauermann
    • [PATCH v11 01/13] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v11 02/13] PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()   Thiago Jung Bauermann
    • [PATCH v11 02/13] PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v11 03/13] PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v11 04/13] integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v11 05/13] integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v11 06/13] ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v11 07/13] ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v11 08/13] ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v11 09/13] ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v11 10/13] ima: Collect modsig   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v11 11/13] ima: Define ima-modsig template   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v11 12/13] ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v11 13/13] ima: Allow template= option for appraise rules as well   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH -next] ima: Make arch_policy_entry static   YueHaibing
  • [PATCH -next] ima: Make arch_policy_entry static   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH -next] security: Make capability_hooks static   YueHaibing
  • [PATCH -next] security: Make capability_hooks static   James Morris
• [PATCH 09/10] usb: Add USB subsystem notifications [ver #3]   Alan Stern
  • [PATCH 09/10] usb: Add USB subsystem notifications [ver #3]   Felipe Balbi
• [PATCH v3 05/33] docs: cgroup-v1: convert docs to ReST and rename to *.rst   Tejun Heo
• [PATCH v2 1/2] LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers   Janne Karhunen
  • [PATCH v2 1/2] ima: use the lsm policy update notifier   Janne Karhunen
    • [PATCH v2 1/2] ima: use the lsm policy update notifier   Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH v2 1/2] LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers   Mimi Zohar
    • [PATCH v2 1/2] LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers   Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v2 1/2] LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers   James Morris
• [PATCH v4 16/28] docs: netlabel: convert docs to ReST and rename to *.rst   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
• [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.2 (#2)   Paul Moore
  • [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.2 (#2)   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [PATCH V8 0/3] Add support for measuring the boot command line during kexec_file_load   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCH V8 0/3] Add support for measuring the boot command line during kexec_file_load   Mimi Zohar
    • [PATCH V8 0/3] Add support for measuring the boot command line during kexec_file_load   prakhar srivastava
• [PATCH V8 1/3] Define a new IMA hook to measure the boot command line arguments   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCH V8 1/3] Define a new IMA hook to measure the boot command line arguments   James Morris
  • [PATCH V8 1/3] Define a new IMA hook to measure the boot command line arguments   Mimi Zohar
    • [PATCH V8 1/3] Define a new IMA hook to measure the boot command line arguments   prakhar srivastava
• [PATCH V8 2/3] Define a new ima template field buf   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCH V8 2/3] Define a new ima template field buf   James Morris
  • [PATCH V8 2/3] Define a new ima template field buf   Mimi Zohar
    • [PATCH V8 2/3] Define a new ima template field buf   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH V8 2/3] Define a new ima template field buf   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH V8 2/3] Define a new ima template field buf   prakhar srivastava
• [PATCH V8 3/3] Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the cmdline args   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCH V8 3/3] Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the cmdline args   James Morris
  • [PATCH V8 3/3] Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the cmdline args   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH V8 3/3] Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the cmdline args   Mimi Zohar
• [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH v4 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Khurana
• [RFC PATCH v4 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Khurana
• [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Xing, Cedric
• [RFC PATCH v4 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Khurana
  • [RFC PATCH v4 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Khurana
    • [RFC PATCH v4 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Milan Broz
      • [RFC PATCH v4 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Singh Khurana
• [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2   Roberto Sassu
• [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2   Janne Karhunen
• [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2   Roberto Sassu
• [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2   Janne Karhunen
• [PATCH V8 3/3] Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the cmdline args   Dave Young
  • [PATCH V8 3/3] Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the cmdline args   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2   Roberto Sassu
• [RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Casey Schaufler
    • [RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Mimi Zohar
      • [RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Sumit Garg
    • [RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support   Sumit Garg
• [RFC 1/7] tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC 1/7] tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm   Jens Wiklander
• [RFC 2/7] tee: enable support to register kernel memory   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC 2/7] tee: enable support to register kernel memory   Jens Wiklander
• [RFC 3/7] tee: add private login method for kernel clients   Sumit Garg
• [RFC 4/7] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys   Sumit Garg
• [RFC 5/7] KEYS: encrypted: Allow TEE based trusted master keys   Sumit Garg
• [RFC 6/7] doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys   Sumit Garg
  • [RFC 6/7] doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [RFC 6/7] doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys   Sumit Garg
      • [RFC 6/7] doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys   Jarkko Sakkinen
• [RFC 7/7] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys   Sumit Garg
• [PATCH 02/13] uapi: General notification ring definitions [ver #4]   Randy Dunlap
• [RFC 1/7] tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC 1/7] tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [RFC 1/7] tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC 1/7] tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm   Sumit Garg
