[RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux

Sean Christopherson sean.j.christopherson at intel.com
Fri Jun 14 17:53:39 UTC 2019


On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 10:45:56AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> The state tracking of #2/#3 doesn't scare me, it's purely the auditing.
> Holding an audit message for an indeterminate amount of time is a
> nightmare.
> 
> Here's a thought.  What if we simply require FILE__EXECUTE or AA_EXEC_MAP
> to load any enclave page from a file?  Alternatively, we could add an SGX
> specific file policity, e.g. FILE__ENCLAVELOAD and AA_MAY_LOAD_ENCLAVE.
> As in my other email, SELinux's W^X restrictions can be tied to the process,
> i.e. they can be checked at mmap()/mprotect() without throwing a wrench in
> auditing.

We would also need to require VM_MAYEXEC on all enclave pages, or forego
enforcing path_noexec() for enclaves.



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