[PATCH v2 2/3] ima: don't ignore INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN EVM status
zohar at linux.ibm.com
Mon Jun 3 12:48:44 UTC 2019
On Mon, 2019-06-03 at 11:25 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> On 5/30/2019 2:00 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Wed, 2019-05-29 at 15:30 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> >> Currently, ima_appraise_measurement() ignores the EVM status when
> >> evm_verifyxattr() returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. If a file has a valid
> >> security.ima xattr with type IMA_XATTR_DIGEST or IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG,
> >> ima_appraise_measurement() returns INTEGRITY_PASS regardless of the EVM
> >> status. The problem is that the EVM status is overwritten with the
> >>> appraisal status
> > Roberto, your framing of this problem is harsh and misleading. IMA
> > and EVM are intentionally independent of each other and can be
> > configured independently of each other. The intersection of the two
> > is the call to evm_verifyxattr(). INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN is returned for a
> > number of reasons - when EVM is not configured, the EVM hmac key has
> > not yet been loaded, the protected security attribute is unknown, or
> > the file is not in policy.
> > This patch does not differentiate between any of the above cases,
> > requiring mutable files to always be protected by EVM, when specified
> > as an "ima_appraise=" option on the boot command line.
> > IMA could be extended to require EVM on a per IMA policy rule basis.
> > Instead of framing allowing IMA file hashes without EVM as a bug that
> > has existed from the very beginning, now that IMA/EVM have matured and
> > is being used, you could frame it as extending IMA or hardening.
> I'm seeing it from the perspective of an administrator that manages an
> already hardened system, and expects that the system only grants access
> to files with a valid signature/HMAC. That system would not enforce this
> behavior if EVM keys are removed and the digest in security.ima is set
> to the actual file digest.
> Framing it as a bug rather than an extension would in my opinion help to
> convince people about the necessity to switch to the safe mode, if their
> system is already hardened.
I don't disagree with you that people should be using EVM to protect
IMA hashes. If you claim this is a bug in the design from the very
beginning, then there needs some explanation as to why it was
upstreamed as it was. My review of this patch provided that
> >> This patch mitigates the issue by selecting signature verification as the
> >> only method allowed for appraisal when EVM is not initialized. Since the
> >> new behavior might break user space, it must be turned on by adding the
> >> '-evm' suffix to the value of the ima_appraise= kernel option.
> >> Fixes: 2fe5d6def1672 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension")
> >> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
> >> Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
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