• [RFC 2/7] tee: enable support to register kernel memory   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC 2/7] tee: enable support to register kernel memory   Sumit Garg
• [RFC 4/7] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC 4/7] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys   Sumit Garg
• [RFC PATCH 0/1] security: add SECURE_KEEP_FSUID to preserve fsuid/fsgid across execve   Igor Lubashev
  • [RFC PATCH 0/1] security: add SECURE_KEEP_FSUID to preserve fsuid/fsgid across execve   James Morris
  • [RFC PATCH 0/1] security: add SECURE_KEEP_FSUID to preserve fsuid/fsgid across execve   James Morris
    • [RFC PATCH 0/1] security: add SECURE_KEEP_FSUID to preserve fsuid/fsgid across execve   Lubashev, Igor
      • [RFC PATCH 0/1] security: add SECURE_KEEP_FSUID to preserve fsuid/fsgid across execve   James Morris
• [RFC PATCH 1/1] security: add SECURE_KEEP_FSUID to preserve fsuid/fsgid across execve   Igor Lubashev
• [PATCH v4 00/14] ima: introduce IMA Digest Lists extension   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 01/14] ima: read hash algorithm from security.ima even if appraisal is not enabled   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 02/14] ima: generalize ima_read_policy()   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 03/14] ima: generalize ima_write_policy() and raise uploaded data size limit   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 04/14] ima: generalize policy file operations   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 05/14] ima: use ima_show_htable_value to show violations and hash table data   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 06/14] ima: add parser of compact digest list   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 07/14] ima: restrict upload of converted digest lists   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 08/14] ima: prevent usage of digest lists that are not measured/appraised   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 09/14] ima: introduce new securityfs files   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 10/14] ima: load parser digests and execute the parser at boot time   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 11/14] ima: add support for measurement with digest lists   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 12/14] ima: add support for appraisal with digest lists   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 13/14] ima: introduce new policies initrd and appraise_initrd   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 14/14] ima: add Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt   Roberto Sassu
  • [PATCH v4 00/14] ima: introduce IMA Digest Lists extension   Roberto Sassu
    • [PATCH v4 00/14] ima: introduce IMA Digest Lists extension   Roberto Sassu
      • [PATCH v4 00/14] ima: introduce IMA Digest Lists extension   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH v4 00/14] ima: introduce IMA Digest Lists extension   Roberto Sassu
• [PATCH v4 05/28] docs: cgroup-v1: convert docs to ReST and rename to *.rst   Jonathan Corbet
  • [PATCH v4 05/28] docs: cgroup-v1: convert docs to ReST and rename to *.rst   Tejun Heo
• dringender Kredit   Herr David Williams
• PRODUCT INQUIRY FOR EXPORT SHIPMENT   Mark Maths
• [PATCH] integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch   Geert Uytterhoeven
  • [PATCH] integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch   Nayna
  • [PATCH] integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch   James Morris
• [PATCH] ima: dynamically allocate shash_desc   Arnd Bergmann
  • [PATCH] ima: dynamically allocate shash_desc   Mimi Zohar
    • [PATCH] ima: dynamically allocate shash_desc   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH] ima: dynamically allocate shash_desc   Arnd Bergmann
      • [PATCH] ima: dynamically allocate shash_desc   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH] ima: dynamically allocate shash_desc   Arnd Bergmann
      • [PATCH] ima: dynamically allocate shash_desc   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH v7 0/3] add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Andrew Morton
      • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Andrew Morton
    • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Michal Hocko
      • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Michal Hocko
      • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Michal Hocko
      • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Michal Hocko
    • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Qian Cai
      • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Qian Cai
  • [PATCH v7 2/2] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH 1/7] General notification queue with user mmap()'able ring buffer   Peter Zijlstra
• [PATCH V8 0/3] Add support for measuring the boot command line during kexec_file_load   Prakhar Srivastava
• [PATCH 1/3] IMA:Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCH 1/3] IMA:Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 2/3] IMA:Define a new template field buf   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCH 2/3] IMA:Define a new template field buf   Mimi Zohar
    • [PATCH 2/3] IMA:Define a new template field buf   prakhar srivastava
      • [PATCH 2/3] IMA:Define a new template field buf   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 3/3] KEXEC:Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args   Prakhar Srivastava
• [PATCH V8 0/3] Add support for measuring the boot command line during kexec_file_load   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCH V9 1/3] IMA:Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments   Prakhar Srivastava
    • [PATCH V9 1/3] IMA:Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments   prakhar srivastava
  • [PATCH V9 2/3] IMA:Define a new template field buf   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCH V9 3/3] KEXEC:Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args   Prakhar Srivastava
• June inquiry   Marketing Dept
• [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Kees Cook
• [PATCH] structleak: disable BYREF_ALL in combination with KASAN_STACK   Arnd Bergmann
  • [PATCH] structleak: disable BYREF_ALL in combination with KASAN_STACK   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH] structleak: disable BYREF_ALL in combination with KASAN_STACK   Arnd Bergmann
      • [PATCH] structleak: disable BYREF_ALL in combination with KASAN_STACK   Ard Biesheuvel
      • [PATCH] structleak: disable BYREF_ALL in combination with KASAN_STACK   Arnd Bergmann
      • [PATCH] structleak: disable BYREF_ALL in combination with KASAN_STACK   Ard Biesheuvel
      • [PATCH] structleak: disable BYREF_ALL in combination with KASAN_STACK   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH] structleak: disable BYREF_ALL in combination with KASAN_STACK   Ard Biesheuvel
• Benchmarks for security features   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH v1 11/22] docs: admin-guide: add .rst files from the main dir   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
