Rational model for UID based controls
David Howells
dhowells at redhat.com
Wed Jun 5 16:56:47 UTC 2019
Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> YES!
I'm trying to decide if that's fervour or irritation at this point ;-)
> And it would be really great if you put some thought into what
> a rational model would be for UID based controls, too.
I have put some thought into it, but I don't see a single rational model. It
depends very much on the situation.
In any case, that's what I was referring to when I said I might need to call
inode_permission(). But UIDs don't exist for all filesystems, for example,
and there are no UIDs on superblocks, mount objects or hardware events.
Now, I could see that you ignore UIDs on things like keys and
hardware-triggered events, but how does this interact with things like mount
watches that see directories that have UIDs?
Are you advocating making it such that process B can only see events triggered
by process A if they have the same UID, for example?
David
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