[PATCH 08/10] net: use new capable_any functionality

Kuniyuki Iwashima kuniyu at amazon.com
Fri Mar 15 23:11:42 UTC 2024


From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones at googlemail.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 12:37:29 +0100
> Use the new added capable_any function in appropriate cases, where a
> task is required to have any of two capabilities.
> 
> Add sock_ns_capable_any() wrapper similar to existing sock_ns_capable()
> one.
> 
> Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN last.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones at googlemail.com>
> Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal at bootlin.com> (ieee802154 portion)
> ---
> v4:
>   - introduce sockopt_ns_capable_any()
> v3:
>   - rename to capable_any()
>   - make use of ns_capable_any
> ---
>  include/net/sock.h       |  1 +
>  net/caif/caif_socket.c   |  2 +-
>  net/core/sock.c          | 15 +++++++++------
>  net/ieee802154/socket.c  |  6 ++----
>  net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c   |  5 +++--
>  net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c |  3 +--
>  net/unix/af_unix.c       |  2 +-
>  7 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
> index b5e00702acc1..2e64a80c8fca 100644
> --- a/include/net/sock.h
> +++ b/include/net/sock.h
> @@ -1736,6 +1736,7 @@ static inline void unlock_sock_fast(struct sock *sk, bool slow)
>  void sockopt_lock_sock(struct sock *sk);
>  void sockopt_release_sock(struct sock *sk);
>  bool sockopt_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
> +bool sockopt_ns_capable_any(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap1, int cap2);
>  bool sockopt_capable(int cap);
>  
>  /* Used by processes to "lock" a socket state, so that
> diff --git a/net/caif/caif_socket.c b/net/caif/caif_socket.c
> index 039dfbd367c9..2d811037e378 100644
> --- a/net/caif/caif_socket.c
> +++ b/net/caif/caif_socket.c
> @@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ static int caif_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
>  		.usersize = sizeof_field(struct caifsock, conn_req.param)
>  	};
>  
> -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> +	if (!capable_any(CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  	/*
>  	 * The sock->type specifies the socket type to use.
> diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
> index 43bf3818c19e..fa9edcc3e23d 100644
> --- a/net/core/sock.c
> +++ b/net/core/sock.c
> @@ -1077,6 +1077,12 @@ bool sockopt_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(sockopt_ns_capable);
>  
> +bool sockopt_ns_capable_any(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap1, int cap2)
> +{
> +	return has_current_bpf_ctx() || ns_capable_any(ns, cap1, cap2);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sockopt_ns_capable_any);
> +
>  bool sockopt_capable(int cap)
>  {
>  	return has_current_bpf_ctx() || capable(cap);
> @@ -1118,8 +1124,7 @@ int sk_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
>  	switch (optname) {
>  	case SO_PRIORITY:
>  		if ((val >= 0 && val <= 6) ||
> -		    sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) ||
> -		    sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
> +		    sockopt_ns_capable_any(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
>  			sock_set_priority(sk, val);
>  			return 0;
>  		}
> @@ -1422,8 +1427,7 @@ int sk_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
>  		break;
>  
>  	case SO_MARK:
> -		if (!sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) &&
> -		    !sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
> +		if (!sockopt_ns_capable_any(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
>  			ret = -EPERM;
>  			break;
>  		}
> @@ -2813,8 +2817,7 @@ int __sock_cmsg_send(struct sock *sk, struct cmsghdr *cmsg,
>  
>  	switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {
>  	case SO_MARK:
> -		if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) &&
> -		    !ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> +		if (!ns_capable_any(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
>  			return -EPERM;
>  		if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(u32)))
>  			return -EINVAL;
> diff --git a/net/ieee802154/socket.c b/net/ieee802154/socket.c
> index 990a83455dcf..42b3b12eb493 100644
> --- a/net/ieee802154/socket.c
> +++ b/net/ieee802154/socket.c
> @@ -902,8 +902,7 @@ static int dgram_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
>  		ro->want_lqi = !!val;
>  		break;
>  	case WPAN_SECURITY:
> -		if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) &&
> -		    !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
> +		if (!ns_capable_any(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_NET_RAW)) {

IIUC, should CAP_NET_RAW be tested first ?

Then, perhaps you should remove the Reviewed-by tag.


>  			err = -EPERM;
>  			break;
>  		}
> @@ -926,8 +925,7 @@ static int dgram_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
>  		}
>  		break;
>  	case WPAN_SECURITY_LEVEL:
> -		if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) &&
> -		    !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
> +		if (!ns_capable_any(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_NET_RAW)) {

Same here.

Thanks!


>  			err = -EPERM;
>  			break;
>  		}
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index cf377377b52d..5a1e5ee20ddd 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -1008,8 +1008,9 @@ int do_ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
>  		inet_assign_bit(MC_ALL, sk, val);
>  		return 0;
>  	case IP_TRANSPARENT:
> -		if (!!val && !sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) &&
> -		    !sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> +		if (!!val &&
> +		    !sockopt_ns_capable_any(sock_net(sk)->user_ns,
> +					    CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
>  			return -EPERM;
>  		if (optlen < 1)
>  			return -EINVAL;
> diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
> index d4c28ec1bc51..e46b11b5d3dd 100644
> --- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
> @@ -773,8 +773,7 @@ int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
>  		break;
>  
>  	case IPV6_TRANSPARENT:
> -		if (valbool && !sockopt_ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) &&
> -		    !sockopt_ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
> +		if (valbool && !sockopt_ns_capable_any(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
>  			retv = -EPERM;
>  			break;
>  		}
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index 5b41e2321209..acc36b2d25d7 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -1783,7 +1783,7 @@ static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)
>  	struct user_struct *user = current_user();
>  
>  	if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(user->unix_inflight) > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE)))
> -		return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> +		return !capable_any(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
>  	return false;
>  }
>  
> -- 
> 2.43.0



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