• [PATCH v1 13/22] docs: x86: move two x86-specific files to x86 arch dir   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
• [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 01/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 02/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 03/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 04/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v2 04/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 04/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 04/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 05/25] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v2 05/25] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v2 06/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 07/25] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v2 07/25] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 07/25] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 08/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 09/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v2 09/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v2 10/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 11/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 12/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 13/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v2 13/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v2 14/25] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 15/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v2 15/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 15/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v2 15/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 15/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 16/25] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v2 16/25] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 16/25] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 17/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v2 17/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v2 18/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v2 18/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 18/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v2 18/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v2 19/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 20/25] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 21/25] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 22/25] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 23/25] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 24/25] Fix slotted list and getpeersec_d   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v2 24/25] Fix slotted list and getpeersec_d   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v2 24/25] Fix slotted list and getpeersec_d   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 25/25] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   James Morris
      • Stacked LSMs (was Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor)   Kees Cook
      • Stacked LSMs (was Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor)   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
• [GIT PULL] apparmor bug fixes for v5.3-rc6   John Johansen
  • [GIT PULL] apparmor bug fixes for v5.3-rc6   pr-tracker-bot at kernel.org
• [PATCH 00/10] keys: Miscellany [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 01/10] keys: sparse: Fix key_fs[ug]id_changed() [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 02/10] keys: sparse: Fix incorrect RCU accesses [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 03/10] keys: sparse: Fix kdoc mismatches [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 04/10] keys: Change keyring_serialise_link_sem to a mutex [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 05/10] keys: Break bits out of key_unlink() [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 06/10] keys: Hoist locking out of __key_link_begin() [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 07/10] keys: Add a keyctl to move a key between keyrings [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 08/10] keys: Grant Link permission to possessers of request_key auth keys [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 09/10] keys: Reuse keyring_index_key::desc_len in lookup_user_key() [ver #3]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 10/10] keys: Add capability-checking keyctl function [ver #3]   David Howells
• [PATCH 0/6] keys: request_key() improvements [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 1/6] keys: Fix request_key() lack of Link perm check on found key [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 2/6] keys: Invalidate used request_key authentication keys [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 3/6] keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 4/6] keys: Provide request_key_rcu() [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 5/6] keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct [ver #2]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 6/6] keys: Kill off request_key_async{, _with_auxdata} [ver #2]   David Howells
• [PATCH 0/9] keys: Namespacing [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 1/9] keys: Simplify key description management [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 2/9] keys: Cache the hash value to avoid lots of recalculation [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 3/9] keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 4/9] keys: Namespace keyring names [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 5/9] keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 0/9] keys: Namespacing [ver #4]   David Howells
• [PATCH 0/9] keys: Namespacing [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 1/9] keys: Simplify key description management [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 2/9] keys: Cache the hash value to avoid lots of recalculation [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 3/9] keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 4/9] keys: Namespace keyring names [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 5/9] keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 6/9] keys: Include target namespace in match criteria [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 7/9] keys: Garbage collect keys for which the domain has been removed [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 8/9] keys: Network namespace domain tag [ver #4]   David Howells
    • [PATCH 8/9] keys: Network namespace domain tag [ver #4]   Willem de Bruijn
      • [PATCH 8/9] keys: Network namespace domain tag [ver #4]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 9/9] keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism [ver #4]   David Howells
• [RFC PATCH v5 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Khurana
  • [RFC PATCH v5 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Khurana
    • [RFC PATCH v5 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Mike Snitzer
