[RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX

[Stephen Smalley]

On 6/5/19 10:11 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> enclave_load() is roughly analogous to the existing file_mprotect().
> 
> Due to the nature of SGX and its Enclave Page Cache (EPC), all enclave
> VMAs are backed by a single file, i.e. /dev/sgx/enclave, that must be
> MAP_SHARED.  Furthermore, all enclaves need read, write and execute
> VMAs.  As a result, the existing/standard call to file_mprotect() does
> not provide any meaningful security for enclaves since an LSM can only
> deny/grant access to the EPC as a whole.
> 
> security_enclave_load() is called when SGX is first loading an enclave
> page, i.e. copying a page from normal memory into the EPC.  Although
> the prototype for enclave_load() is similar to file_mprotect(), e.g.
> SGX could theoretically use file_mprotect() and set reqprot=prot, a
> separate hook is desirable as the semantics of an enclave's protection
> bits are different than those of vmas, e.g. an enclave page tracks the
> maximal set of protections, whereas file_mprotect() operates on the
> actual protections being provided.  In other words, LSMs will likely
> want to implement different policies for enclave page protections.
> 
> Note, extensive discussion yielded no sane alternative to some form of
> SGX specific LSM hook[1].
> 
> [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrXf8mSK45h7sTK5Wf+pXLVn=Bjsc_RLpgO-h-qdzBRo5Q@mail.gmail.com
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson at intel.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c | 12 ++++++------
>   include/linux/lsm_hooks.h              | 13 +++++++++++++
>   include/linux/security.h               | 12 ++++++++++++
>   security/security.c                    |  7 +++++++
>   4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
> index 44b2d73de7c3..29c0df672250 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
>   #include <linux/highmem.h>
>   #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
>   #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>   #include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
>   #include <linux/slab.h>
>   #include <linux/suspend.h>
> @@ -582,9 +583,6 @@ static int sgx_encl_page_copy(void *dst, unsigned long src, unsigned long prot)
>   	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
>   	int ret;
>   
> -	if (!(prot & VM_EXEC))
> -		return 0;
> -

Is there a real use case where LSM will want to be called if !(prot & 
VM_EXEC)? Also, you seem to be mixing prot and PROT_EXEC with vm_flags 
and VM_EXEC; other code does not appear to assume they are identical and 
explicitly converts, e.g. calc_vm_prot_bits().

>   	/* Hold mmap_sem across copy_from_user() to avoid a TOCTOU race. */
>   	down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
>   
> @@ -599,15 +597,17 @@ static int sgx_encl_page_copy(void *dst, unsigned long src, unsigned long prot)
>   	 * but with some future proofing against other cases that may deny
>   	 * execute permissions.
>   	 */
> -	if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) {
> +	if ((prot & VM_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) {
>   		ret = -EACCES;
>   		goto out;
>   	}
>   
> +	ret = security_enclave_load(vma, prot);
> +	if (ret)
> +		goto out;
> +
>   	if (copy_from_user(dst, (void __user *)src, PAGE_SIZE))
>   		ret = -EFAULT;
> -	else
> -		ret = 0;
>   
>   out:
>   	up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 47f58cfb6a19..c6f47a7eef70 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1446,6 +1446,12 @@
>    * @bpf_prog_free_security:
>    *	Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog.
>    *
> + * Security hooks for Intel SGX enclaves.
> + *
> + * @enclave_load:
> + *	@vma: the source memory region of the enclave page being loaded.
> + *	@prot: the (maximal) protections of the enclave page.
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>    */
>   union security_list_options {
>   	int (*binder_set_context_mgr)(struct task_struct *mgr);
> @@ -1807,6 +1813,10 @@ union security_list_options {
>   	int (*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
>   	void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
>   #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX
> +	int (*enclave_load)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot);
> +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_SGX */
>   };
>   
>   struct security_hook_heads {
> @@ -2046,6 +2056,9 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
>   	struct hlist_head bpf_prog_alloc_security;
>   	struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security;
>   #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX
> +	struct hlist_head enclave_load;
> +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_SGX */
>   } __randomize_layout;
>   
>   /*
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 659071c2e57c..0b6d1eb7368b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1829,5 +1829,17 @@ static inline void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
>   #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>   #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
>   
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> +int security_enclave_load(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot);
> +#else
> +static inline int security_enclave_load(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> +					unsigned long prot)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_SGX */
> +
>   #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
>   
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 613a5c00e602..c6f7f26969b2 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2359,3 +2359,10 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
>   	call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
>   }
>   #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX
> +int security_enclave_load(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(enclave_load, 0, vma, prot);
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_SGX */
>