[PATCH 08/10] net: use new capable_any functionality
Christian Göttsche
cgzones at googlemail.com
Fri Mar 15 11:37:29 UTC 2024
Use the new added capable_any function in appropriate cases, where a
task is required to have any of two capabilities.
Add sock_ns_capable_any() wrapper similar to existing sock_ns_capable()
one.
Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN last.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones at googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal at bootlin.com> (ieee802154 portion)
---
v4:
- introduce sockopt_ns_capable_any()
v3:
- rename to capable_any()
- make use of ns_capable_any
---
include/net/sock.h | 1 +
net/caif/caif_socket.c | 2 +-
net/core/sock.c | 15 +++++++++------
net/ieee802154/socket.c | 6 ++----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 5 +++--
net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 3 +--
net/unix/af_unix.c | 2 +-
7 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
index b5e00702acc1..2e64a80c8fca 100644
--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -1736,6 +1736,7 @@ static inline void unlock_sock_fast(struct sock *sk, bool slow)
void sockopt_lock_sock(struct sock *sk);
void sockopt_release_sock(struct sock *sk);
bool sockopt_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+bool sockopt_ns_capable_any(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap1, int cap2);
bool sockopt_capable(int cap);
/* Used by processes to "lock" a socket state, so that
diff --git a/net/caif/caif_socket.c b/net/caif/caif_socket.c
index 039dfbd367c9..2d811037e378 100644
--- a/net/caif/caif_socket.c
+++ b/net/caif/caif_socket.c
@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ static int caif_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
.usersize = sizeof_field(struct caifsock, conn_req.param)
};
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable_any(CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/*
* The sock->type specifies the socket type to use.
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 43bf3818c19e..fa9edcc3e23d 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -1077,6 +1077,12 @@ bool sockopt_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(sockopt_ns_capable);
+bool sockopt_ns_capable_any(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap1, int cap2)
+{
+ return has_current_bpf_ctx() || ns_capable_any(ns, cap1, cap2);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sockopt_ns_capable_any);
+
bool sockopt_capable(int cap)
{
return has_current_bpf_ctx() || capable(cap);
@@ -1118,8 +1124,7 @@ int sk_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
switch (optname) {
case SO_PRIORITY:
if ((val >= 0 && val <= 6) ||
- sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) ||
- sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ sockopt_ns_capable_any(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
sock_set_priority(sk, val);
return 0;
}
@@ -1422,8 +1427,7 @@ int sk_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
break;
case SO_MARK:
- if (!sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) &&
- !sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!sockopt_ns_capable_any(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
ret = -EPERM;
break;
}
@@ -2813,8 +2817,7 @@ int __sock_cmsg_send(struct sock *sk, struct cmsghdr *cmsg,
switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {
case SO_MARK:
- if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) &&
- !ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable_any(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(u32)))
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/net/ieee802154/socket.c b/net/ieee802154/socket.c
index 990a83455dcf..42b3b12eb493 100644
--- a/net/ieee802154/socket.c
+++ b/net/ieee802154/socket.c
@@ -902,8 +902,7 @@ static int dgram_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
ro->want_lqi = !!val;
break;
case WPAN_SECURITY:
- if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) &&
- !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
+ if (!ns_capable_any(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
err = -EPERM;
break;
}
@@ -926,8 +925,7 @@ static int dgram_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
}
break;
case WPAN_SECURITY_LEVEL:
- if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) &&
- !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
+ if (!ns_capable_any(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
err = -EPERM;
break;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index cf377377b52d..5a1e5ee20ddd 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -1008,8 +1008,9 @@ int do_ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
inet_assign_bit(MC_ALL, sk, val);
return 0;
case IP_TRANSPARENT:
- if (!!val && !sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) &&
- !sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!!val &&
+ !sockopt_ns_capable_any(sock_net(sk)->user_ns,
+ CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (optlen < 1)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
index d4c28ec1bc51..e46b11b5d3dd 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
@@ -773,8 +773,7 @@ int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
break;
case IPV6_TRANSPARENT:
- if (valbool && !sockopt_ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) &&
- !sockopt_ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (valbool && !sockopt_ns_capable_any(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
retv = -EPERM;
break;
}
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 5b41e2321209..acc36b2d25d7 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1783,7 +1783,7 @@ static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)
struct user_struct *user = current_user();
if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(user->unix_inflight) > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE)))
- return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ return !capable_any(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
return false;
}
--
2.43.0
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