      • [RFC PATCH v5 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Milan Broz
    • [RFC PATCH v5 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Milan Broz
      • [RFC PATCH v5 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Singh Khurana
    • [RFC PATCH v5 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Eric Biggers
      • [RFC PATCH v5 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Singh Khurana
      • [RFC PATCH v5 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Eric Biggers
      • [RFC PATCH v5 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Milan Broz
      • [RFC PATCH v5 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Singh Khurana
  • [RFC PATCH v5 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Eric Biggers
    • [RFC PATCH v5 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Singh Khurana
      • [RFC PATCH v5 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Eric Biggers
      • [RFC PATCH v5 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   Jaskaran Singh Khurana
    • [RFC PATCH v5 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.   James Morris
• [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Sean Christopherson
  • [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Jarkko Sakkinen
      • [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits   Xing, Cedric
  • [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX   Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX   Xing, Cedric
  • [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX   Xing, Cedric
    • [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX   Dr. Greg
  • [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Xing, Cedric
  • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Andy Lutomirski
    • [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation   Stephen Smalley
  • [RFC PATCH v4 11/12] security/apparmor: Add enclave_load() implementation   Sean Christopherson
  • [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG   Sean Christopherson
    • [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG   Xing, Cedric
  • [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks   Cedric Xing
    • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Cedric Xing
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Casey Schaufler
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Xing, Cedric
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Stephen Smalley
      • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks   Andy Lutomirski
    • [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/sgx: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module   Cedric Xing
    • [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux   Cedric Xing
• Klientskie bazy. Email: prodawez at armyspy.com Uznajte podrobnee.   linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org
• [PATCH V31 06/25] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE   Dave Young
  • [PATCH V31 06/25] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V31 06/25] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE   Matthew Garrett
• [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Dave Young
  • [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Dave Young
      • [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
      • [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
      • [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Dave Young
• [PATCH v3 00/24] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v3 01/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 01/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 02/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 02/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 03/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 03/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 04/24] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 04/24] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 04/24] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 05/24] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 05/24] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 05/24] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 06/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 06/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 06/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 07/24] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 07/24] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 07/24] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 08/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 08/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 08/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 09/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 09/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 09/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 11/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 11/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 11/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 12/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 12/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 12/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 13/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 13/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 13/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 14/24] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 14/24] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 14/24] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 15/24] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 15/24] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 15/24] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 16/24] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 16/24] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 16/24] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 17/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 17/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 17/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 18/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 18/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 18/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 19/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 19/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 19/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 20/24] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 20/24] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 20/24] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob   John Johansen
      • [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob   Paul Moore
      • [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob   John Johansen
      • [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob   Paul Moore
      • [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization   John Johansen
      • [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 23/24] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 23/24] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 23/24] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v3 24/24] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 24/24] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v3 24/24] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   John Johansen
• [PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V34 01/29] security: Support early LSMs   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 01/29] security: Support early LSMs   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE   Dave Young
      • [PATCH V34 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE   Dave Young
  • [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   James Morris
      • [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
      • [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   James Morris
      • [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V34 10/29] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 10/29] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V34 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH V34 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   Daniel Axtens
      • [PATCH V34 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V34 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH V34 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module   Thomas Gleixner
  • [PATCH V34 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH V34 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode   Masami Hiramatsu
  • [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Daniel Borkmann
      • [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
      • [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Andy Lutomirski
      • [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
      • [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Daniel Borkmann
      • [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V34 24/29] Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 24/29] Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V34 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V34 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
  • [PATCH V34 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH V34 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down   Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH V34 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages   Matthew Garrett
    • [PATCH V34 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM   James Morris
    • [PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM   Matthew Garrett
      • [PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM   James Morris
    • [PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM   John Johansen
• Klientskie bazy. Email: prodawez at armyspy.com Uznajte podrobnee.   linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org
• From:Miss: Fatima Yusuf.   Miss.Fatima Yusuf
• [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   Dr. Greg
  • [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX   James Morris
• [PATCH V10 0/3] Add support for measuring the boot command line during kexec_file_load   Prakhar Srivastava
  • [PATCH V10 1/3] IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments   Prakhar Srivastava
    • [PATCH V10 1/3] IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments   Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH V10 2/3] IMA: Define a new template field buf   Prakhar Srivastava
    • [PATCH V10 2/3] IMA: Define a new template field buf   Thiago Jung Bauermann
      • [PATCH V10 2/3] IMA: Define a new template field buf   Mimi Zohar
      • [PATCH V10 2/3] IMA: Define a new template field buf   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH V10 3/3] KEXEC: Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args   Prakhar Srivastava
• [PATCH V34 10/29] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down   Jiri Kosina
• possible deadlock in console_trylock_spinning   syzbot
  • possible deadlock in console_trylock_spinning   Tetsuo Handa
• [PATCH bpf-next v9 00/10] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH bpf-next v9 05/10] bpf,landlock: Add a new map type: inode   Mickaël Salaün
    • [PATCH bpf-next v9 05/10] bpf, landlock: Add a new map type: inode   Al Viro
      • [PATCH bpf-next v9 05/10] bpf, landlock: Add a new map type: inode   Mickaël Salaün
      • [PATCH bpf-next v9 05/10] bpf, landlock: Add a new map type: inode   Al Viro
      • [PATCH bpf-next v9 05/10] bpf, landlock: Add a new map type: inode   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH bpf-next v9 01/10] fs, security: Add a new file access type: MAY_CHROOT   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH bpf-next v9 02/10] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier   Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH bpf-next v9 02/10] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier   Alexei Starovoitov
    • [PATCH bpf-next v9 02/10] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH bpf-next v9 03/10] bpf, landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock hooks   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH bpf-next v9 04/10] seccomp, landlock: Enforce Landlock programs per process hierarchy   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH bpf-next v9 06/10] landlock: Handle filesystem access control   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH bpf-next v9 07/10] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH bpf-next v9 08/10] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH bpf-next v9 09/10] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH bpf-next v9 10/10] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation for Landlock   Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v8 0/3] add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Michal Hocko
      • [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Michal Hocko
      • [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Qian Cai
      • [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Michal Hocko
      • [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Andrew Morton
      • [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
      • [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH v8 2/2] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH v8 0/3] add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options   Alexander Potapenko
• linux-next: Tree for Jun 26 (security/integrity/ima/)   Randy Dunlap
  • linux-next: Tree for Jun 26 (security/integrity/ima/)   Mimi Zohar
    • linux-next: Tree for Jun 26 (security/integrity/ima/)   David Howells
      • linux-next: Tree for Jun 26 (security/integrity/ima/)   Randy Dunlap
• [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v4 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v4 02/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v4 03/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.   John Johansen
      • [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   John Johansen
    • [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
      • [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   John Johansen
      • [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security   John Johansen
    • [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security   Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   James Morris
      • [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   John Johansen
      • [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   James Morris
    • [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag   John Johansen
  • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   John Johansen
      • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Kees Cook
    • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   James Morris
    • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   James Morris
      • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   James Morris
      • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   James Morris
      • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   James Morris
      • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   John Johansen
    • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   James Morris
      • [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor   John Johansen
• [PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   James Morris
  • [PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Andy Lutomirski
    • [PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   James Morris
      • [PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
      • [PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Andy Lutomirski
      • [PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Andy Lutomirski
      • [PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Matthew Garrett
      • [PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode   Andy Lutomirski
• [GIT PULL] tpmdd updates for Linux v5.3   Jarkko Sakkinen
• Клиентские базы! Email: prodawez at armyspy.com Узнайте подробнее!   linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org
• LSM module for SGX?   Jarkko Sakkinen
  • LSM module for SGX?   Stephen Smalley
    • LSM module for SGX?   Xing, Cedric
• [PATCH v9 0/3] add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH v9 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
    • [PATCH v9 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Qian Cai
      • [PATCH v9 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Kees Cook
      • [PATCH v9 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Qian Cai
    • [PATCH v9 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Michal Hocko
    • [PATCH v9 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   James Morris
  • [PATCH v9 2/2] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH] apparmor: fix unsigned len comparison with less than zero   Colin King
• [PATCH] ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH] ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition   Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH v12 00/11] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v12 02/11] PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v12 03/11] PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v12 04/11] integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v12 05/11] ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v12 06/11] ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v12 07/11] ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v12 08/11] ima: Collect modsig   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v12 09/11] ima: Define ima-modsig template   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v12 10/11] ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig   Thiago Jung Bauermann
  • [PATCH v12 11/11] ima: Allow template= option for appraise rules as well   Thiago Jung Bauermann
• [PATCH v10 0/3] add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH v10 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options   Alexander Potapenko
  • [PATCH v10 2/2] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time   Alexander Potapenko
• [PATCH 21/39] docs: x86: move two x86-specific files to x86 arch dir   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
• [PATCH 27/39] docs: cgroup-v1: add it to the admin-guide book   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
• [PATCH 37/39] docs: adds some directories to the main documentation index   Mauro Carvalho Chehab
  • [PATCH 37/39] docs: adds some directories to the main documentation index   Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz
• [PATCH 1/4] [v2] structleak: disable STRUCTLEAK_BYREF in combination with KASAN_STACK   Arnd Bergmann
  • [PATCH 1/4] [v2] structleak: disable STRUCTLEAK_BYREF in combination with KASAN_STACK   Kees Cook
• [PATCH 0/9] Keyrings, Block and USB notifications [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 2/9] security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 3/9] security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 4/9] General notification queue with user mmap()'able ring buffer [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 5/9] keys: Add a notification facility [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 6/9] Add a general, global device notification watch list [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 7/9] block: Add block layer notifications [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 8/9] usb: Add USB subsystem notifications [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 9/9] Add sample notification program [ver #5]   David Howells
• [PATCH 1/9] uapi: General notification ring definitions [ver #5]   David Howells
• [PATCH 0/6] Mount and superblock notifications [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 1/6] security: Add hooks to rule on setting a superblock or mount watch [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 2/6] Adjust watch_queue documentation to mention mount and superblock watches. [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 3/6] vfs: Add a mount-notification facility [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 4/6] vfs: Add superblock notifications [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 5/6] fsinfo: Export superblock notification counter [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 6/6] Add sample notification program [ver #5]   David Howells
  • [PATCH 0/6] Mount and superblock notifications [ver #5]   David Howells
• Fwd: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Stephen Smalley
  • Fwd: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display   Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH v4 3/3] gen_init_cpio: add support for file metadata   Mimi Zohar

Last message date: Sun Jun 30 15:39:59 UTC 2019
Archived on: Sun Jun 30 15:40:30 UTC 2019

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